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Well, not ''quite'' — “it is true that there is no truth” refutes itself, after all — but rather that the idea of “[[objective truth]]” is ''incoherent''. There is no [[objective truth]], ''because the idea of “objective truth” doesn’t make sense''. Truths are ''propositions'' about ''things''. Propositions put things into a relationship with each other: “the cat sat on the mat”. “Propositions” are a property of language: they only exist within the framework of a language. “Things” are not — things (we preesume — have continutiy whether we see them or not, and whether we talk about them or not. Things are properties of the universe. | Well, not ''quite'' — “it is true that there is no truth” refutes itself, after all — but rather that the idea of “[[objective truth]]” is ''incoherent''. There is no [[objective truth]], ''because the idea of “objective truth” doesn’t make sense''. Truths are ''propositions'' about ''things''. Propositions put things into a relationship with each other: “the cat sat on the mat”. “Propositions” are a property of language: they only exist within the framework of a language. “Things” are not — things (we preesume — have continutiy whether we see them or not, and whether we talk about them or not. Things are properties of the universe. | ||
Thus, things ''aren’t'' true or false: ''only propositions about things are''. Propositions are prisoners of the language they are articulated in. | Thus, things ''aren’t'' true or false: ''only propositions about things are''. Propositions are prisoners of the language they are articulated in. Beyond it, they are only marks on a page. | ||
“گربه روی تشک نشست” | “گربه روی تشک نشست” | ||
See? | See?<ref>Translated from Persian into English: “the cat sat on the mat.”</ref> | ||
Truths are propositions. Truths, therefore are | Truths are propositions. Truths, therefore are a function of the language they are articulated in. A truth cannot “transcend” its language. It doesn’t make sense. This is not even to take the point that, thanks to the [[Goedel|indeterminacy of closed logical sets]], no statement in a natural language has a unique, exclusive meaning. There is | ||
This is its debt to [[post-modernism]], and it is a proposition that contemporary rationalists find hard to accept, whether hailing from the right — see {{author|Douglas Murray}}’s {{br|The Madness of Crowds}} for an articulate example — or the left — see {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}’s patient and detailed examination in {{br|Cynical Theories}}. | This is its debt to [[post-modernism]], and it is a proposition that contemporary rationalists find hard to accept, whether hailing from the right — see {{author|Douglas Murray}}’s {{br|The Madness of Crowds}} for an articulate example — or the left — see {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}’s patient and detailed examination in {{br|Cynical Theories}}. |