Template:Isda 5(a)(vi) summ: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
No edit summary
No edit summary
 
(19 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{drop|C|ross Default is}} designed to cover the unique risks that come from ''lending money to people who have also borrowed heavily from other people, likely on better terms than you''. The basic vibe is: if any of this other borrowing becomes theoretically payable then I want the right to terminate my ISDA as well.
{{drop|C|ross Default covers}} the unique risks that come from ''lending money to people who have also borrowed heavily from others, likely on better terms than you''. The basic vibe is:  
{{quote|
If any of your other loans become payable, I want mine to be payable too.}}
In the {{isdama}} that means I get an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}. Sounds simple? Well: ride with me a while.


Sounds simple, doesn’t it? Well: ride with me a while.
====Origins in the loan market====
{{drop|C|ross default}} grew out of the traditional loan market, and was transplanted into derivatives at the dawn of the [[Age of Swaps]].  Consider a traditional unsecured loan. Its characteristics are as follows:


====Cross default’s origins in the loan market====
''Firstly'', there is an identifiable [[lender]] — usually a bank — and [[Borrower|borrower]] — usually a business — in a formalised relationship of dominance and subservience. Their roles in this [[power structure]] cannot change. The lender is, always, the lender: it gives away its money against the borrower’s bare promise to later give it back. The borrower does not have risk to the lender.
{{drop|C|ross default is}} an ancient concept. It grew out of the traditional loan market and was transplanted into the swaps market at the dawn of the [[Age of Swaps]]. Consider a traditional unsecured loan. Its characteristics are as follows: {{l1}}


Firstly, there is an identifiable [[lender]] — usually a big institutional bank — and an identifiable [[Borrower|borrower]] — usually a small business or an individual. They are in a formalised relationship of dominance and subservience, and this [[power structure]] and their roles will not change. The bank is, always, the risk taker: it is giving away its money against nothing but the borrower’s earnest promise to later give it back. <li>
''Secondly'', a loan is an ''outright allocation of capital from lender to borrower''. There, intrinsically, [[credit risk]]. The lender’s main concern is that the borrower can give the money back. It will want the right to force it to if the borrower’s creditworthiness takes a turn for the worse. The bank therefore wants its “weapons” pointed at the borrower. The borrower, in contrast, has no need to point any weapons at the bank.


Secondly, therefore a loan represents the ''outright allocation of a large amount of capital from the bank to the customer'': there is an intrinsic creation of [[credit risk]]. A large part of the bank’s business is assessing whether the borrower is likely to give the money back and implementing terms in its loan contract to force the borrower to give the money back if things do not go according to plan. The bank therefore keeps its “weapons” trained on the borrower. Conversely, once thre borrower has the money, it is ''not'' at risk to the bank. The borrower does not need to point any weapons at the bank. <li>
''Thirdly'', the borrower has few payment obligations: usually, only periodic interest and final repayment. Most of the borrower’s obligations come at the end of the contract.  


Thirdly, this allocation of capital is time-constrained. Unless the borrower defaults, the bank cannot get its money back before the specified term. All it is entitled to is interest on the amount loaned. <li>
''Fourthly'', unless the borrower defaults, the bank cannot get its money back before expiry of the term. All it is entitled to is periodic interest on the amount loaned.


Fourthly, as a consequence, during the term of the loan, the borrower will not often have to pay any money to the borrower. Usually, only periodic interest, and that might only be quarterly or even semi-annually. All the borrower’s financial obligations are “rear-loaded”. They all come at the end of the loan contract. <li></ol>
Because the borrower has infrequent payment obligations, and they are large, the bank will want to be able to call a default as soon as it thinks the customer will not be able to repay. It will not want to wait and see.  


The bank is at significant risk, therefore, if the customer’s creditworthiness deteriorates during the term of the loan. This is what its weapons are there to manage: The bank will want to be able to call a default as soon as it thinks the customer will not be able to repay later. It will not want to wait and see.  
But what default events can it look to? “Failure to pay” or “breach of agreement” won’t do, because there might not be any payment obligations due under the loan. If the borrower has loans with other banks, it may owe interest on them before it owes anything under this loan.  


But what default events can it look to in the loan contract? A “failure to pay” or a “breach of agreement” won’t do, because the customer might not have any payment or performance obligations due under the loan. The bank will not want to wait six months for the next interest payment.
This will make all bank lenders nervous: if the borrower becomes distressed, everyone will want to use their weapons as soon as possible: there is an advantage to being the first lender to pull the trigger. If one lender shoots — if it even becomes ''entitled to shoot'' — then the other banks will want to be able to shoot, too.


The borrower may have taken out loans with other banks. It may owe money to other lenders before it owes anything to the bank. This will make the bank nervous: other lenders are also exposed to that borrower’s solvency. If the borrower becomes financially distressed, everyone will want to use their weapons. There is plainly an advantage to being the first lender to pull the trigger. If another lender shoots — if another lender even becomes ''entitled to shoot'' — then the bank will want to be entitled to shoot, too.
Hence, the concept of “cross default”: should a borrower be in material default under a third-party loan, cross default permits the bank to call in its loan, too, even though the borrower has not missed any payments directly. Even if none were even due.  


