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Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth: Difference between revisions
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Template:Critical theory, modernism and the death of objective truth (view source)
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These tend to have a ''human'' cast to them: they hail from social and not physical sciences. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality. And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does. | These tend to have a ''human'' cast to them: they hail from social and not physical sciences. They are about history, sociology, psychology, politics, ethics, morality. And it is not just post modernists who disagree about these things. ''Everyone'' does. | ||
Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but imperative. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods. | Indeed, in much of economic theory, disagreement is not just possible but ''imperative''. Economic system cannot function without differing evaluations of the same goods. On account of this precise relativism is commerce not a [[zero-sum game]]. I can sell you something for less than it is worth to me; you can buy it at the same price for less than it is worth to you. We have both created value. | ||
Nor is this a happy mistake on either part. Say, due to the same manufacturing mishap, I have two right-footed shoes and you have two left-footed shoes. The mishap bankrupted the firm, so we can’t return the shoes , but as they are, the shoes are worthless to us. By swapping one, we each exchange something of no value for something of real value. Everyone wins. Value is not instrinsic. | |||
So when social commentators exasperatedly blame post modernism, or relativism for some failure to see the world in the plane terms it should be seen, we should hear alarms at once. | So when social commentators exasperatedly blame post modernism, or relativism for some failure to see the world in the plane terms it should be seen, we should hear alarms at once. | ||
A complaint about post truth degeneracy is its own post-truth degeneracy: it is an assertion if ''my'' truth over yours. These are the intractable arguments of politics, atheism and religion. They are fruitless because the conversants are each stuck in their own languages with their own sets of assumptions, values, priorities and norms. | |||
The challenge in a civil society is accommodating contradicting assumptions, values, priorities and norms. The more they vary, the harder it is to accommodate them — but usually the more obvious the advantages of doing so. JC spends most of his time in London, which is about as diverse a settlement as you will find on the planet, and — for all the motivated hyperbole — an extraordinary oasis of tolerance. Londoners, by and large, are masters at embracing strangeness and newness that they like and minding their own business about strangeness they do not. | |||
The key is to understanding that understanding your own truth is not the challenge when it comes to social interaction, but reading your interlocutor and accommodating hers. Social interaction is a creative exercise in forging commonality and a means of dialogue. You can’t do that by insisting on your own terms for the debate. This is true whether you are upset at apparent denial of settled science or about being being misgendered. | |||
We cannot expect others to defer to, or respect our worldview. This is the consequence of post truth. | |||
Tolerance does not require | |||
“Zero-tolerance” is an ugly but popular adjective. | |||
A complete failure to communicate | |||
==Old piece== | |||
====Analytic and synthetic and propositions==== | ====Analytic and synthetic and propositions==== | ||
{{Drop|B|ear with me}} for a brief technical interlude:it won’t take long. There are two kinds of propositions: [[analytic proposition|analytic]] and [[Synthetic proposition|synthetic]] ones. “Analytic” propositions are true by definition. Synthetic propositions tell us about the world beyond the language they are expressed in. Analytical propositions are ''mathematical'' statements; synthetic propositions as ''scientific'' statements. | {{Drop|B|ear with me}} for a brief technical interlude:it won’t take long. There are two kinds of propositions: [[analytic proposition|analytic]] and [[Synthetic proposition|synthetic]] ones. “Analytic” propositions are true by definition. Synthetic propositions tell us about the world beyond the language they are expressed in. Analytical propositions are ''mathematical'' statements; synthetic propositions as ''scientific'' statements. | ||
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It is, of course, trivially true that mathematical truths are true. When we talk about “objective truths”, we are talking about synthetic — ''scientific'' —propositions only. | It is, of course, trivially true that mathematical truths are true. When we talk about “objective truths”, we are talking about synthetic — ''scientific'' —propositions only. | ||
====Objective truths==== | ====Objective truths==== | ||
{{quote| | {{quote| | ||
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The irony deepens, for defenders of the enlightenment bring critical theory to book for its ignorance of obvious truths, while critical theory itself has bootstrapped itself into assembling a new set of of objective truths, which happened to be different to the conventional enlightenment ones. | The irony deepens, for defenders of the enlightenment bring critical theory to book for its ignorance of obvious truths, while critical theory itself has bootstrapped itself into assembling a new set of of objective truths, which happened to be different to the conventional enlightenment ones. | ||
The deep problem that critical theory has, all agree (from Christopher Hitchens, {{author|Richard Dawkins}}, {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}, {{author|Douglas Murray}} and recently {{author|Matthew Syed}}) is that | The deep problem that critical theory has, all agree (from Christopher Hitchens, {{author|Richard Dawkins}}, {{author|Helen Pluckrose}}, {{author|Douglas Murray}} and recently {{author|Matthew Syed}}) is that some things — physical sciences are a favourite example — just ''are'' true. No amount of identifying with an alternative theory of gravity will stop you from hitting the ground if you throw yourself out of a window. | ||
On the other hand [https://www.city-journal.org/american-campus-as-a-factory Jacob Howland] made the interesting assertion recently that so completely has [[critical theory]] | On the other hand [https://www.city-journal.org/american-campus-as-a-factory Jacob Howland] made the interesting assertion recently that so completely has [[critical theory]] escaped its [[postmodern]] origins, that it has become captured by, of all people the [[high-modernist]]s who inhabit an intellectual world that seeks to solve all problems by top-down taxonomies and computation. | ||
{{quote|''An illiberal alliance of technological corporatism and progressivism is rapidly turning universities into a “talent pipeline” for the digital age. When fully constructed, this pipeline will deliver a large and steady flow of human capital, packaged in certifiable skill sets and monetised in social-impact or “pay-for-success” bonds. But the strongly particular or eccentric shapes of mind, character, and taste that make human beings, as John Stuart Mill says, “a noble and beautiful object of contemplation” would clog the talent pipeline.''}} | {{quote|''An illiberal alliance of technological corporatism and progressivism is rapidly turning universities into a “talent pipeline” for the digital age. When fully constructed, this pipeline will deliver a large and steady flow of human capital, packaged in certifiable skill sets and monetised in social-impact or “pay-for-success” bonds. But the strongly particular or eccentric shapes of mind, character, and taste that make human beings, as John Stuart Mill says, “a noble and beautiful object of contemplation” would clog the talent pipeline.''}} | ||