Employment derivatives: Difference between revisions

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The market needed an observable, objective measure of “prevailing startup insanity”, which Barkley denoted “''π”''. He had just the means to achieve it. Under the auspices of the British Human Capital Managers’ Association (BHCMA), he arranged for a committee of fashionable startups to meet each afternoon in a WeWork in Shoreditch and over kombucha martinis to state publicly, in front of a live panel of [[venture capitalist]]<nowiki/>s, how much they would be prepared to pay an underperforming settlements and reconciliations clerk to join them and drive customer engagement. They expressed this as a premium of discount to ''π''', being the equivalent value for the preceding day.
The market needed an observable, objective measure of “prevailing startup insanity”, which Barkley denoted “''π”''. He had just the means to achieve it. Under the auspices of the British Human Capital Managers’ Association (BHCMA), he arranged for a committee of fashionable startups to meet each afternoon in a WeWork in Shoreditch and over kombucha martinis to state publicly, in front of a live panel of [[venture capitalist]]<nowiki/>s, how much they would be prepared to pay an underperforming settlements and reconciliations clerk to join them and drive customer engagement. They expressed this as a premium of discount to ''π''', being the equivalent value for the preceding day.


The BHCMA would trim the top and bottom estimates, average the remainder and compile and publish the trimmed arithmetic mean rate as the [[London Inter-Employer Basic Offered Rate]] ([[LIEBOR|PIEBOR]]). PIEBOR quickly became the ''de facto''  measure of  ''π'' and was soon factored into the “floating” leg of [[employment rate swap]]<nowiki/>s as standard.
The BHCMA would trim the top and bottom estimates, average the remainder and compile and publish the trimmed arithmetic mean rate as the [[London Inter-Employer Basic Offered Rate]] ([[LIEBOR|PIEBOR]]). PIEBOR quickly became the ''de facto''  measure of  ''π'' and was soon factored into the “floating” leg of [[employment rate swap]]s as standard.


==== Credibility spread ====
==== Credibility spread ====
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Meantime, the need for periodic [[Reduction in force|reductions in force]] was greatly reduced and could be handled quantitatively without reference to individual performance or value — as that was baked into the portfolio credibility rating. This led to the curious phenomenon of staff with the ''highest'' credibility ratings — ergo those who were, “pound for pound”, most expensive — being the first to go.  
Meantime, the need for periodic [[Reduction in force|reductions in force]] was greatly reduced and could be handled quantitatively without reference to individual performance or value — as that was baked into the portfolio credibility rating. This led to the curious phenomenon of staff with the ''highest'' credibility ratings — ergo those who were, “pound for pound”, most expensive — being the first to go.  
====Expansion====
====Expansion====
The banks could even sell employment derivatives directly to employees, saving the bother of having to hedge themselves. By the same token, employees could hedge away their intrinsic loyalty discount, and restrict their need to find new jobs to genuine changes in role or idiosyncratic hatred of their bosses. But there was no need to simply “benchmark” themselves periodically any more.
By this financial engineering Barkley had unwittingly created a tradable instrument out of an abstract benchmark. Due to the offsetting nature of ERS transactions one needed to be neither long nor short actual staff but could trade directionally on abstract [[π]] without having a job, or any workers, at all. These “synthetic” instruments were valuable for sectors affected by the vagaries of the labour market even where not themselves directly exposed to it. Recruitment consultants, employment lawyers, HR Consultants — that kind of thing.
 
Individual workers began to buy π-linked [[contracts for difference]] as a way of laying off their own intrinsic [[loyalty discount]], a sort of negative carry that comes from unreflective devotion to a single monolithic corporation. This restricted the need to quit to a narrow run of unmanageable idiosyncrasies such as cultural fit, business relocation and visceral hatred of the boss.
 
Before long more exotic ERS payoffs emerged. Capital protected [[Reduction in force|RIF puts]], employment collars, diversity forwards and  synthetic collateralised gender pay gap swaps. All these risks, and more, could be managed in the hypothetical with out adjusting the physical staff roster at all.
 
Banks even began selling employment derivatives directly to their employees, saving the bother of having to hedge themselves.  
 
So began the sad chronicle of employment rate swap mis-selling. In this dark episode, banks would separate the employee’s fixed rate, and pay that under a physical employment contract, then separately hedge out their π risk with a linked derivative. Before the emergence of ERS, the π risk was intrinsic to the employment contract and could not be abstracted and traded separately.  


Barkley also saw the opportunity to trade the instrument as an abstract benchmark, for which one did not need exposure to the employment market at all.  This was made possible by the offsetting nature of ERS transactions. You needed to be neither long nor short actual staff but could trade directionally on abstract [[π]].
The scandal blew up when it emerged HR departments were being offered incentives to place employee counterparties on performance management, arranging with other firms to bid them away or just peremptorily layingthe employee off, leaving her holding a twenty-five year out of the money employment rate swap and badly exposed should crypto go tits up.


This led to a proliferation of exotic ERS products, many with no practical utility. So began the sad chronicle of employment rate swap mis-selling. In this dark episode, banks would separately hedge out their employee’s π risk, to the employee herself<ref>Self-referencing employment derivatives are now not permitted in many jurisdictions, and attract penalty risk weighing in the UK.</ref>and then peremptorily lay the employee off, leaving her holding a twenty-five year out of the money employment rate swap and badly exposed should crypto go tits up.
Such “self-referencing employment derivatives” are now not permitted in many jurisdictions, and attract penalty risk weighing in the UK.  


{{Sa}}
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