Mediocrity drift: Difference between revisions

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{{a|hr|}}{{d|{{PAGENAME}}|/ˌmiːdɪˈɒkrɪti drɪft/|n}}A curious, unintended, negative feedback loop of lazy [[human capital management]].  
{{a|hr|}}{{d|{{PAGENAME}}|/ˌmiːdɪˈɒkrɪti drɪft/|n}}A curious, unintended, negative feedback loop of lazy [[human capital management]].  


Let’s say firms generally run a benign affirmative action policy, to increase representation. This means, when presented with equivalent candidates, it will prioritise candidates of a type it doesn’t have when [[lateral hire|laterally hiring]], and those in over-represented groups when selecting candidates for a [[RIF]].  
Let’s say firms generally run a benign affirmative action policy, to increase representation. This means, when presented with broadly equivalent candidates, it will prioritise candidates of a type it doesn’t have when [[lateral hire|laterally hiring]], and those in over-represented groups when selecting candidates for a [[RIF]].  


Since one tends to laterally hire one golden strand at a time, but reduce the workforce in large hanks this creates an odd system effect.
Since one tends to laterally hire one golden strand at a time, but reduce the workforce in large hanks, this creates an odd system effect, predicated on three assumptions:
*That, generally, [[lateral quitter]]s are ''relatively'' good employees.
*That, generally, [[RIF]] candidates aren’t.
*That all personnel, however you choose to categorise them, are evenly distributed relative to the [[cost-value threshold]], and that any given subgroup, however classified (except by reference to pure value) will be about as good as any other.  


This effect is predicated on three assumptions:
So, IT professionals as a group will be as good as what they do as will lawyers; young as well as old, men as women, and so on. Each will have the same proportions of outperformers and plodders.  
*That, generally, lateral quitters are ''relatively'' good employees.
*That, generally [[RIF]] candidates aren’t.
*That all personnel are evenly distributed relative to the cost-value threshold, and that any given subgroup, of staff, however classified (except by pure value) will be about as good as each other. So IT professionals will be as good as what they do as will lawyers; young as well as old, men as women and so on. Each will have outperformers and plodders.  


If so, then running a system to favour one group over another has a rather counterintuitive effect on the remaining population. On ''average'', the majority will ''increase'' in relative value, while minority will ''decrease'' in relative value, ''even though no individual performance changes at all''.  
If so, then a system which favours one group (group A) over another (group B) has a counterintuitive effect on the remaining populations of each group: on ''average'', the unfavoured group B will ''increase'' in relative value, while favoured group A will ''decrease'' in relative value, ''even though no individual performance, in either group, changes at all''.  


On second glance you can see why this should be so. The process systematically weeds out bad majority employees and good majority ones. The “good section” will progressively become majority-dominated — they are not being bid away as frequently — and the “below par” section becomes progressively minority dominated.  
On a second glance, you can see why this should be so. The process systematically weeds out ''underperforming'' members of group B and ''overperforming'' members of group A. The “good” side of the distribution will progressively become group B-dominated — they are not being bid away as frequently — and the “below par” section will becomes progressively group A dominated.  


Two observations: here is [[systemantics]] in its raw natural state; and notice how pernicious the idea of the ''average'' is here. On average, the minority is paid progressively less. It looks like minority employees are being discriminated against on pay, but in fact they are being ''favoured for poor performance''.  
Two observations: here is [[systemantics]] in its raw natural state; and notice how pernicious the idea of the ''average'' is here. On average, the minority is paid progressively less. It looks like minority employees are being discriminated against on pay, but in fact they are being ''favoured for poor performance''.  

Revision as of 23:12, 25 November 2022

The Human Resources military-industrial complex


The instrument (the “telescreen”, it was called) could be dimmed, but there was no way of shutting it off completely.
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Mediocrity drift
/ˌmiːdɪˈɒkrɪti drɪft/ (n.)
A curious, unintended, negative feedback loop of lazy human capital management.

Let’s say firms generally run a benign affirmative action policy, to increase representation. This means, when presented with broadly equivalent candidates, it will prioritise candidates of a type it doesn’t have when laterally hiring, and those in over-represented groups when selecting candidates for a RIF.

Since one tends to laterally hire one golden strand at a time, but reduce the workforce in large hanks, this creates an odd system effect, predicated on three assumptions:

  • That, generally, lateral quitters are relatively good employees.
  • That, generally, RIF candidates aren’t.
  • That all personnel, however you choose to categorise them, are evenly distributed relative to the cost-value threshold, and that any given subgroup, however classified (except by reference to pure value) will be about as good as any other.

So, IT professionals as a group will be as good as what they do as will lawyers; young as well as old, men as women, and so on. Each will have the same proportions of outperformers and plodders.

If so, then a system which favours one group (group A) over another (group B) has a counterintuitive effect on the remaining populations of each group: on average, the unfavoured group B will increase in relative value, while favoured group A will decrease in relative value, even though no individual performance, in either group, changes at all.

On a second glance, you can see why this should be so. The process systematically weeds out underperforming members of group B and overperforming members of group A. The “good” side of the distribution will progressively become group B-dominated — they are not being bid away as frequently — and the “below par” section will becomes progressively group A dominated.

Two observations: here is systemantics in its raw natural state; and notice how pernicious the idea of the average is here. On average, the minority is paid progressively less. It looks like minority employees are being discriminated against on pay, but in fact they are being favoured for poor performance.

How your incoming lateral hires perform will remain to be seen, but remember performance is measured relative to cost, and since by leaving they have marked themselves to market, they leave their old quincunx at the top and enter their new quincunx at the mean Your arriving at a higher cost than the ones you are replacing, they start not as outlier good staff, but average ones.

See also