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{{box|“delay in pursuing an equitable claim or remedy may result in the relief or remedy being lost.”}} | {{box|“delay in pursuing an equitable claim or remedy may result in the relief or remedy being lost.”}} | ||
You don’t hear about laches in English common law very often. | You don’t hear about laches in English common law very often. I’d ''never'' heard of it in 28 years’ immersion in the law before this glorious day in July in the year of our lord 2016. | ||
But | But it’s been around since at least 1873, wherein it was articulated in {{casenote|Lindsay Petroleum Company|Hurd}} like this: | ||
{{quote| | {{quote| | ||
“Now the doctrine of [[laches]] in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a [[equitable remedy|remedy]], either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a [[waiver]] of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”}} | “Now the doctrine of [[laches]] in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a [[equitable remedy|remedy]], either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a [[waiver]] of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”}} | ||
but | but let’s be clear: | ||
*It is an equitable doctrine, and denies only [[equitable remedy|equitable remedies]]. you can’t invoke it to prevent a claim in damages for breach of contract. | *It is an equitable doctrine, and denies only [[equitable remedy|equitable remedies]]. you can’t invoke it to prevent a claim in damages for breach of contract. | ||
*It doesn’t override a specific [[statute of limitations]] (for much the same reason). | *It doesn’t override a specific [[statute of limitations]] (for much the same reason). | ||