Template:Derivatives as specified indebtedness: Difference between revisions

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====[[Derivatives]] as {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}}====
====[[Derivatives]] as {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}}====
Be wary of including derivatives in the definition of {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}}, no matter how high the {{isdaprov|Threshold Amount}} (we would say ''never'' do it, but realistically the wise minds of the [[credit department]] may well be beyond your calming influence, so you may not have a choice).  
Be wary of including [[derivatives]] or other non-debt-like money payment obligations in the definition of {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}}, no matter how high a {{isdaprov|Threshold Amount}}. We would say ''never'' do it, but the wise minds of the [[credit department]] may well be beyond your calming influence, so you may not have a choice. But if you have a choice, don’t do it.  


The {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} language aggregates up all individual defaults, so even though a single ISDA would be unlikely to have a ''net'' out-of-the-money [[MTM]] of anything like 3% of shareholders’ funds, a large number of individual transactions if aggregated may, particularly if you’re selective about which transactions you’re counting — which the language entitles you to be.  
{{isdaprov|Cross Default}} aggregates up all individual defaults, so even though a single {{isdama}} would be unlikely to have a ''net'' out-of-the-money [[MTM]] of anything like 3% of shareholders’ funds, a large number of individual transactions if aggregated may, particularly if you’re selective about which transactions you’re counting — which the language entitles you to be.  


Thus, where you have a large number of small failures, you can still have a big problem. This is why you should also [[carve out]] [[deposit]]s: [[Operational error|operational failure]] or regulatory action can create an immediate problem, especially for banks.
Thus, where you have a large number of small failures, you can still have a big problem. This is why you should also [[carve out]] [[deposit]]s: [[Operational error|operational failure]] or regulatory action can create an immediate problem, especially for banks.


Now it is true that you might provide the indebtedness under a [[master trading agreement]] be calculated by reference to its net close-out amount, but this only really points up the imbalance between buyside and sell-side. Buy-side managers may have fifty or even a hundred {{isdama}}s, split across dozens of different funds. [[Broker dealer|Broker-dealer]]s will have ''tens of thousands facing the same legal entity''. You are short an option, fellas. Now seeing as most trading agreemetns are fully collateralised, and so don’t represent material indebtedness, it may be that even so, no threshold is at risk. But if no threshold is ever at risk, then why are you including thge {{isdama}} in the first place?
Now it is true that you can provide the {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}} represented by a [[master trading agreement]] can be calculated by reference to its net close-out amount, but this only really points up the imbalance between buy-side and sell-side. Sure, buy-side managers may have fifty or even a hundred {{isdama}}s but they will be split across dozens of different funds. [[Broker dealer|Broker-dealer]]s, on the other hand, will have ''hundreds of thousands of [[master agreement]]s, all facing the same legal entity''. Credit dudes: ''you are the wrong side of this risk, fellas''.  


O tempora. O [[paradox]].
Now seeing as most trading agreements are fully collateralised, and so don’t represent material indebtedness on a netted basis, it may be that even with hundreds of thousands of the blighters, no-one’s {{isdaprov|Threshold}} is ever seriously threatened. But if no threshold is ever at risk, then ''why are you including the {{isdama}} in {{isdaprov|Specified Indebtedness}} in the first place?''
 
O tempora. O [[paradox]]. <br>

Revision as of 15:39, 3 November 2020

Derivatives as Specified Indebtedness

Be wary of including derivatives or other non-debt-like money payment obligations in the definition of Specified Indebtedness, no matter how high a Threshold Amount. We would say never do it, but the wise minds of the credit department may well be beyond your calming influence, so you may not have a choice. But if you have a choice, don’t do it.

Cross Default aggregates up all individual defaults, so even though a single ISDA Master Agreement would be unlikely to have a net out-of-the-money MTM of anything like 3% of shareholders’ funds, a large number of individual transactions if aggregated may, particularly if you’re selective about which transactions you’re counting — which the language entitles you to be.

Thus, where you have a large number of small failures, you can still have a big problem. This is why you should also carve out deposits: operational failure or regulatory action can create an immediate problem, especially for banks.

Now it is true that you can provide the Specified Indebtedness represented by a master trading agreement can be calculated by reference to its net close-out amount, but this only really points up the imbalance between buy-side and sell-side. Sure, buy-side managers may have fifty or even a hundred ISDA Master Agreements but they will be split across dozens of different funds. Broker-dealers, on the other hand, will have hundreds of thousands of master agreements, all facing the same legal entity. Credit dudes: you are the wrong side of this risk, fellas.

Now seeing as most trading agreements are fully collateralised, and so don’t represent material indebtedness on a netted basis, it may be that even with hundreds of thousands of the blighters, no-one’s Threshold is ever seriously threatened. But if no threshold is ever at risk, then why are you including the ISDA Master Agreement in Specified Indebtedness in the first place?

O tempora. O paradox.