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{{a|glossary|}}:''I believe for every drop of rain that falls, a flower grows. ''
{{a|devil|}}{{Quote|
:''I believe that somewhere in the darkest night, a candle glows. ''
{{turnip farmer}}}}
:''I believe for everyone who goes astray, someone will come to show the way'' <br>
:::—Roger Whittaker


:'''[[Credit]]''': Latin, vb (3rd pers. sing.): He, she or it ''[[I believe|believes]]''.
{{d|Credit|/ˈkrɛdɪt/|v|}}


'''[[TL;DR]]''': A  feature, not a bug.
A merchant’s ability obtain goods or services before payment, based on the provider’s trust that the merchant will subsequently pay for them. (''From the [[Latin]], credere, to believe''.)


[[Trust]]: a fundamental part of every legal, political, and financial system that has ever existed and one the need for which cannot be dissolved by technology<ref>Not even [[blockchain]]. ''Especially'' not blockchain.</ref>. Trust converts the ''single-round'' [[prisoner’s dilemma]] — in which a rational ''homo economicus'' would, and therefore ''should'', throw {{sex|her}} co-conspirator under the bus — to the ''iterated'' [[prisoner’s dilemma]], in which the longer term benefits of ''not'' doing that outweigh the undeniable headrush it provides in short term. If you know you will see her again, and go through this again — or even if you aren’t pretty sure you ''won’t — the rational thing is to cooperate, at least as long as your co-conspirator does.
===A feature, not a bug.===


[[Trust]] is a moral imperative, not a legal one. It derives  its power from the very fact that it is not backed by any obligation. It is not a compulsion; it is a voluntary submission to the mercy of a third party in the hope of a reciprocal submission back.
[[Trust]] is fundamental to every legal, political, and financial system that has ever existed. It is the one component of a prosperous polity that cannot be dissolved by technology.<ref>Not even [[blockchain]]. ''Especially'' not blockchain.</ref> Trust converts the “''single-round”'' [[prisoner’s dilemma]] — in which a rational ''homo economicus'' would, and therefore ''should'', throw {{sex|her}} co-conspirator under the bus — to the “''iterated”'' [[prisoner’s dilemma]], in which the longer term benefits of ''not'' doing that outweigh the undeniable headrush it would provide in short term if you did.  


Other variations:  
If you know you will a fellow merchant again, and go through this again — or even if you aren’t pretty sure you won’t, but ''can’t quite be sure —'' the rational thing to do is cooperate, at least as long as your co-conspirator does.
 
[[Trust]] is a ''moral'' imperative, not a legal one. It derives  its power from the very fact that it is ''not'' backed by obligation. It is not a compulsion; it is a voluntary submission to the mercy of a third party in the hope of a reciprocal submission back. It is to make oneself vulnerable for the betterment of all. It explains the fable of the wealthy merchant who accosts the elderly pauper.
 
Other variations:
:''A {{sex|gentleman’s}} word is {{sex|his}} bond.''
:''A {{sex|gentleman’s}} word is {{sex|his}} bond.''
:''“I meant what I said, and I said what I meant. An elephant’s faithful one-hundred per cent.”''
:''“I meant what I said, and I said what I meant. An elephant’s faithful one-hundred per cent.”''
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To trust someone is to ''take a [[risk]]''.
To trust someone is to ''take a [[risk]]''.


Prevailing orthodoxy is to [[Taxonomy|taxonomise]], categorise, and eliminate every foible, variable, weakness, and [[risk]], as you go, delimiting, boxing, [[reductionism|reducing]] and bit-crushing risks down into their smallest components. “By so isolating and atomising risks,” the orthodox are prone to say,  “you eliminate them, you see.”
=== Rules are a poor proxy for trust ===
Prevailing orthodoxy is to [[Taxonomy|taxonomise]], categorise, and eliminate every foible, variable, weakness, and [[risk]], as you go, delimiting, boxing, [[reductionism|reducing]] and bit-crushing risks down into their smallest components.  
 
“By so isolating and atomising risks,” the orthodox are prone to say,  “you eliminate them, you see.”


