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Other market counterparties, perhaps less so.  
Other market counterparties, perhaps less so.  
Given that its potential effect is likely to be “[[iatrogenic]]” — worse than the risk it addresses — a non-bank counterparty could be forgiven for being a little blasé.<ref>For the little it is worth, JC gets to that conclusion as follows: the risk that without AET a counterparty{{L3}}goes bankrupt without an intervening Event of Default<li>is significantly out of the money on a collateralised basis<li>has a receiver who takes the decision to cherry pick transactions<li>is successful doing so in its own jurisdiction and<li>then successfully manages to enforce its judgment in the Non-Defaulting Party’s home jurisdiction notwithstanding the contract being robust there —</ol>
Given that its potential effect is likely to be “[[iatrogenic]]” — worse than the risk it addresses — a non-bank counterparty could be forgiven for being a little blasé.<ref>For the little it is worth, I get to that conclusion as follows: the risk that is that:{{L3}}
is, we think, vanishingly low, supported by the fact that it does not seem to have happened even once in the 43-year history of the global OTC derivatives market.  
Your counterparty goes bankrupt without an intervening Failure to Pay '' and''<li>
It is significantly net  [[out-of-the-money]] on a collateralised basis when it does so '' and''<li>
Its receiver cherry-picks its in-the-money Transactions and gets a local judgment against you for those '' and''<li>
''Your'' home courts enforce the foreign judgment even though the netting is robust in your jurisdiction. </ol>
This risk is, I think, vanishingly low. It does not seem to have happened even once in the 43-year history of the global OTC derivatives market.  


Against that contingency we pit the ''present'' risk that the Non-Defaulting Party is prematurely catapulted out of Transactions it was quite happy to remain in: that were adequately capitalised, perhaps even out of the money, and for which it might have preferred to roll the dice and take a chance on closing out the risks later, at a time of lower volatility, thereby reducing the risk of off-market loss for both parties.</ref>
Against that contingency pit the ''present'' risk that you are, without notice, prematurely catapulted out of adequately capitalised Transactions you were happy to remain in, that were perhaps even out of the money to you, and for which you might have preferred to roll the dice and risk not being able to close out later in the optimistic hope that reasonableness and consensus might yet prevail at a time of lower volatility, thereby reducing the risk of off-market loss for both parties.</ref>


====The theory====
====The theory====
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There are two things such a suspension could affect:  
There are two things such a suspension could affect:  
{{L1}}'''Discretionary termination right''': Firstly, insolvency rules may operate to prevent the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} closing out {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} under the ISDA ''at all''. They may give the insolvency administrator a discretion to affirm or avoid individual {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}. This bigly messes with the fundamental philosophy of the {{isdama}}:  
{{L1}}'''Discretionary termination right itself''': Firstly, insolvency rules may prevent the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} closing out {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} ''at all''. They may give the administrator the [[discretion]] to affirm or avoid individual {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}. This ''bigly'' messes with the fundamental philosophy of the {{isdama}}:  
{{quote|
{{quote|
A swap counterparty to a portfolio of swap transactions scheduled to mature over the next five years may have no ''present'' obligation to pay any cash under those {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s even if, from a [[mark-to-market]] perspective, the [[net present value]] of that portfolio is significantly negative. Who knows? Things may come right.}}
A swap counterparty to a portfolio of swap transactions scheduled to mature over the next five years may have no ''present'' obligation to pay any cash under those {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s even if, from a [[mark-to-market]] perspective, the [[net present value]] of that portfolio is significantly negative. Who knows? Things may come right.}}


All those hopes and dreams would be crushed if the {{isdama}} were terminated on grounds of {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}. The {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} would immediately be liable to pay that full mark-to-market value in cash. A bankruptcy suspension right prevents the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} from crushing the bankrupt party’s dreams. Well, its other unsecured creditors’ dreams, at any rate.<li>
All those hopes and dreams would be crushed if the {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} were terminated on grounds of {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}. The {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} would immediately be liable to pay that full mark-to-market value in cash. A bankruptcy suspension right prevents the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} from crushing the bankrupt party’s dreams. Well, its other unsecured creditors’ dreams, at any rate.<li>
'''Netting right''': Beyond that, having exercised its early termination right the contractual provisions of the single agreement operate to net all transaction exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may have a right to enforce some contracts and set aside others that netting right is prejudiced.</ol></li>
'''Netting right''': Beyond that, having exercised its early termination right, the “[[single agreement]]” operates to net all {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may have a right to enforce some contracts and set aside others. that netting right is prejudiced.</ol></li>
====History====
{{{{{1}}}|AET}} It was introduced in the {{1987ma}}, but was not labelled “{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}}”: it just sat there and applied across the board. Unlike in later editions, it was not conceived as an election to be used with caution only when needed against counterparties in jurisdictions vulnerable to bankruptcy shenanigans.


{{{{{1}}}|AET}} It was introduced in the {{1987ma}}, but was not labelled “{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}}in that agreement, possibly because it was not conceived as an optional election to be used with caution where needed: it just sat there and applied across the board.
While under the [[Modern ISDAs]] {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is only triggered by ''certain'' events under the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} [[Events of Default - ISDA Provision|event of default]], in the {{1987ma}} ''any'' Bankruptcy Event triggered it, against ''any'' counterparty in any jurisdiction. This is just one more reason not to use the {{1987ma}}, if there are any [[Burmese Junglers]] still out there looking for a way back to civilisation.  


