Template:Failure to pay procedure: Difference between revisions

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One must now ascertain termination values for the {{{{{1}}}|Terminated Transaction}}s as of the {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} per the methodology set out in Section {{{{{1}}}|6(e)(i)}}.  
One must now ascertain termination values for the {{{{{1}}}|Terminated Transaction}}s as of the {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} per the methodology set out in Section {{{{{1}}}|6(e)(i)}}.  


Now armed with our crystalised {{{{{1}}}|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} and with an {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} to target, we go directly to Section {{{{{1}}}|6(e)}}, noting as we fly over it, that Section {{{{{1}}}|6(c)}} reminds us [[for the avoidance of doubt]] that even if the {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} which triggers the {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} evaporates in the meantime — these things happen, okay? — yon {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}}’s goose is still irretrievably cooked.<ref>If [[Credit department|Credit]] suddenly gets executioner’s remorse and wants to let the Defaulting Party off), the Non-defaulting Party will have to expressly terminate the close-out process, preferably by written notice. There’s an argument — though it is hard to picture the time or place on God’s green earth where a {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} would make it — that cancelling an in-flight close out is no longer exclusively in the Defaulting Party’s gift, and requires the NDP’s consent. It would be an odd, self-harming kind of Defaulting Party that would run ''that'' argument unless the market was properly gyrating.</ref>
Now armed with our crystalised {{{{{1}}}|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} and with an {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} to target, we go directly to Section {{{{{1}}}|6(e)}}, noting as we fly over it, that Section {{{{{1}}}|6(c)}} reminds us [[for the avoidance of doubt]] that even if the {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} which triggers the {{{{{1}}}|Early Termination Date}} evaporates in the meantime — these things happen, okay? — yon {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}}’s goose is still irretrievably cooked.<ref>If [[Credit department|Credit]] suddenly gets executioner’s remorse and wants to let the Defaulting Party off), the Non-defaulting Party will have to expressly terminate the close-out process, preferably by written notice. There’s an argument — though it is hard to picture the time or place on God’s green earth where a Defaulting Party would make it — that cancelling an in-flight close out is no longer exclusively in the Defaulting Party’s gift, and requires the NDP’s consent. It would be an odd, self-harming kind of Defaulting Party that would run ''that'' argument unless the market was properly gyrating.</ref>


The trading and risk people need to come up with {{{{{1}}}|Close-out Amount}}s for all outstanding {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s. Now note, even though you have designated an Early Termination Date not more than 20 days from your Section {{{{{1}}}|6(a)}} notice, it may well take you a lot longer to close out your portfolio than that, and as long as you are acting in a commercially reasonable way, you can take longer. '''The 20 days notice period is a red herring'''. There is a longer essay about the meaningless of that 20 day time limit [[By not more than 20 days’ notice|here]].
The trading and risk people need to come up with {{{{{1}}}|Close-out Amount}}s for all outstanding {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s. Now note, even though you have designated an Early Termination Date not more than 20 days from your Section {{{{{1}}}|6(a)}} notice, it may well take you a lot longer to close out your portfolio than that, and as long as you are acting in a commercially reasonable way, you can take longer. '''The 20 days notice period is a red herring'''. There is a longer essay about the meaningless of that 20 day time limit [[By not more than 20 days’ notice|here]].

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