Representation: Difference between revisions

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A {{tag|representation}} is a statement made by one party which has the effect of inducing another into entering a {{tag|contract}}. By its nature, a {{tag|representation}} is therefore not a term of the contract itself — it is an {{tag|egg}} to the contract's chicken — although attorneys will gleefully add representations into the contract afterward, for good measure, and will co-brand them as [[warranty|warranties]] — being binding contractual terms — for good measure.
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Non-contractual representations may provide relief: a false representation may entitle the party induced into the contract in reliance on it to claim under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and [[rescind]] the {{tag|contract}} altogether, or claim damages for [[negligent misstatement]] in {{tag|tort}}.


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Revision as of 15:54, 7 September 2016

A representation is a statement of present or historical fact made by one person to another outside the bounds of a contract that induces that other person to enter a contract. By its nature, a representation is therefore not a term of the contract itself — it cannot be; it was made before the contract came about; it is an egg to the contract’s chicken — although that won’t stop Legal riddling your contract with representations and, usually, co-branding them as warranties for good measure. A false representation may entitle an innocent to claim under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and rescind its contract, or claim damages for negligent misstatement in tort.

Being founded on the tortious action on negligent misstatement, one of the ingredients of an actionable misrepresentation is that the representer somehow fell short of her duty of care: the simple fact that the representation was false might not be not enough if she can’t cannot reasonably have known it was false. This feels a more significant distinction than it is: tort governs situations where the parties, being randoms, have not had the opportunity to document their duties to one another, so the law steps in to help. Where they have, through the medium of contract, the law says, “you don’t need my clever appeals to the judgment of prudent people on public transport in south London to work out how you must treat each other, because you have worked it out for yourselves.”

Where the parties have written down their respective duties, but they still appeal to a tortious standard — which is what they are doing by writing “representations” into a contract — they are admitting to confusion between the laws of tort and contract. Here the fellow on the Clapham omnibus would surely say that the abstract duty of care maps exactly on to what the parties have voluntarily agreed. Why would it be any different? To be “negligent” under a contract is surely to breach it; no more and no less.[1]

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See also

  1. This is why the idea of “gross negligence” is all the more abstruse.