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Examples of “[[risk compensation]]” where the introductions of safety measures — which we may characterise as “enhancements to the certainty of safety” — lead to ''increased'' risk-taking are legion.<ref>Anti-lock breaks, seatbelts, speed limits, cycle helmets, ski helmets, skydiving safety equipment: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation.</ref> Where town planners have removed all traffic controls, signage and control, a dramatic reduction in speed and accidents has followed.<ref>An [https://web.archive.org/web/20150924012452/http://www.fietsberaad.nl/library/repository/bestanden/Evaluation%20Laweiplein.pdf evaluation] of the ''Laweiplein'' scheme in Drachten, Netherlands, which replaced a set of traffic lights with an open square with a roundabout and pedestrian crossings, found that traffic now flows more freely at a constant rate and with reduced congestion, shorter delays and improved capacity.</ref> | Examples of “[[risk compensation]]” where the introductions of safety measures — which we may characterise as “enhancements to the certainty of safety” — lead to ''increased'' risk-taking are legion.<ref>Anti-lock breaks, seatbelts, speed limits, cycle helmets, ski helmets, skydiving safety equipment: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation.</ref> Where town planners have removed all traffic controls, signage and control, a dramatic reduction in speed and accidents has followed.<ref>An [https://web.archive.org/web/20150924012452/http://www.fietsberaad.nl/library/repository/bestanden/Evaluation%20Laweiplein.pdf evaluation] of the ''Laweiplein'' scheme in Drachten, Netherlands, which replaced a set of traffic lights with an open square with a roundabout and pedestrian crossings, found that traffic now flows more freely at a constant rate and with reduced congestion, shorter delays and improved capacity.</ref> | ||
Doubt counsels caution. It recommends contingency. It declares knowledge provisional. It is open-minded, non-judgmental, it is the preparedness to admit error. In polarised times, it is doubt, not certainty, that is lacking. It is not the wilful suspicion of truth, but dogmatic conviction in it, that fractures the peace. | |||
To aspire to certainty is wish for finality; completeness; the limits of our commitment to each other, and the arbitrary end of affairs we would be better served by continuing. If a relationship is productive now why end it? If a relationship is not, why prolong it? If it is not satisfactory, why not change it?<ref>For an excellent argument along these lines see {{Author|David Graeber}}, {{br|Debt: The First 5,000 Years}}</ref> | |||
==={{t|Epistemology}} of [[certainty]]=== | ==={{t|Epistemology}} of [[certainty]]=== | ||
May we take [[Descartes]] as read? | May we take [[Descartes]] as read? The philosophy gets more interesting a little later on. | ||
If we take it that [[truth]] is a property of a sentence, not of the world<ref>Richard Rorty: {{br|Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity}}.</ref> and a sentence is an artefact of a language, then language would have to be a closed logical system, to which both (or all) parties to that truth were fully conversant. Not only, typically, are they not — languages are quite loose things and hard to draw boundaries — but languages are ''not closed logical systems''. This we owe to [[Goedel]]. We can, with our word games, minimise indeterminacy ([[legal language]] is a good example of where we do this, by convention eliminating [[metaphor]], avoiding slang and informal construction and where, even after that, there is potential ambiguity, minimising it with [[definitions]], but even there, the best we can hope for is that our static document can describe the order, state and function of a simple, or complex system. It cannot describe a complex system (essentially one where individual agents with conflicting interests and language structures interact. But commerce occurs in exactly that type of environment. | If we take it that [[truth]] is a property of a sentence, not of the world<ref>Richard Rorty: {{br|Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity}}.</ref> and a sentence is an artefact of a language, then language would have to be a closed logical system, to which both (or all) parties to that truth were fully conversant. Not only, typically, are they not — languages are quite loose things and hard to draw boundaries — but languages are ''not closed logical systems''. This we owe to [[Goedel]]. We can, with our word games, minimise indeterminacy ([[legal language]] is a good example of where we do this, by convention eliminating [[metaphor]], avoiding slang and informal construction and where, even after that, there is potential ambiguity, minimising it with [[definitions]], but even there, the best we can hope for is that our static document can describe the order, state and function of a simple, or complex system. It cannot describe a complex system (essentially one where individual agents with conflicting interests and language structures interact. But commerce occurs in exactly that type of environment. | ||