Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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Thus, “things” ''aren’t'' true or false: only “''propositions'' about things” are.  
Thus, “things” ''aren’t'' true or false: only “''propositions'' about things” are.  
====Analytic and synthetic and propositions====
====Analytic and synthetic and propositions====
{{Drop|B|ear with me}} for a brief technical interlude. This won’t take long. There are two kinds of propositions: [[analytic proposition|analytic]] ones, and [[Synthetic proposition|synthetic]] ones. Analytic propositions are logically true as a function of the language they are expressed in. Synthetic propositions tell us about the world beyond the language. Think of analytical propositions as ''mathematical'' statements, and synthetic propositions as ''scientific'' statements.
{{Drop|B|ear with me}} for a brief technical interlude:it won’t take long. There are two kinds of propositions: [[analytic proposition|analytic]] and [[Synthetic proposition|synthetic]] ones. “Analytic” propositions are true by definition. Synthetic propositions tell us about the world beyond the language they are expressed in. Analytical propositions are ''mathematical'' statements; synthetic propositions as ''scientific'' statements.


{{quote|
{{quote|
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This is ''analytically'' “true” because, in the language of Euclidean geometry, a polygon that does not meet those criteria ''is not a square''.  
This is ''analytically'' “true” because, in the language of Euclidean geometry, a polygon that does not meet those criteria ''is not a square''.  


This is an absolute truth, but it is not “objective”. It does not transcend the logical axioms of the language in which it is expressed.
{{quote|
The cat is sitting on the dog’s mat.}}


The “truth” of a synthetic proposition, if it has one, derives from how the proposition relates to the world beyond the logical axioms of the language in which it is expressed.  
The “truth” of this proposition, if it has one, depends upon the world beyond the logical axioms of the language in which it is expressed. If the cat is not sitting on the mat, or it is not the dog’s mat, the proposition is false.  


It is, of course, trivially true that mathematical truths are true. When we talk about “objective truths”, we are talking about synthetic — ''scientific'' —propositions only.
====Objective truths====
{{quote|
{{quote|
The cat is sitting on the dog’s mat.}}
Show me a cultural relativist at thirty thousand feet and I’ll show you a hypocrite. Airplanes are built according to scientific principles and they work. They stay aloft and they get you to a chosen destination. Airplanes built to tribal or mythological specifications such as the dummy planes of the Cargo cults in jungle clearings or the bees-waxed wings of Icarus don’t.
:—[[Richard Dawkins]], ''River Out of Eden'' (1995)}}
{{drop|W|hen commentators like}} Richard Dawkins exasperate about the post-truth world, the “clinchers” they come up with tend to be these kinds of basic propositions concerning the physics of inert objects.
 
We will note, but leave aside for now, that cultural relativists do not tend to disagree about the behaviour of inert objects. These are not the sorts of truths they dispute, so even if Dawkins could make out his claim — he can’t — it would hardly win the argument. 


It is, of course, trivially true that mathematical truths are true. When we talk about there being objective truth, we mean there are synthetic — ''scientific'' —propositions
But he’s raised this example, so let’s address it.  


A truth cannot “transcend” the language it is expressed in, because that language gives the proposition meaning. It doesn’t make sense for the truth to transcend it's medium.<ref>This is not even to take the point that, thanks to the [[Goedel|indeterminacy of closed logical sets]], no statement in a natural language can possibly have a unique, exclusive meaning.</ref> There is the further difficulty that “language” itself is an indeterminate, incomplete, unbounded thing; no two individuals share exactly the same vocabulary, let alone the same cultural experiences to map to that vocabulary, let alone the same metaphorical schemes. It is what {{author|James P. Carse}} would describe as “dramatic” and not “theatrical”.<ref>In his {{br|Finite and Infinite Games}}.</ref> This makes the business of acquiring and communicating in a language — where meaning does not reside in the textual marks, but in the indeterminate cultural milieu in which the communication occurred — all the more mysterious. That we call it “communication”; that we infer from that a lossless transmission of information from one mind, is a deep well of mortal frustration.  
The factual proposition could be one of three: airplanes work; airplanes are built according to scientific principles, or the scientific principles by which airplanes are built describe the true operation of the universe.
====“Transcendent truth”====
{{drop|A| truth cannot}} “transcend” the language it is expressed in, because that language gives the proposition meaning. It doesn’t make sense for the truth to transcend it's medium.<ref>This is not even to take the point that, thanks to the [[Goedel|indeterminacy of closed logical sets]], no statement in a natural language can possibly have a unique, exclusive meaning.</ref> There is the further difficulty that “language” itself is an indeterminate, incomplete, unbounded thing; no two individuals share exactly the same vocabulary, let alone the same cultural experiences to map to that vocabulary, let alone the same metaphorical schemes. It is what {{author|James P. Carse}} would describe as “dramatic” and not “theatrical”.<ref>In his {{br|Finite and Infinite Games}}.</ref> This makes the business of acquiring and communicating in a language — where meaning does not reside in the textual marks, but in the indeterminate cultural milieu in which the communication occurred — all the more mysterious. That we call it “communication”; that we infer from that a lossless transmission of information from one mind, is a deep well of mortal frustration.  


This is its debt to [[post-modernism]], and it is a proposition that contemporary rationalists find hard to accept, whether hailing from the right — see {{author|Douglas Murray}}’s {{br|The Madness of Crowds}} for an articulate example — or the left — see {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}’s patient and detailed examination in {{br|Cynical Theories}}.
This is its debt to [[post-modernism]], and it is a proposition that contemporary rationalists find hard to accept, whether hailing from the right — see {{author|Douglas Murray}}’s {{br|The Madness of Crowds}} for an articulate example — or the left — see {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}’s patient and detailed examination in {{br|Cynical Theories}}.
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