Hence, the concept of “cross default”: should a borrower be in material default under a different contract with a third-party lender, a cross default right permits the bank to call in its loan, too, even though the borrower has not missed any payments to the bank. Even if none were even due.  
This puts the borrower’s lenders into a standoff: all will have “twitchy trigger fingers”. All will want to accelerate their loans as soon as anybody else is entitled to.  


This is a drastic measure: it puts the bank and the borrower’s other lenders into a kind of Mexican standoff: if you know your borrower has given up a cross-default right to other lenders then all lenders have twitchy trigger fingers. All will want to accelerate their loans as soon as anybody else is entitled to.  
There is a curious “[[systemantic]]” effect here: though {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is designed as a credit ''mitigant'', its very existence makes a credit ''default'' more likely.  


There is a curious phenomenon here: a kind of [[systemantics]]: though {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is designed as credit-risk ''mitigant'', its very existence makes a credit ''default'' more likely. The cruel games we play
The loan market therefore developed some “thresholds” around the cross-default concept: firstly, you could only invoke {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} if the [[borrower]]’s default exceeded a certain monetary value. {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} should only apply to events material enough to threaten the borrower’s solvency.


The loan market therefore developed some “thresholds” around the cross-default concept: you could only invoke {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} if the borrower’s default exceeded a certain monetary value. {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} should only apply to events material enough to threaten the borrower’s solvency.
Recap: {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is meant to protect against the risk of material uncollateralised indebtedness, on terms containing infrequent payment obligations, where the borrower also has significant indebtedness to other lenders in the market. It is a ''one-way'' right. A borrower has no cross-default right against a lender.
 
Remember that {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is meant to protect against the risk of material uncollateralised indebtedness, on terms containing infrequent payment obligations, where the borrower also has significant indebtedness to other lenders in the market.
 
Also, to reiterate: cross-default is a one-way right. A borrower has no cross-default right against a lender. (Why would it? That would be silly.)


====The ISDA evolved from the loan market====
====The ISDA evolved from the loan market====
{{drop|[[Swap history|W]]|e have seen}} elsewhere that the {{isdama}} evolved in the 1980s out of innovations in the loan market. Early swaps were offsetting loans. They were documented by lawyers who were, by training and disposition, banking specialists: they were used to thinking of the world in terms of ''lending''.
{{drop|[[Swap history|W]]|e have seen}} that the {{isdama}} developed out of the loan market. Early swaps were offsetting loans. They were documented by lawyers who were banking specialists: they were used to thinking about the world in terms of ''lending''.  
 
When it came to drawing up early versions of the {{isdama}} it was only natural that the lawyers who drafted it would include the usual suite of banking weaponry to manage the risk of default. That included {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}.
 
=====Swaps are not like outright loans=====
 
But swaps are not very much like outright loans. They are not, by nature, lending arrangements. Swaps are, in a sense, ''financing'' arrangements: the swap dealer finances assets, but does not engage in the outright allocation of capital, as a lender does. [[Lending versus financing|Financing and lending]] are fundamentally different activities. They present different risks.
 
Swaps, also, are by their nature fully bi-directional. Unlike in the loan market, roles are not fixed. There is no pre-determined lender and borrower: under a swap, either party can owe money. Who is “in-the-money” can change at any time.
 
This means the range of default events under the {{isdama}} must be symmetrical and bi-directional: if there is to be a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} right, it must point in both directions. The bilateral nature of the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}  in the {{isdama}} applies equally to banks as it does to customers. This presents some rather curly conceptual challenges, as we will see.


But in another sense, swaps sort of ''are'' like loans. Swap dealers manage their books to be “flat” market risk, whereas swap customers enter swaps to take on market risk. Swap dealers have a quasi-banking role: they may not be allocating capital, but they are arranging it.  
It was only natural that early versions of the {{isdama}} included the usual set of banker’s “weapons” to manage the risk of default. That included {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}.


=====The rationale for cross default is not present in a swap=====
=====Swaps are different=====
But swaps are not very much like outright loans. They are ''financing'', not ''lending'' arrangements: The swap dealer does not allocate capital outright to the customer, as a lender does. [[Lending versus financing|Financing and lending]] are fundamentally different activities. They present different risks.


In any case, the features of loans that {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}  was developed to address are broadly ''not present'' in swap transactions: {{l1}}
Swaps, also, are by their nature fully bi-directional. There is no fixed lender and borrower. (In theory, there’s no lender or borrower at all). Under a swap, either party can “owe money”. Who is “in-the-money” can change suddenly, without warning and it has nothing to do with the parties’ relative creditworthiness.


