Mercury Tax Group Limited v HMRC: Difference between revisions

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The court, alas for the tax dodgers, was having none of it.
The court, alas for the tax dodgers, was having none of it.
{{quote|“... I believe that the common understanding is that the document to be signed exists as a discrete physical entity (whether in a single version or in a series of [[counterparts]]) at the moment of signing. The significance of this is not entirely talismanic (though it would not affect my view even if it were): the requirement that a party sign an actual existing authoritative version of the contractual document gives some, albeit not total, protection against fraud or mistake.”}}
If that were not enough, the document was intended to be a [[deed]], meaning section 1(3) of the [[Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989]] came into play, which provides:
{{quote|1(3) An instrument is validly executed as a [[deed]] by an individual if, and only if –
:(a) it is signed —
::(i) by {{sex|him}} in the presence of a witness who attests the signature; or
::(ii) at {{sex|his}} direction and in {{sex|his}} presence and the presence of two witnesses who each attest the signature; and
:(b) it is [[delivered]] as a [[deed]] by {{sex|him}} or a person authorised to do so on {{sex|his}} behalf.}}
The court found that this language necessarily involves that the signature and attestation must form part of the same physical document constituting the deed. Additionally, the fact that the parties ''intended'' them to be deeds, rather than that they were ''required by law to be'' deeds (in order to have legal effect) was what mattered: “the fact remains that the parties intended them to be deeds and their validity must be judged on that basis”.


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