Specific performance

From The Jolly Contrarian
Revision as of 13:38, 14 October 2020 by Amwelladmin (talk | contribs)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
The basic principles of contract


Formation: capacity and authority · representation · misrepresentation · offer · acceptance · consideration · intention to create legal relations · agreement to agree · privity of contract oral vs written contract · principal · agent

Interpretation and change: governing law · mistake · implied term · amendment · assignment · novation
Performance: force majeure · promise · waiver · warranty · covenant · sovereign immunity · illegality · severability · good faith · commercially reasonable manner · commercial imperative · indemnity · guarantee
Breach: breach · repudiation · causation · remoteness of damage · direct loss · consequential loss · foreseeability · damages · contractual negligence · process agent
Remedies: damages · adequacy of damages ·equitable remedies · injunction · specific performance · limited recourse · rescission · estoppel · concurrent liability
Not contracts: Restitutionquasi-contractquasi-agency

Index: Click to expand:

Comments? Questions? Suggestions? Requests? Insults? We’d love to 📧 hear from you.
Sign up for our newsletter.

Specific performance one of the great equitable remedies for breach of contract — designed to wrap an innocent, clean-handed contractual counterparty with the warm blanket of the courts of chancery when the cold economic rationalism of the common law leaves the moral senses still outraged. All it really amounts to is a court order directing a contractual counterparty to do what it has promised to do where the court has plausible grounds to think that it might not — most likely where “damages would not be an adequate remedy” — you will hear that phrase checked about a lot — and the innocent party cannot find someone else to perform the contract (and thus have a clear and manifestly adequate measure of loss for a damages claim).

Specific performance is a common remedy in commercial construction contracts, but less so for contracts for personal services where bleeding-heart liberal types — and let’s face it, the whole law of equity sprung from the brow of bleeding-heart liberal types — would fret that specific performance might restrict an individual’s freedom.

A court is less apt to grant specific performance where the contractual obligations are not clearly defined or it would have to supervise the performance over a period of time.

See also