Firstly, swaps are not primarily instruments of uncollateralised indebtedness. Swaps are implied financings where, on day 1, the customer is not indebted to the dealer or vice versa. (A “financing” is an arrangement where a customer raises cash against a margined asset, a “loan” is where a customer raises cash against its own un-margined promise to repay). <li>
This means the {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}} under the {{isdama}} must be symmetrical and bi-directional: if there is to be a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} right, it must point in both directions.  
Therefore, unlike in a traditional loan the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}  in the {{isdama}} applies equally to the bank as it does to the customer.  


Secondly, swap notionals tend to be relatively small compared to the loan facilities in which you might expect to see a cross default. <li>
This presents some rather curly conceptual challenges, as we will see.


Thirdly, swap payments are frequent and flow in both directions, especially under an {{isdama}} having multiple unrelated transactions, with individual payment dates and tenors. <li>
=====Cross default is not needed in a swap=====
In any case, the risks of loans that {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} address, broadly, do not hold for swaps:


Fourthly, at least nowadays, {{isdama}}s are typically daily margined to a zero {{vmcsaprov|Threshold}} so even though it is conceptually ''possible'' for indebtedness to arise under an ISDA, in practice, it mostly does not. <li>
''Firstly'', swaps are not ''primarily'' instruments of uncollateralised indebtedness.


Lastly, many ISDA customers will not have significant unmargined third-party indebtedness: most heavy users of swaps like [[investment fund]]s invest on margin and not by means of outright uncollateralised loan. As we will see, asset financing arrangements tend ''not'' to have cross default terms in them — the one exception being the ISDA. <li></ol>
''Secondly'', there tend to be ''multiple'' small Transactions rather than a single big one: therefore payments under the ISDA architecture are frequent and flow in both directions, especially under an {{isdama}} with multiple Transactions. You don’t have the “no coupon due for six months” problem.


You would not therefore expect to have to use {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} often to close out an {{isdama}}. Usually, there would long since have been a {{{{{1}}}|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} or {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}, and both of those events are a much more deterministic, identifiable and therefore safe means of bringing an ISDA arrangement to an end. And this is the general experience.
''Thirdly'', {{isdama}}s are typically [[margin|margined]], so even though it is conceptually ''possible'' for uncollateralised exposure to arise under an ISDA, in practice, it there won’t be much and it will be quickly reset.


====How does it work?====
''Lastly'', the majority of swap end users will not have significant unmargined third-party debt: [[investment fund]]s<ref>In this I include [[hedge fund]]s, mutual funds, index funds, ETFs, pension funds, life insurance plans, private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds.</ref> tend to invest on margin. They do not borrow under uncollateralised loans. So there are few instances of specified indebtedness that they are likely to trigger. It is far more likely that a bank counterparty or swap dealer will have material specified indebtedness. This is a bit of a self-own.  
{{drop|I|magine swap counterparty}} X who, alongside its {{Isdama}} with you, has “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}” - outstanding loan obligations to lenders A, B and C.  


Should X default under any of loans A B or C in a total sum over the specified {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}, the cross-default provision in your ISDA will entitle you to accelerate all outstanding Transactions under your ISDA.
You would not expect {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} to often arise as a sole means of closing out an {{isdama}}. Usually, there would long since have been a {{{{{1}}}|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} or {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}, and both of those events are a much more deterministic, identifiable and therefore safe means of bringing an ISDA arrangement to an end.


=====“Capable of acceleration” versus failure to pay=====
====How does Cross Default work?====
{{drop|I|magine swap counterparty}} N who, alongside its {{Isdama}} with you, has significant {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} to lenders A, B and C.


A bit fussily, Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vi)}} distinguishes between the general acceleration of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} — a general [[event of default]] of any kind at any time during the tenor of any {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} such as the borrower’s bankruptcy, a breach of its reps and warranties, a non-payment of interest, any [[repudiatory breach]] of the contract of indebtedness, really and a failure to pay: a borrower’s failure to fulfil, in full, final repayment of the debt itself when due.
Should N default under any of that indebtedness — that is, should any of those lenders become ''entitled'' to call in their loans, whether or not they actually ''do'' — in a total sum greater than your agreed “{{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}, you would be entitled to close out your ISDA, ''even though N had not defaulted in any way directly to you''.
 
Does not a “failure to pay” count as an acceleration event? This drafting seems redundant? The distinction is technical: with a loan, the lion’s share of the borrower’s payment obligation falls on the maturity date, at which point the loan cannot logically be “accelerated” because it is already due. {{icds}}’s drafting simply catches the distinction between a default event happening before the termination date and that final fundamental repayment failure.
 
=====“Default”=====
 
“Default” is described widely and (at least in the {{2002ma}}) is not restricted to payment defaults. A breach of representations or a technical breach of loan covenants would count as an actionable {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} as long as it entitled the third-party lender to accelerate the loan.
 
======The lender does not have to accelerate======
 
The lender need not ''actually'' accelerate the loan. The cross-default right arises when the lender becomes ''entitled'' to accelerate. See below for our discussion of [[cross acceleration]] — a weakened version of {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} that requires the loan to be actually called in.
 
