Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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====Airborne relativists====
====Airborne relativists====
{{Drop|A|t this point}} two self-refuting mythological creatures are cast into the ring: “atheists in foxholes”, and “postmodernists on aeroplanes”. Neither , according to the other, exists.
{{Drop|A|t this point}} two self-refuting mythological creatures are cast into the ring: “atheists in foxholes”, and “postmodernists on aeroplanes”. Neither, according to the other, exists.


“Show me,” [[Richard Dawkins]] huffs, “a [[relativist]] on a plane and I'll show you a hypocrite at 30,000 feet”.  
“Show me,” [[Richard Dawkins]] huffs, “a [[relativist]] on a plane and I'll show you a hypocrite at 30,000 feet”.  


By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather to the contrary is all a ''posture''. Because ''aeroplanes''.
By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather to the contrary is all a ''posture''. Because ''aeroplanes''.


But Dawkins misreads ''consensus'' for ''truth'', and he mistakes ''observation'' for ''explanation''. The “truth” to which he appeals here is not “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — we imagine the finer points of that were not worked out when Richard Pearse took his first flight, so that specificity of knowledge is not needed, and in any case even now few airline passengers ''have'' that kind of understanding — but the simple statement that “planes go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  
But Dawkins misreads ''consensus'' for ''truth'', and he mistakes ''observation'' for ''explanation''. The “truth” to which he appeals here is not “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — the finer points of which were not worked out when Richard Pearse took his first flight, so that specificity of knowledge is not needed, and in any case even now few airline passengers ''have'' that kind of understanding — but the simple statement that “planes seem to go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  


One can have any number of reasons for believing that, including “St. Christopher watches over travellers”, scientists are clever and they figured it out or just, “the probability of planes falling randomly out of the sky has declined markedly since the seventies, and there is less than a one-in-a million chance I’ll die on a passenger flight.”
One can have any number of reasons for believing that, including, “St. Christopher watches over all travellers”, “scientists are clever and they figured it out”, “it’s magic!” or just, “the probability of planes falling randomly out of the sky has declined markedly since the Seventies, and there is now less than a one-in-a million chance I’ll die on a passenger flight, I care not why.”


In any case the belief we care about is that this ''particular'' plane won’t fall out of the sky, and — inductive fallacy again — no one actually knows.  
In any case the important belief here is, “this ''particular'' plane won’t fall out of the sky”, and — inductive fallacy again — no one actually knows whether that is true. It may, for reasons quite unrelated to aerodynamics. We are taking an awful lot of things, over and above aerodynamics, on trust. That the ground-crew remembered to put the petrol cap on. That there are no undiscovered stress fractures in the fuselage, no surface-to-air-missiles launched at the plane , the airline has not secretly changed the airline’s flight path without telling the pilot — and so on. Experience tells us none of these things are a certainty.


In fact a relativist does not needs faith in the accuracy of aerodynamics but only its ''regularity''. We do not board planes at 30,000 feet, but on the ground. An aeroplane would never get ''off'' the ground, and so would have no prospect of falling back onto it, unless some aerodynamic principle was at play. It does not matter what that aerodynamic principle is, as long as it keeps working until the flight is over.
The fact, if we have to talk about facts, is this: millions of people get aboard giant compressed tubes and catapult themselves across the planet each year because they have blind trust that everything will be okay if they do, and not because of their considered opinions of the plane’s aerodynamic design.


Our postmodernist might even hold a degree in advanced aeronautics, and might happen to think it provides an excellent model based on known data. She just holds that caveat that, you know, the conclusion is inductive, can't be proven, and is provisional. After all, the history of science is of astounding discoveries that reveal the universe does not work the way we thought it did. Given we still can’t reconcile the physics of atoms with that of galaxies, and neither provide a great explanation of what we experience when we get in planes, we can’t really blame the relativist.
In fact a relativist does not need faith in the accuracy of aerodynamics but only its ''regularity''. We do not board planes at 30,000 feet, but on the ground. An aeroplane that could not fly would not get ''off'' the ground, and so would have have  a hard time falling back onto it, unless some aerodynamic principle was at play. It does not matter what that aerodynamic principle is, as long as it keeps working until the flight is over.


All the relativist asks is that we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements of transcendent truth to pragmatic statements of provisional fitness. Functionally, stopping with “it works as far as we know” is not a grea~t concession. JC is not aware of any university that has yet closed its physics department on account of completion of its mission.
Our postmodernist might even be an aircraft engineer with a degree in advanced aeronautics, and might have good grounds to think it an excellent model based on known data. She just holds that opinion with a caveat: the conclusion is inductive, can't be proven, and is provisional. After all, the history of science is of astounding discoveries that reveal the universe does not work the way the cleverest scientists thought it did.
 
Given the brightest minds still can’t reconcile the physics of atoms with that of galaxies, and neither provides a great explanation of what we experience at a human scale when we get in planes, we can’t really blame the relativist for arching an eyebrow at Professor Dawkins.
 
So hand wavey appeals to planes, or desks, or throwing ourselves out the window, don’t advance the argument about ''truth''.
 
There is an irony here: materialist philosophers have grappled ineffectually at the question of consciousness, because it seems to defy scientific explanation: it gets in the way of the Platonic, materialist idea that there are forms, we just can’t directly apprehend them, but that science and rationalism are somehow allowing us covertly to converge, by increments, on the these ideal forms — the fundamental truth of the cosmos.
 
The general vibe is therefore to define consciousness away — to make it an illusion, a trick of the mind. Algorithms appear to open that door: we can replicate intelligence without consciousness then perhaps consciousness disappears in a puff of logic.
 
But preserving ''truth'' at the expense of ''consciousness'' is surely to throw out the baby and keep the bathwater. The relativist says, why not keep the idea of consciousness and give up on truth?
 
It isn’t like we ''need'' it, after all. All the relativist asks is that when we talk about knowledge we don’t overstate our case: that we downgrade unjustifiable statements about ''forms'' to pragmatic statements of ''fitness''. Functionally, stopping with “it works as far as we know” is not a grea~t concession. JC is not aware of any university that has yet closed its physics department on account of completion of its mission.
====Sociological quibbles====
====Sociological quibbles====
{{Drop|I|n any case}}, generalised observations about the typical behaviour of physical objects at the human scale of interaction are not the sorts of things postmodernists tend to disagree about. As Professor Dawkins observes, relativists ''do'' get on planes. Even if you could establish aerodynamics were true — as per the above, you can’t — it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.
{{Drop|I|n any case}}, generalised observations about the typical behaviour of physical objects at the human scale of interaction are not the sorts of things postmodernists tend to disagree about. As Professor Dawkins observes, relativists ''do'' get on planes. Even if you could establish aerodynamics were true — as per the above, you can’t — it would not establish anything about the sorts of things post modernists ''do'' disagree about.

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