83,521
edits
Template:M summ 2016 NY VM CSA Eligible Collateral (VM): Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Template:M summ 2016 NY VM CSA Eligible Collateral (VM) (view source)
Revision as of 11:50, 27 August 2023
, 27 August 2023no edit summary
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) (Created page with "The kinds of collateral that you may exchange under a {{nyvmcsa}}. It looks like you can choose what you like, right, but CFTC rules in practice restrict it to cash in certain currencies. This is broadly analogous to what happens in Europe under EMIR and the other major regulatory regimes imposing margin requirements. You may wonder why regulatory VM is cash and regulatory IM is not, and premium subscribers can find out. We also have an impassioned JC When var...") |
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
The kinds of collateral that you may exchange under a {{nyvmcsa}}. It looks like you can choose what you like, right, but CFTC rules in practice restrict it to cash in certain currencies. This is broadly analogous to what happens in Europe under [[EMIR]] and the other major regulatory regimes imposing margin requirements. You may wonder why regulatory VM is cash and regulatory IM is not, and premium subscribers can find out. | [[Eligible Collateral (VM) - NY VM CSA Provision|The]] kinds of collateral that you may exchange under a {{nyvmcsa}}. It looks like you can choose what you like, right, but CFTC rules in practice restrict it to cash in certain currencies. This is broadly analogous to what happens in Europe under [[EMIR]] and the other major regulatory regimes imposing margin requirements. You may wonder why regulatory VM is cash and regulatory IM is not, and premium subscribers can find out. | ||
We also have an impassioned [[JC]] [[When variation margin attacks|essay]] about why bilateral variation margin is potentially a ''destabilising'' effect on financial systems, which was admirably demonstrated during the [[Archegos]] fiasco. But no-one listens to the JC. | We also have an impassioned [[JC]] [[When variation margin attacks|essay]] about why bilateral variation margin is potentially a ''destabilising'' effect on financial systems, which was admirably demonstrated during the [[Archegos]] fiasco. But no-one listens to the JC. | ||