Needless to say, this makes the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} a very powerful and sensitive tool. Too ''powerful''. Too ''sensitive''.
 
======Most favoured nation======
 
It also introduces an unusual variability to the ISDA universe: While the {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}} described in the {{isdama}} are for the most part standardised and inviolate, default events under a bilaterally-negotiated loan facility may well be tweaked. Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vi)}} references “a default, event of default or other similar condition or event (however described) in respect of such party”. This is loose and could for example include ''potential'' events of default (those which will become an event of default on expiry of a [[grace period]]).
 
In any case, {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is a “most favoured nation” clause importing into the ISDA every single “default or similar event” from the counterparty’s other third-party loan contracts: any defaults rights you have given away to any other material lender you must also give to me. This is wide, and, as noted elsewhere acts as much as anything else to ''destabilise'' the creditworthiness of the counterparty.


===== “Specified Indebtedness” =====
===== “Specified Indebtedness” =====
What counts as “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}”? The ISDA itself defines it as “[[Borrowed money|borrowed money]]” without further elaborating on what that means. Generally speaking, it means ''loans''.
======Financing arrangements======
“Borrowed money” excludes margined [[financing]] arrangements.<ref>See [[Lending versus financing|elsewhere]].</ref> “Financing arrangements” include a wide selection of capital markets transactions including [[margin loan]]s, [[synthetic prime brokerage]], [[swap]]s, [[stock loan]]s and [[repo]]s.


What counts as {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}” is a topic of hot debate.  
These are “asset transformations” rather than borrowings and do not involve uncollateralised [[indebtedness]]as such: at inception, the party raising money gives title to an asset of greater value to the financer, and is subsequently margined to that asset value. Therefore net, the financing beneficiary is not a debtor at all, but a ''creditor''.


The ISDA itself restricts “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}” to “[[Borrowed money|borrowed money]]” without further elaborating on what that means. Clearly it takes in formal loan arrangements; it’s not clear whether trade credit terms would be included — Firth on derivatives thinks not — but in light of the small relative size of those arrangements, it probably doesn’t make much difference in any case.  
This does not stop excitable [[credit officer]]s expanding “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}” to bring financing arrangements into scope. A favourite tweak is to include derivatives and securities financing arrangements without stopping to clarify how the “[[borrowed money]]” under them (hint, under a margined ISDA, there will not be any) is to be measured. Notional? [[Mark-to-market]] exposure? Outstanding payment obligations? Present value of all future payments?


======Financing arrangements======
======Bank deposits======
Bank deposits plainly ''are'' “[[borrowed money]]”, and they mightily add up: as we will see, aggregation is important when calculating the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}.


[[Financing]] arrangements are not caught in the standard wording, as discussed [[Lending versus financing|elsewhere]]. They do not involve uncollateralised “[[indebtedness]]” as such but rather are margined transformations of owned assets.  
Bank deposits illustrate the problem of having cross-default in a financing contract like an ISDA. In the traditional loan market, bank deposits tend not to trigger cross default obligations, because the sort of parties ''having'' cross default obligations do not have deposits. Only banks accept deposits. Since they are usually the lender in a commercial loan they, and their deposits, are not subject to cross default.  


This does not stop [[credit officer]]s fiddling with the definition of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} to bring them into scope — a favourite tweak is to include derivatives and securities financing arrangements as {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} without stopping to clarify how the “[[borrowed money]]” under them (hint, under a margined ISDA, there will not be any) is to be measured.  
But ISDAs are bilateral, so a bank dealer’s deposits ''will'' be in scope and could trigger a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} against a bank. It is not out of the question that a bank could be prevented from honouring deposits through operational error, IT outage or geopolitical incident. This would put it in technical default on a large number of its deposits at once.  


For reasons we will come to, this is a grave mistake.
Therefore, banks exclude [[Deposit|retail deposits]] from the ambit of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}. They will not lightly resile from this position, so [[buy-side legal eagle]]s looking for a [[I’m not going to die in a ditch about it|ditch to die in]] are advised to avoid this one.


======Bank deposits======
======Public indebtedness======
With the honourable exception of public bond issuances, most {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} arises under ''private'' arrangements about which the market will have no reliable real-time information. No one will know how much a given borrower owes, much less whether it has defaulted and when.


A type of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} that would not upset cross defaults in the loan market but has the potential to do so in the swaps market is the [[deposit|bank deposit]]. Deposits are plainly borrowed money, and they mightily add up: as we will see, aggregation is important when calculating the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}.
This makes practical policing and enforcement of {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} fraught, where it is even possible.


Only banks are allowed to accept bank deposits, and in the traditional loan market banks are lenders and therefore are not subject to cross default terms, so deposits are not in play.  
=====“Default”=====
“Default” is described widely and (at least in the {{2002ma}}) is not restricted to payment defaults. A technical breach of representations as long as it entitles the lender to accelerate would count towards an actionable {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}.  


