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====Good Faith and Commercially Reasonable Manner====
====Good Faith and Commercially Reasonable Manner====
===“[[Good faith]] and [[commercially reasonable manner]]” as a general standard===
Whether a merchant should commit herself to dealing in [[good faith]], or in a [[commercially reasonable manner]], or [[In good faith and a commercially reasonable manner|both]], is one that vexes the legal profession. Especially those in [[US Attorney|America]]. It should not. While doing no more than articulating the [[commercial imperative]] it can put many a tedious, and expensive, [[negotiation]] to the sword.  
Whether a merchant should commit himself to dealing in [[good faith]], or in a [[commercially reasonable manner]], or [[In good faith and a commercially reasonable manner|both]], is one that vexes many of our learned friends. Especially those in [[US Attorney|America]]. The only discomfort it should occasion is to a solicitor’s<ref>Being an officer of the court, American friends, and not someone who goes door-to-door selling encyclopaedias.</ref> livelihood, for this magic expression, while doing no more than articulating the [[commercial imperative]] and the basic commercial outlook of a [[good egg]], puts many a tedious [[negotiation]] to the sword.  


Everyone benefits but officers of Her Majesty's — or (''cough'') the People’s — courts.
Of course, there is a certain kind of negotiator apt to see phantoms and ghosts at every turn.  She has a bleak vision indeed of a counterparty’s general commercial aspirations for his organisation. Hobbesian.


“[[In good faith and a commercially reasonable manner]]cuts the crap and promises to unlock some negotiations and take the [[tedious]] line-by-line muck-raking out of others.
“What if,” she will say, “your traders mendaciously use this clause to bring about my firm’s misfortune in a way I – er – cannot now anticipate?”  


There is a certain kind of legal negotiator apt to see phantoms and ghosts at every turn. He has a bleak vision indeed of a counterparty’s general commercial aspirations for his organisation.  
=====Litigation risk=====
The one argument against the general principle is that acting “reasonably” is inherently ''vague'' and therefore a source of potential dispute ''in itself'', ''even if'' we always exercise our rights reasonably and in good faith. This is just what you would expect a work-creating lawyer to say.


“What if,” he will say, “your traders mendaciously use this clause to bring about my firm’s misfortune in a way I – er – cannot now anticipate?” (This fellow’s imagination tend to be fantastical in the abstract, but rather prosaic  in the particular).  
JC says, “come now”. This is ''constructive'' vaguess - of the good kind — it only presents [[litigation]] risk to clients who don’t trust you — and here you have bigger problems, frankly — or to those whom ''you'' don’t trust — also not without issues. Here, your problem is not the good faith obligation; it’s that you have a lousy client relationship. It hardly affects litigation risk in any case: An unhappy client will take action either way, and will argue a lack of good faith in any case.


Such a chap is often placated by the magical expression “acting in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner”.  It may help persuade him across that wobbly bridge to [[Consensus ad idem|consensus]]. Many a time it has helped the [[JC]] get home in time for supper.
A contract is a bond of [[trust]]. How would a merchant explain to his counterparty that he wished to reserve for himself the right to act in ''[[bad faith]]''?


'''Litigation risk''': The one argument against the general principle is that it is inherently vague and therefore a source of potential dispute ''in itself'', ''even if'' we always exercise our rights reasonably and in good faith. But come now — it only presents [[litigation]] risk to clients who don’t trust you — and here you have bigger problems, frankly — or for those whom ''you'' don’t trust — also not without issues. Here, your problem is not the good faith obligation; it’s that you have a lousy client relationship. It hardly affects litigation risk in any case: An unhappy client will take action either way, and will argue a lack of good faith in any case.
As for [[commercial reasonableness]], yes, ''it admits shades of doubt, and encourages litigation'' — well, for you the great case of {{casenote|Barclays|Unicredit}} should be a source of succour. The fact that “[[in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner]]” is written into the [[Uniform Commercial Code]] should bend the American ear: if it is okay there — and in the {{nyvmcsa}} — why not elsewhere?
 
