Template:Regulator requests: Difference between revisions

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====Obligation to notify provider of regulator requests====
====Obligation to notify provider of regulator requests====
This is a common and oft accepted provision: where you are obliged to disclose to a regulator, you must first notify the provider of the information, to allow them to make representations, or try to get an [[injunction]], to prevent disclosure. However excitable your [[counterparty]] is on this point — and junior lawyers at real money firms can be quite exciteable — resist this. It is potty. When you step through it, it is hard to see any real-world cases where your [[counterparty]] could or would actually try to stop disclosure to a regulator, and plenty of benign circumstances where disclosure is a matter of course. To wit:
This is a common and oft accepted provision: where you are obliged to disclose to a regulator, you must first notify the provider of the information, to allow them to make representations, or try to get an [[injunction]], to prevent disclosure. However excitable your [[counterparty]] is on this point — and junior lawyers at real money firms can be quite exciteable — resist this. It is potty. When you step through it, it is hard to see any real-world cases where your [[counterparty]] could or would actually try to stop disclosure to a regulator, and plenty of benign circumstances where disclosure is a matter of course. To wit:
*'''[[Trade reporting|Trade]]/[[transaction reporting]]''': [[Broker]]s will be obliged to disclose a lot of trade-specific client information to regulators and exchanges every day on account of {{t|MiFID}}/{{t|EMIR}} [[Trade reporting|trade]] and [[trade reporting]]. We are not going to repeatedly tell the client that.
 
*'''Ad-hoc ''general'' information requests''': Outside [[Trade reporting|trade]]/[[transaction reporting]], when regulators ask for [[ad hoc]] information from a [[broker]], it is usually for a wide-ranging data set across whole trading books and sectors, covering multiple clients. It is unrealistic to accept [[Brokers]] to monitor which clients within that population have confis, much less a right to be specifically notified beforehand. Nor will they want to go to the trouble of getting all those consents. Why? BECAUSE LIFE IS TOO SHORT.  
''[[Trade reporting|Trade]]/[[transaction reporting]]'': [[Broker]]s will be obliged to disclose a lot of trade-specific client information to regulators and exchanges every day on account of {{t|MiFID}}/{{t|EMIR}} [[Trade reporting|trade]] and [[trade reporting]]. We are not going to repeatedly tell the client that.
*'''Ad-hoc ''client-specific'' information requests''': Where a regulator specifically asks for data on a single client, it is likely the regulator will also have made equivalent disclosure requests to the client at the same time (or copied the client on those requests to the [[broker]]) — if the request is benign — and if it has not, the investigation is likely to be one where the regulator would not allow the [[broker]] to alert the client anyway, and indeed where such notification could be a criminal offence (market abuse, etc). Even where the notification clause carves out where “notification being illegal” this leaves the [[empty set]] of circumstances where the [[broker]] would have to give info about a specific client and the client doesn’t, but was entitled to know about it.
 
*'''Commercial sensitivity''': Lastly, the legitimate point of a confi is ''to respect the client’s legitimate interest in protecting the commercial value of non-public information''. It is ''not'' to keep silent about behavioural turpitude; indeed a [[broker]]’s regulatory obligations may oblige it to report, without invitation, bad acts it observes, whether the client likes it or not and whether there is a [[confidentiality agreement]] or not. Generally, client information a [[broker]] holds is not legally or professionally [[privilege]]d. Since, by definition, passing information to a regulator should not<ref>Absent a severe dereliction of the regulator’s duty, and in that case there’s not really much the broker can be expected to do about it, is there?</ref> prejudice the commercial value of that information, it is hard to see when client would have a valid reason to seek [[injunctive relief]] to prevent disclosure of information to a competent regulator.
''Ad-hoc ''general'' information requests'': Outside [[Trade reporting|trade]]/[[transaction reporting]], when regulators ask for [[ad hoc]] information from a [[broker]], it is usually for a wide-ranging data set across whole trading books and sectors, covering multiple clients. It is unrealistic to accept [[Brokers]] to monitor which clients within that population have confis, much less a right to be specifically notified beforehand. Nor will they want to go to the trouble of getting all those consents. Why? BECAUSE LIFE IS TOO SHORT.  
 
''Ad-hoc ''client-specific'' information requests'': Where a regulator specifically asks for data on a single client, it is likely the regulator will also have made equivalent disclosure requests to the client at the same time (or copied the client on those requests to the [[broker]]) — if the request is benign — and if it has not, the investigation is likely to be one where the regulator would not allow the [[broker]] to alert the client anyway, and indeed where such notification could be a criminal offence (market abuse, etc). Even where the notification clause carves out where “notification being illegal” this leaves the [[empty set]] of circumstances where the [[broker]] would have to give info about a specific client and the client doesn’t, but was entitled to know about it.
 