But ISDA {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is bilateral, so could — unless you fix it, ''would''— catch a bank [[swap dealer]]’s customer deposit base. It is not out of the question that a bank could be prevented from repaying deposits through operational error, IT outage or geographical incident and therefore technically be in default on a large number of its deposits at once.  
Vitally, the lender need not ''actually'' accelerate the loan. The cross-default right arises as soon as it is ''entitled'' to accelerate. This makes the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} event a powerful and sensitive tool. ''Too'' powerful. ''Too'' sensitive.


For this reason, banks tend to exclude [[Deposit|retail deposits]] from the definition of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}. This is sensible, and they will not resile from this position, so [[Buy-side legal eagle|buy-side agitants]], when you are picking your [[I’m not going to die in a ditch about it|ditch to die in]], I would not make it this one.
There is now an entirely different page dedicated to [[cross acceleration]] — a weakened version of {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} that requires the loan to be actually called in.


======Public indebtedness======
===== “Threshold Amount” =====
The {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} is the level over which accumulated defaults in {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} trigger {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}. It is usually expressed as a [[cash]] amount ''or'' a percentage of [[Tier 1 capital|shareholder funds]], or both, in which case — [[Trick for young players|schoolboy error]] hazard alert — be careful to say whether it is the ''greater'' or ''lesser'' of the two.


The last thing to note about {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} is that typically, [[borrowed money]] tends to arise under private contracts and the circumstances in which it is in default will not be known to the market. The only exception to this are public bond issuances. Beyond that, generally speaking, the market will not have real-time information about the level of a given counterparty’s overall indebtedness, much less whether it has defaulted on it. This makes practical policing and enforcement of a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} right fraught, where it is even possible.
Because of the extreme risk {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} presents, the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} should represent an existential threat to the counterparty’s solvency. For a bank counterparty, that is typically two or three per cent of its shareholders’ equity or the cash equivalent.  


===== “Threshold Amount” =====
A cash equivalent runs the risk of “decoupling” from the value of shareholders’ equity — especially in times of great market stress — so while it is easier to measure and monitor, it presents a greater systemic risk, and you may find it more prudent to stick with an equity-linked threshold.
======Snowball risk======
This “accumulation” feature means relatively trivial amounts of indebtedness can be problematic. This is particularly so where there are a lot of them — see bank deposits and swap transactions — or where the default is technical, systemic or operational. Should a system outage prevent a counterparty from honouring a class of contracts it might instantly trigger a catastrophic cross-default right across all {{isdama}}s.


The {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} is the level over which accumulated defaults in Specified Indebtedness comprise an actionable {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} under the {{isdama}}.  
For buy-side parties (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles) the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} may be a lot lower than that — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, for fund entities will key off [[NAV]], not shareholder funds.


It is usually defined as a [[cash]] amount or a percentage of [[Tier 1 capital|shareholder funds]], or both, in which case — [[Trick for young players|schoolboy error]] hazard alert — be careful to say whether it is the ''greater'' or ''lesser'' of the two.  
======Problematic derivatives======
Bear in mind, too, that if even one of your ISDA contracts has a lower {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}, that can create a chain reaction: because the exposure under that ISDA, once it has been triggered by a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}, then contributes to the total amount of defaulted Specified Indebtedness and may itself lead to {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}s being triggered in other ISDAs. And each of those then contributes … you get the idea.


This accumulation feature means that relatively trivial amounts of indebtedness can be problematic particularly where the default is technical, systemic or operational. As mentioned above, should a system outage prevent the bank from honouring its deposits — almost certainly a sum greater than 2% of its shareholder equity — it might instantly trigger a cross-default right on all its {{isdama}}s. This would be catastrophic if acted upon. That is a big if, it is true — but commending the institution’s soul into the hands of rapacious [[hedge fund]] swap counterparties is not a gambit most prudent banks would willingly take.
The obvious solution is to ''exclude'' derivatives and similar financing arrangements from the definition of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}. That is, to revert to the ISDA standard.


Because of the [[snowball effect]] that a [[cross default]] clause can have, the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} for every contract should be big: like, [[bankruptcy|life-threateningly]] big. So, expect a [[swap dealer]] to accept little less than 2-3% of shareholder funds, or sums in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars.
======Cherry-picking======
One last problem with including swaps: how do you measure the “indebtedness” under a Transaction?


For [[end users]] (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles) the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} may be a lot lower than that — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, for fund entities will key off [[NAV]], not shareholder funds.
You could, in theory, [[cherry-pick]] all out-of-the-money {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}, total them up and cross a {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} fairly easily.  
 
Bear in mind, too, that if even one of your ISDA contracts has a lower {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}, that can create a chain reaction: because the exposure under that ISDA, once it has been triggered by a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}, then contributes to the total amount of defaulted Specified Indebtedness and may itself lead to {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}s being triggered in other ISDAs. And each of those then contributes … you get the idea.