A great risk in the system is that posed by humans beings: all their inconstancy, unreliability, stupidity or mendacity. Thus, eliminating risk tends to be conflated with eliminating ''individuals'', or at least the need to ''[[trust]]'' them. In this contrarian’s opinion, The Root of All Evil in the present system is any device which seeks to substitute data, policy, rule, or algorithm for judgement, confidence, and trust.
A great risk in the system is that posed by humans beings: all their inconstancy, unreliability, stupidity or mendacity. Thus, eliminating risk tends to be conflated with eliminating ''individuals'', or at least the need to ''[[trust]]'' them. Hence, a millenarian yen to rid the present system of the need for trust, replacing it with ''rules'' and ''[[Electric monk|technology]]''.  


So in the same way that rules, playbooks and policies override the judgment of and confidence in individuals, the desire to eliminate the need for trusted intermediaries in a distributed Ledger system has the same fundamental shortcoming.
To be clear here: distributed ledgers do not reinforce trust between merchants: they ''eliminate the need for'' it.


By way of analogy, the conversion of a moral obligation (pick your children up promptly at the conclusion of today's session<ref>You may remember this from Freakonomics</ref>) with a financial one  parents will be charged £10 per hour for late collection of children after the session) has the same effect.
So in the same way that rules, playbooks and policies override the judgment of and confidence in individuals using them — thereby deprecating those individuals and stunting their ability to connect on an emotional level — the will to eliminate [[Trusted intermediary|trusted intermediaries]] in a [[Blockchain|distributed ledger]] system has the same fundamental shortcoming.  


Contrarian view:  aspects of social relations like friendships, marketing, vacation placements with colleagues' children, which are today seen as an acceptable nepotism and indications of unfairness in the system, in fact tend to reinforce bonds of trust and confidence between existing market participants. This may be inequitable for new entrants to the market and those who have been disenfranchised (as they are systematically deprived of these opportunities to enter the market in favour of insiders) but they do tend to increase general levels of trust amongst those participants in the market
''Trust is a feature, not a bug.''


The answer maybe not to prevent these activities, but to try to ensure equivalents are put in place for those without the necessary connections.  
By way of analogy, converting a ''moral'' obligation to someone else (say, “pick your children up promptly at the conclusion of today’s kindergarten session”)<ref>You may remember this from Freakonomics</ref> into a ''financial'' one (if you arrive more than ten minutes after the session ends, you will be charged a late collection fee) has the same effect. Now there is a price on your time: I can pay for my delinquency without compunction.


What things tend to substitute financial for moral obligations? Contracts. Laws. Regulations. Code.  
Social relationships, friendships and emotional connections — which [[High modernism|modernist]]<nowiki/>s view as irrelevant at best, or more likely indications of graft or nepotism in the system — in fact have a perfectly sensible role: ''they reinforce bonds of trust'' between participants.


{{draft}}
Now to be sure: this may be unfair to outsiders who don’t have those connections or any way of making them — but the answer is to create opportunities for those at the margins, who might otherwise be disenfranchised (as they are systematically deprived of the opportunities to enter the market in favour of insiders) to build those social relations.  For example: be imaginative about your hiring choices. Why do you reflexively hire from magic circle firms and Russell Group universities? but a decentralised ledger where no-one ''needs'' to trust others in the market is hardly a decent no substitute. You cannot banish bonds of trust.
 
The answer is not to prevent these activities, but create alternative structures which lower the barriers to entry into relations of trust for those without the necessary connections.
 
{{Sa}}{{draft}}
 
*{{br|Debt: The First 5,000 Years|''Debt: The First 5000 Years}}
*{{br|Bitcoin is Venice}}
{{ref}}
{{ref}}
<references />

Latest revision as of 17:38, 6 March 2024

In which the curmudgeonly old sod puts the world to rights.
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The old turnip farmer has fallen upon hard times. His wife has died and his crop has failed.
One day, a local merchant visits him and asks to borrow some turnips. The old fellow shrugs, rummages around in his sack, and produces a couple of dried-up, cankered tubers.
“It isn’t much,” says the old man.
“It’s just what I need,” says the merchant.
“Well, it’s all have. You needn’t borrow it,” the old man says, “you can just have it.”
The merchant thanks him and bids him good-day.
“What did you do that for, Dad?” asks the merchant’s daughter, when he returns home that evening. “You don’t even like turnips. And you are very wealthy. You could buy all the turnips you could want from the grocer down the road. Why impose your will on that poor old farmer?”
“Because now I am in his debt,” replied the merchant, “and he needs feel no shame to ask a favour of me.”