''Commercial sensitivity'': Lastly, the legitimate point of a confi is ''to respect the client’s legitimate interest in protecting the commercial value of non-public information''. It is ''not'' to keep silent about behavioural turpitude; indeed a [[broker]]’s regulatory obligations may oblige it to report, without invitation, bad acts it observes, whether the client likes it or not and whether there is a [[confidentiality agreement]] or not. Generally, client information a [[broker]] holds is not legally or professionally [[privilege]]d. Since, by definition, passing information to a regulator should not<ref>Absent a severe dereliction of the regulator’s duty, and in that case there’s not really much the broker can be expected to do about it, is there?</ref> prejudice the commercial value of that information, it is hard to see when client would have a valid reason to seek [[injunctive relief]] to prevent disclosure of information to a competent regulator.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
And that is borne out by the [[JC]]’s tawdry personal experience (anecdotal though it may be, it does span 22 years and three different [[investment bank]]s): the [[JC]] has never ever, ever seen ''anyone'' even ''try'' to get an [[injunction]] to stop disclosure of {{confiprov|confidential information}} to a regulator.
And that is borne out by the [[JC]]’s tawdry personal experience (anecdotal though it may be, it does span 22 years and three different [[investment bank]]s): the [[JC]] has never ever, ever seen ''anyone'' even ''try'' to get an [[injunction]] to stop disclosure of {{confiprov|confidential information}} to a regulator.
=====Cut-out-and-keep response=====
Try sending your counterpart something like this (put “dear —”, and “kind regards” around it, of course):
{{subtable|{{Confi disclosure to regulators}} }}

Latest revision as of 16:47, 30 May 2024

Obligation to notify provider of regulator requests

This is a common and oft accepted provision: where you are obliged to disclose to a regulator, you must first notify the provider of the information, to allow them to make representations, or try to get an injunction, to prevent disclosure. However excitable your counterparty is on this point — and junior lawyers at real money firms can be quite exciteable — resist this. It is potty. When you step through it, it is hard to see any real-world cases where your counterparty could or would actually try to stop disclosure to a regulator, and plenty of benign circumstances where disclosure is a matter of course. To wit:

Trade/transaction reporting: Brokers will be obliged to disclose a lot of trade-specific client information to regulators and exchanges every day on account of MiFID/EMIR trade and trade reporting. We are not going to repeatedly tell the client that.

Ad-hoc general information requests: Outside trade/transaction reporting, when regulators ask for ad hoc information from a broker, it is usually for a wide-ranging data set across whole trading books and sectors, covering multiple clients. It is unrealistic to accept Brokers to monitor which clients within that population have confis, much less a right to be specifically notified beforehand. Nor will they want to go to the trouble of getting all those consents. Why? BECAUSE LIFE IS TOO SHORT.

Ad-hoc client-specific information requests: Where a regulator specifically asks for data on a single client, it is likely the regulator will also have made equivalent disclosure requests to the client at the same time (or copied the client on those requests to the broker) — if the request is benign — and if it has not, the investigation is likely to be one where the regulator would not allow the broker to alert the client anyway, and indeed where such notification could be a criminal offence (market abuse, etc). Even where the notification clause carves out where “notification being illegal” this leaves the empty set of circumstances where the broker would have to give info about a specific client and the client doesn’t, but was entitled to know about it.

Commercial sensitivity: Lastly, the legitimate point of a confi is to respect the client’s legitimate interest in protecting the commercial value of non-public information. It is not to keep silent about behavioural turpitude; indeed a broker’s regulatory obligations may oblige it to report, without invitation, bad acts it observes, whether the client likes it or not and whether there is a confidentiality agreement or not. Generally, client information a broker holds is not legally or professionally privileged. Since, by definition, passing information to a regulator should not[1] prejudice the commercial value of that information, it is hard to see when client would have a valid reason to seek injunctive relief to prevent disclosure of information to a competent regulator.

And that is borne out by the JC’s tawdry personal experience (anecdotal though it may be, it does span 22 years and three different investment banks): the JC has never ever, ever seen anyone even try to get an injunction to stop disclosure of confidential information to a regulator.

Cut-out-and-keep response

Try sending your counterpart something like this (put “dear —”, and “kind regards” around it, of course):


Disclosure to regulators

There are three main reasons a regulator might require confidential information from us relating to a client:

Trade/transaction reporting: Brokers will be obliged to disclose a lot of trade-specific client information to regulators and exchanges every day on account of Dodd Frank and other regulatory reporting regimes (for example MiFID/EMIR trade and trade reporting). You should assume we will do that.

Ad-hoc general information requests: Outside trade/transaction reporting, when regulators ask for ad hoc information from us, it is usually for a wide-ranging data set across whole trading books and sectors, covering multiple clients. Given the benign nature of these requests, it is not practicable to obtain consents or make disclosures to all affected clients beforehand.

Ad-hoc client-specific information requests: Where a regulator specifically asks for data on a single client, either:

  • if the request is benign, the regulator is likely to have made equivalent disclosure requests to the client at the same time (or copied the client on those requests to the broker), or
  • if the request is not — that is, the investigation is one where the regulator would not allow us to alert the client anyway, we would not be able to, and such notification could be a criminal offence.

Thus, even where the notification clause carves out where “notification being illegal” this leaves the empty set of circumstances where we would have to give info about a specific client and the client doesn’t, but was entitled to know about it.

Lastly, a confidentiality agreement is designed to respect the client’s legitimate interest in protecting the commercial value of non-public information. It is not meant to be a tool to prevent regulatory disclosure. Generally, we will not be in a position to make demands as to how a regulator treats that information when we disclose it. Since passing information to a regulator should not generally prejudice the commercial value of that information, it is hard to see when client would have a valid reason to seek injunctive relief to prevent disclosure of information to a competent regulator, and our experience is that no client has ever in fact attempted to do so.


  1. Absent a severe dereliction of the regulator’s duty, and in that case there’s not really much the broker can be expected to do about it, is there?