There is one last problem with including ISDAs within {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}: what is the “indebtedness” you are measuring? You can look at individual transaction exposures and aggregate them. Nothing requires you to apply a [[Single agreement|Single Agreement]] concept or any kind of cross-transactional netting to those exposures. (Why would it? ISDA contracts are designed to be out of scope for {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}). If you bring them into scope you could, in theory, [[cherry-pick]] all out-of-the-money {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}, total them up and cross a {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} fairly easily.  
Nothing requires you to apply a [[Single agreement|Single Agreement]] concept or cross-transactional netting to those exposures. (Why would it? ISDA contracts are meant to be out of scope for {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}).  


Now it is true that you can require the {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} of a [[master trading agreement]] to be calculated by reference to its net close-out amount, but this only really points up the imbalance between dealers and their customers. Sure, big fund managers may have fifty or even a hundred {{Isdama}}s, but they will be split across dozens of different funds, each a different entity with its own {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}. [[Swap dealer]]s, on the other hand, will have literally ''hundreds of thousands of [[master agreement]]s, all facing the same legal entity''. ''Dealers are the wrong side of this risk''.  
Even if you calculate {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} by reference to a ''net'' close-out amount, this only really highlights the imbalance between dealers and their customers. Sure, big fund managers may have ten, twenty or even fifty {{Isdama}}s, but they will be split across dozens of different funds, each a different entity with its own {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}. [[Swap dealer]]s, on the other hand, will have literally ''hundreds of thousands'' of [[master agreement]]s, all facing the same legal entity. ''Dealers are the wrong side of this risk''.  


This can of course be managed by careful negotiation, but JC would say there is a much better means of managing this risk: excluding transactions under collateralised master trading agreements altogether, for the perfectly sensible reason that they should not be considered as “[[borrowed money]]”.
Now, you ''could'' manage this by careful negotiation but there is a better way: ''excluding financing transactions altogether'', for the perfectly sensible reason that ''they are not “[[borrowed money]]”''.


Now seeing as most [[master trading agreement]]s are fully collateralised, and so don’t represent material [[indebtedness]] on a net basis anyway, it may be that — if correctly calibrated to catch the net mark-to-market exposure, no-one’s {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} will ever be seriously threatened.  
======Cross default as a “most favoured nation” clause======
While the ISDA {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}} are standardised, bilaterally-negotiated default events under private loans will be highly customised.  


But if no {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} is ever likely to be breached, then ''why are you including Specified Indebtedness in the first place?
Especially since Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vi)}} is pretty loose about what counts as a qualifying default:
{{quote|
“a default, event of default or other similar condition or event (however described) in respect of such party”.}}
This could include ''potential'' events of default (those which will become an event of default on expiry of a [[grace period]]). In any case, it would haul into the ISDA’s ambit any weird or sensitive default triggers in that loan documentation that deal with peculiarities of the lending arrangement and have no real bearing on the general credit position of the borrower as a derivatives counterparty.


O tempora. O [[paradox]].
In other words {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} functions as a gated “most favoured nation” clause. This is a wide, swingeing term and is likely to be much more severe against bank and dealer counterparties than end-users, since banks will have a lot more indebtedness.

Latest revision as of 13:11, 9 November 2024

Cross Default covers the unique risks that come from lending money to people who have also borrowed heavily from others, likely on better terms than you. The basic vibe is:

If any of your other loans become payable, I want mine to be payable too.

In the ISDA Master Agreement that means I get an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}. Sounds simple? Well: ride with me a while.

Origins in the loan market

Cross default grew out of the traditional loan market, and was transplanted into derivatives at the dawn of the Age of Swaps. Consider a traditional unsecured loan. Its characteristics are as follows:

Firstly, there is an identifiable lender — usually a bank — and borrower — usually a business — in a formalised relationship of dominance and subservience. Their roles in this power structure cannot change. The lender is, always, the lender: it gives away its money against the borrower’s bare promise to later give it back. The borrower does not have risk to the lender.

Secondly, a loan is an outright allocation of capital from lender to borrower. There, intrinsically, credit risk. The lender’s main concern is that the borrower can give the money back. It will want the right to force it to if the borrower’s creditworthiness takes a turn for the worse. The bank therefore wants its “weapons” pointed at the borrower. The borrower, in contrast, has no need to point any weapons at the bank.

Thirdly, the borrower has few payment obligations: usually, only periodic interest and final repayment. Most of the borrower’s obligations come at the end of the contract.

Fourthly, unless the borrower defaults, the bank cannot get its money back before expiry of the term. All it is entitled to is periodic interest on the amount loaned.

Because the borrower has infrequent payment obligations, and they are large, the bank will want to be able to call a default as soon as it thinks the customer will not be able to repay. It will not want to wait and see.

But what default events can it look to? “Failure to pay” or “breach of agreement” won’t do, because there might not be any payment obligations due under the loan. If the borrower has loans with other banks, it may owe interest on them before it owes anything under this loan.