A {{tag|contract}} is a bond of [[trust]]. How would a merchant explain to his counterparty that he wished to reserve for himself the right to act in ''[[bad faith]]''?
 
As for [[commercial reasonableness]], and that objection I can already see you formulating that ''it admits shades of doubt, and encourages litigation'' — well, for you the great case of {{casenote|Barclays|Unicredit}} should be a source of succour. And for you Americans, for whom {{casenote|Barclays|Unicredit}} is of persuasive value only, there is the fact that “[[in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner]]” is written into the [[Uniform Commercial Code]] should bend your ear: if it is okay there — and in the {{nyvmcsa}} — why not elsewhere?


In any case, whatever your contract says, if a court finds you have acted wantonly, or in bad faith, do not expect much sympathy when you argue that, by the contract, you were ''entitled'' to. <br>
In any case, whatever your contract says, if a court finds you have acted wantonly, or in bad faith, do not expect much sympathy when you argue that, by the contract, you were ''entitled'' to. <br>

Latest revision as of 16:00, 13 May 2024

Good Faith and Commercially Reasonable Manner

Whether a merchant should commit herself to dealing in good faith, or in a commercially reasonable manner, or both, is one that vexes the legal profession. Especially those in America. It should not. While doing no more than articulating the commercial imperative it can put many a tedious, and expensive, negotiation to the sword.

Of course, there is a certain kind of negotiator apt to see phantoms and ghosts at every turn. She has a bleak vision indeed of a counterparty’s general commercial aspirations for his organisation. Hobbesian.

“What if,” she will say, “your traders mendaciously use this clause to bring about my firm’s misfortune in a way I – er – cannot now anticipate?”

Litigation risk

The one argument against the general principle is that acting “reasonably” is inherently vague and therefore a source of potential dispute in itself, even if we always exercise our rights reasonably and in good faith. This is just what you would expect a work-creating lawyer to say.

JC says, “come now”. This is constructive vaguess - of the good kind — it only presents litigation risk to clients who don’t trust you — and here you have bigger problems, frankly — or to those whom you don’t trust — also not without issues. Here, your problem is not the good faith obligation; it’s that you have a lousy client relationship. It hardly affects litigation risk in any case: An unhappy client will take action either way, and will argue a lack of good faith in any case.

A contract is a bond of trust. How would a merchant explain to his counterparty that he wished to reserve for himself the right to act in bad faith?

As for commercial reasonableness, yes, it admits shades of doubt, and encourages litigation — well, for you the great case of Barclays v Unicredit should be a source of succour. The fact that “in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner” is written into the Uniform Commercial Code should bend the American ear: if it is okay there — and in the 2016 NY Law VM CSA — why not elsewhere?

In any case, whatever your contract says, if a court finds you have acted wantonly, or in bad faith, do not expect much sympathy when you argue that, by the contract, you were entitled to.

Legally ineligible Credit Support

New for the regulatory margin CSAs

There is no such concept in the ancient CSAs, concerning as it does legal and not contractual ineligibility of credit support, and that being a function of criteria imposed by regulators on one’s mandatory obligations to post and collect margin, which did not exist before 2016, it is hardly surprising ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ of yore didn’t anticipate the need for this clause, which is convoluted, finnicky, and you can avoid the need for it entirely, should you post cash in a sensible currency.

Regulatory margin title transfer CSA vs security interest CSA

In most respects they are identical (with references to “Transferor” and “Transferee” switched to “Pledgor” and “Secured Party”). There are two technical differences, for completists:

Specification of certain matters

One from the “well, I’ll be blowed” school of legal expression wherein ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ states the bleeding obvious for the benefit of those timid types who — despite being schooled in its weft and warp — don’t quite trust the common law to deliver elementary common sense.

On the one hand, you can see where they’re coming from — this is the same common law which concluded that email is not an electronic messaging system,[2] after all - but on the other hand come on.