Credit
/ˈkrɛdɪt/ (v.)

A merchant’s ability obtain goods or services before payment, based on the provider’s trust that the merchant will subsequently pay for them. (From the Latin, credere, to believe.)

A feature, not a bug.

Trust is fundamental to every legal, political, and financial system that has ever existed. It is the one component of a prosperous polity that cannot be dissolved by technology.[1] Trust converts the “single-round” prisoner’s dilemma — in which a rational homo economicus would, and therefore should, throw her co-conspirator under the bus — to the “iterated” prisoner’s dilemma, in which the longer term benefits of not doing that outweigh the undeniable headrush it would provide in short term if you did.

If you know you will a fellow merchant again, and go through this again — or even if you aren’t pretty sure you won’t, but can’t quite be sure — the rational thing to do is cooperate, at least as long as your co-conspirator does.

Trust is a moral imperative, not a legal one. It derives its power from the very fact that it is not backed by obligation. It is not a compulsion; it is a voluntary submission to the mercy of a third party in the hope of a reciprocal submission back. It is to make oneself vulnerable for the betterment of all. It explains the fable of the wealthy merchant who accosts the elderly pauper.

Other variations:

A gentleman’s word is his bond.
“I meant what I said, and I said what I meant. An elephant’s faithful one-hundred per cent.”

To trust someone is to take a risk.

Rules are a poor proxy for trust

Prevailing orthodoxy is to taxonomise, categorise, and eliminate every foible, variable, weakness, and risk, as you go, delimiting, boxing, reducing and bit-crushing risks down into their smallest components.

“By so isolating and atomising risks,” the orthodox are prone to say, “you eliminate them, you see.”

A great risk in the system is that posed by humans beings: all their inconstancy, unreliability, stupidity or mendacity. Thus, eliminating risk tends to be conflated with eliminating individuals, or at least the need to trust them. Hence, a millenarian yen to rid the present system of the need for trust, replacing it with rules and technology.

To be clear here: distributed ledgers do not reinforce trust between merchants: they eliminate the need for it.

So in the same way that rules, playbooks and policies override the judgment of and confidence in individuals using them — thereby deprecating those individuals and stunting their ability to connect on an emotional level — the will to eliminate trusted intermediaries in a distributed ledger system has the same fundamental shortcoming.

Trust is a feature, not a bug.

By way of analogy, converting a moral obligation to someone else (say, “pick your children up promptly at the conclusion of today’s kindergarten session”)[2] into a financial one (if you arrive more than ten minutes after the session ends, you will be charged a late collection fee) has the same effect. Now there is a price on your time: I can pay for my delinquency without compunction.

Social relationships, friendships and emotional connections — which modernists view as irrelevant at best, or more likely indications of graft or nepotism in the system — in fact have a perfectly sensible role: they reinforce bonds of trust between participants.

Now to be sure: this may be unfair to outsiders who don’t have those connections or any way of making them — but the answer is to create opportunities for those at the margins, who might otherwise be disenfranchised (as they are systematically deprived of the opportunities to enter the market in favour of insiders) to build those social relations. For example: be imaginative about your hiring choices. Why do you reflexively hire from magic circle firms and Russell Group universities? but a decentralised ledger where no-one needs to trust others in the market is hardly a decent no substitute. You cannot banish bonds of trust.

The answer is not to prevent these activities, but create alternative structures which lower the barriers to entry into relations of trust for those without the necessary connections.

See also

References

  1. Not even blockchain. Especially not blockchain.
  2. You may remember this from Freakonomics