This will make all bank lenders nervous: if the borrower becomes distressed, everyone will want to use their weapons as soon as possible: there is an advantage to being the first lender to pull the trigger. If one lender shoots — if it even becomes entitled to shoot — then the other banks will want to be able to shoot, too.

Hence, the concept of “cross default”: should a borrower be in material default under a third-party loan, cross default permits the bank to call in its loan, too, even though the borrower has not missed any payments directly. Even if none were even due.

This puts the borrower’s lenders into a standoff: all will have “twitchy trigger fingers”. All will want to accelerate their loans as soon as anybody else is entitled to.

There is a curious “systemantic” effect here: though {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is designed as a credit mitigant, its very existence makes a credit default more likely.

The loan market therefore developed some “thresholds” around the cross-default concept: firstly, you could only invoke {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} if the borrower’s default exceeded a certain monetary value. {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} should only apply to events material enough to threaten the borrower’s solvency.

Recap: {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} is meant to protect against the risk of material uncollateralised indebtedness, on terms containing infrequent payment obligations, where the borrower also has significant indebtedness to other lenders in the market. It is a one-way right. A borrower has no cross-default right against a lender.

The ISDA evolved from the loan market

We have seen that the ISDA Master Agreement developed out of the loan market. Early swaps were offsetting loans. They were documented by lawyers who were banking specialists: they were used to thinking about the world in terms of lending.

It was only natural that early versions of the ISDA Master Agreement included the usual set of banker’s “weapons” to manage the risk of default. That included {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}.

Swaps are different

But swaps are not very much like outright loans. They are financing, not lending arrangements: The swap dealer does not allocate capital outright to the customer, as a lender does. Financing and lending are fundamentally different activities. They present different risks.

Swaps, also, are by their nature fully bi-directional. There is no fixed lender and borrower. (In theory, there’s no lender or borrower at all). Under a swap, either party can “owe money”. Who is “in-the-money” can change suddenly, without warning and it has nothing to do with the parties’ relative creditworthiness.

This means the {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}} under the ISDA Master Agreement must be symmetrical and bi-directional: if there is to be a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} right, it must point in both directions. Therefore, unlike in a traditional loan the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} in the ISDA Master Agreement applies equally to the bank as it does to the customer.

This presents some rather curly conceptual challenges, as we will see.

Cross default is not needed in a swap

In any case, the risks of loans that {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} address, broadly, do not hold for swaps:

Firstly, swaps are not primarily instruments of uncollateralised indebtedness.

Secondly, there tend to be multiple small Transactions rather than a single big one: therefore payments under the ISDA architecture are frequent and flow in both directions, especially under an ISDA Master Agreement with multiple Transactions. You don’t have the “no coupon due for six months” problem.

Thirdly, ISDA Master Agreements are typically margined, so even though it is conceptually possible for uncollateralised exposure to arise under an ISDA, in practice, it there won’t be much and it will be quickly reset.

Lastly, the majority of swap end users will not have significant unmargined third-party debt: investment funds[1] tend to invest on margin. They do not borrow under uncollateralised loans. So there are few instances of specified indebtedness that they are likely to trigger. It is far more likely that a bank counterparty or swap dealer will have material specified indebtedness. This is a bit of a self-own.

You would not expect {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} to often arise as a sole means of closing out an ISDA Master Agreement. Usually, there would long since have been a {{{{{1}}}|Failure to Pay or Deliver}} or {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}, and both of those events are a much more deterministic, identifiable and therefore safe means of bringing an ISDA arrangement to an end.

How does Cross Default work?

Imagine swap counterparty N who, alongside its ISDA Master Agreement with you, has significant {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} to lenders A, B and C.

Should N default under any of that indebtedness — that is, should any of those lenders become entitled to call in their loans, whether or not they actually do — in a total sum greater than your agreed “{{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}”, you would be entitled to close out your ISDA, even though N had not defaulted in any way directly to you.

“Specified Indebtedness”

What counts as “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}”? The ISDA itself defines it as “borrowed money” without further elaborating on what that means. Generally speaking, it means loans.

Financing arrangements

“Borrowed money” excludes margined financing arrangements.[2] “Financing arrangements” include a wide selection of capital markets transactions including margin loans, synthetic prime brokerage, swaps, stock loans and repos.

These are “asset transformations” rather than borrowings and do not involve uncollateralised “indebtedness” as such: at inception, the party raising money gives title to an asset of greater value to the financer, and is subsequently margined to that asset value. Therefore net, the financing beneficiary is not a debtor at all, but a creditor.

This does not stop excitable credit officers expanding “{{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}” to bring financing arrangements into scope. A favourite tweak is to include derivatives and securities financing arrangements without stopping to clarify how the “borrowed money” under them (hint, under a margined ISDA, there will not be any) is to be measured. Notional? Mark-to-market exposure? Outstanding payment obligations? Present value of all future payments?

Bank deposits

Bank deposits plainly areborrowed money”, and they mightily add up: as we will see, aggregation is important when calculating the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}.

