Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions

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By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather to the contrary is all a ''posture''. Because — ''aeroplanes''.
By the fact that he takes his argument no further, we expect Dawkins believes he has won it, [[quod erat demonstrandum]]. There are objective truths, everyone knows it, and this [[postmodernist]] blather to the contrary is all a ''posture''. Because — ''aeroplanes''.


But Dawkins misreads ''consensus'' for ''truth'', and he mistakes ''observation'' for ''explanation''.  
But Dawkins misreads ''consensus'' for ''truth'', and ''observation'' for ''explanation''.  


Nor is it clear to which “transcendent truth” he appeals. It does not seem to be “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — the finer points of which were not worked out when {{Plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Pearse|Richard Pearse}} took his first flight and are in any case quite lost on birds — so that kind of truth is not needed to take a flight. It may be nothing more than the simple statement that “planes seem to go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  
Nor is it clear to which “transcendent truth” he appeals. It does not seem to be “the veracity of modern aerodynamics” — the finer points of which were not worked out when {{Plainlink|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Pearse|Richard Pearse}} took his first flight and are in any case quite lost on birds — so that kind of truth is not needed to take a flight. It may be nothing more than the simple statement that “planes seem to go up and come down reliably enough that I am prepared to get in one”.  

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