Bank deposits illustrate the problem of having cross-default in a financing contract like an ISDA. In the traditional loan market, bank deposits tend not to trigger cross default obligations, because the sort of parties having cross default obligations do not have deposits. Only banks accept deposits. Since they are usually the lender in a commercial loan they, and their deposits, are not subject to cross default.

But ISDAs are bilateral, so a bank dealer’s deposits will be in scope and could trigger a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} against a bank. It is not out of the question that a bank could be prevented from honouring deposits through operational error, IT outage or geopolitical incident. This would put it in technical default on a large number of its deposits at once.

Therefore, banks exclude retail deposits from the ambit of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}. They will not lightly resile from this position, so buy-side legal eagles looking for a ditch to die in are advised to avoid this one.

Public indebtedness

With the honourable exception of public bond issuances, most {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} arises under private arrangements about which the market will have no reliable real-time information. No one will know how much a given borrower owes, much less whether it has defaulted and when.

This makes practical policing and enforcement of {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} fraught, where it is even possible.

“Default”

“Default” is described widely and (at least in the 2002 ISDA) is not restricted to payment defaults. A technical breach of representations as long as it entitles the lender to accelerate would count towards an actionable {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}.

Vitally, the lender need not actually accelerate the loan. The cross-default right arises as soon as it is entitled to accelerate. This makes the {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} event a powerful and sensitive tool. Too powerful. Too sensitive.

There is now an entirely different page dedicated to cross acceleration — a weakened version of {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} that requires the loan to be actually called in.

“Threshold Amount”

The {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} is the level over which accumulated defaults in {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} trigger {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}. It is usually expressed as a cash amount or a percentage of shareholder funds, or both, in which case — schoolboy error hazard alert — be careful to say whether it is the greater or lesser of the two.

Because of the extreme risk {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} presents, the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} should represent an existential threat to the counterparty’s solvency. For a bank counterparty, that is typically two or three per cent of its shareholders’ equity or the cash equivalent.

A cash equivalent runs the risk of “decoupling” from the value of shareholders’ equity — especially in times of great market stress — so while it is easier to measure and monitor, it presents a greater systemic risk, and you may find it more prudent to stick with an equity-linked threshold.

Snowball risk

This “accumulation” feature means relatively trivial amounts of indebtedness can be problematic. This is particularly so where there are a lot of them — see bank deposits and swap transactions — or where the default is technical, systemic or operational. Should a system outage prevent a counterparty from honouring a class of contracts it might instantly trigger a catastrophic cross-default right across all ISDA Master Agreements.

For buy-side parties (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles) the {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} may be a lot lower than that — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, for fund entities will key off NAV, not shareholder funds.

Problematic derivatives

Bear in mind, too, that if even one of your ISDA contracts has a lower {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}, that can create a chain reaction: because the exposure under that ISDA, once it has been triggered by a {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}, then contributes to the total amount of defaulted Specified Indebtedness and may itself lead to {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}s being triggered in other ISDAs. And each of those then contributes … you get the idea.

The obvious solution is to exclude derivatives and similar financing arrangements from the definition of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}}. That is, to revert to the ISDA standard.

Cherry-picking

One last problem with including swaps: how do you measure the “indebtedness” under a Transaction?

You could, in theory, cherry-pick all out-of-the-money {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}, total them up and cross a {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}} fairly easily.

Nothing requires you to apply a Single Agreement concept or cross-transactional netting to those exposures. (Why would it? ISDA contracts are meant to be out of scope for {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}}).

Even if you calculate {{{{{1}}}|Specified Indebtedness}} by reference to a net close-out amount, this only really highlights the imbalance between dealers and their customers. Sure, big fund managers may have ten, twenty or even fifty ISDA Master Agreements, but they will be split across dozens of different funds, each a different entity with its own {{{{{1}}}|Threshold Amount}}. Swap dealers, on the other hand, will have literally hundreds of thousands of master agreements, all facing the same legal entity. Dealers are the wrong side of this risk.

Now, you could manage this by careful negotiation — but there is a better way: excluding financing transactions altogether, for the perfectly sensible reason that they are not “borrowed money.

Cross default as a “most favoured nation” clause

While the ISDA {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}} are standardised, bilaterally-negotiated default events under private loans will be highly customised.

Especially since Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vi)}} is pretty loose about what counts as a qualifying default:

“a default, event of default or other similar condition or event (however described) in respect of such party”.

This could include potential events of default (those which will become an event of default on expiry of a grace period). In any case, it would haul into the ISDA’s ambit any weird or sensitive default triggers in that loan documentation that deal with peculiarities of the lending arrangement and have no real bearing on the general credit position of the borrower as a derivatives counterparty.

In other words {{{{{1}}}|Cross Default}} functions as a gated “most favoured nation” clause. This is a wide, swingeing term and is likely to be much more severe against bank and dealer counterparties than end-users, since banks will have a lot more indebtedness.

  1. In this I include hedge funds, mutual funds, index funds, ETFs, pension funds, life insurance plans, private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds.
  2. See elsewhere.