{{{{{1}}}|AET}} is thus only triggered by ''certain'' events under the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} [[Events of Default - ISDA Provision|event of default]] — formal bankruptcy procedures — and not by economic events that tend to indicate insolvency (such as an inability to pay debts as they fall due, [[technical insolvency]] or a creditor’s mere exercise of default rights or enforcement of security. Though, interestingly, those events (captured in limbs (2) and (7) of the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition) ''did'' trigger automatic early termination in the {{1987ma}}. This is just one more reason not to use that edition, if there are any [[Burmese Junglers]] out there looking for one.  
By 1992, {{icds}} had realised that the risk of “bankruptcy shenanigans” largely arose in ''formal'' bankruptcy procedures and not as a result of “soft” economic events tending to indicate mere ''[[insolvency]]''. As we note [[Bankruptcy as a phase transition|elsewhere]], the ISDA’s {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition somewhat jumbles the distinct concepts of “[[bankruptcy]]and “[[insolvency]]”.
 
In any case, a Counterparty’s “inability to pay its debts as they fall due”, its “[[technical insolvency]]or a creditor’s enforcement of security — is no more of a challenge to close-out netting than any other Event of Default, so the {{1992ma}} reduced its scope by excluding the soft insolvency events captured in limbs (2) and (7) of the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition.


{{{{{1}}}|AET}} does not apply to other {{{{{1}}}|Events of Default}}.
====It is now an election====
====It is now an election====
Though the {{1987ma}} triggered automatic termination upon any type of {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} event for any counterparty in any jurisdiction, it has since turned out that the mischief against which {{{{{1}}}|AET}} guards does not really arise in most jurisdictions: only those a history of Teutonic jurisprudence.  
Though the {{1987ma}} triggered automatic termination upon the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} of''any'' counterparty in any jurisdiction, it has since turned out that the mischief against which {{{{{1}}}|AET}} guards does not really arise in most jurisdictions. <ref>The ones where it does are the Germanic ones ([[Germany]], Austria, [[Switzerland]]) and also Japan. though, of course, check your netting opinions!</ref>
 
In those (e.g., [[Germany]], Austria, [[Switzerland]] and Japan) immediately upon commencement of formal bankruptcy proceedings a bankruptcy [[administrator]] would be entitled “[[cherry-pick]]” those {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s it wishes to honour (typically, those that are [[in-the-money]] to the {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} whose estate it is administering) and those it wished would just conveniently vanish from the financial record (namely those where the {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} is [[out-of-the-money]]).


Since the whole point of the {{{{{1}}}|Single Agreement}} and the [[close-out netting]] concept is to get to a market exposure as close as possible to zero before launching any recovery actions, this kind of cherry-picking would completely demolish the entire capital theory on which the {{isdama}} is founded. Hence, Automatic Early Termination!
Since the whole point of the {{{{{1}}}|Single Agreement}} and the [[close-out netting]] concept is to get to a market exposure as close as possible to zero before launching any recovery actions, this kind of cherry-picking would completely demolish the entire capital theory on which the {{isdama}} is founded. Hence, Automatic Early Termination!
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====It only has limited use====
====It only has limited use====
{{{{{1}}}|AET}} is only really useful:  
{{Drop|A|utomatic Early Termination}} is only really useful to a regulated financial institution, which would incur a capital charge if it doesn’t have a [[netting opinion]], and where it wouldn’t ''get'' that netting opinion for a particular counterparty unless {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} applied to its ISDA. <br>
 
There are only a few counterparty types in a few jurisdictions where these conditions prevail. There are not many because {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bit of an oh-do-me-a-favour-no-one-will-seriously-fall-for-that-will-they? gambit. This sort of thing passed for sport in the eighties and nineties — [[I’ll be gone; you’ll be gone]] — but only really passes muster these days because AET is so deeply ingrained into our documents and our way of doing things that no-one has the gorm to know any better.
 
A piece of time-travelling contractual magic —[[deem]]ing an ISDA to have terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before the event that, on expiry of a [[grace period]] would later trigger it, purely so that the termination would not be [[problematic]] for one creditor under discretionary rules designed to ensure fairness and avoid just that kind of preference seems rather optimistic.
 
The benign view is still a bit hopeful: {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} delivers netting not where otherwise unequivocally it would be forbidden, but rather it buttresses a permitted outcome, dispelling residual doubt about the effectiveness of netting during bankruptcy as a result of looseness in regulation following the [[phase transition]] from solvency. 


(1) to a regulated financial institution, which <br>
The pragmatic view is blunter: derivatives master agreements were weird innovations that might not compute for official assignees in the 1990s. Now, they are not. Everyone knows what ISDAs are, why they net, and why the [[single agreement]] is a sensible plank in the capital structure of the financial system, and why allowing administrators to cherry pick Transactions under an arm’s length ISDA would not lead to a fair result for anyone, and this is reflected in the fact that no single agreement has been challenged in 40 years.  
(2) would incur a capital charge if it doesn’t have a [[netting opinion]]'', and <br>
(3) where it wouldn’t get that netting opinion for a particular counterparty without {{{{{1}}}|AET}} being switched on in its {{isdama}}. <br>


There are only a few counterparty types where these conditions prevail: the German and Swiss corporates mentioned above, for example. There may be others, but not many, because {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is a good-old-days, regulators-really-are-dopey-if-they-fall-for-this kind of tactic. It only really survives these days because it is so part of the furniture no-one has the chutzpah to question it, despite the trail of destruction and confusion it has left across the commercial courts of the US an the UK.
The question is whether, unwittingly, {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} creates more practical risk ''now'' than ever it avoided in the derivative dark ages of superstition, fear and nightmare.  


I mean, ''really''? [[Deem]]ing your ISDA to have magically terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before that termination would become problematic as a result of your insolvency? Come ''on''. Is any sophisticated insolvency regime going to buy that kind of magical thinking? (No slight meant on Germany or Switzerland here: the “Teutonic” {{{{{1}}}|AET}} does not deliver netting where unequivocally it would otherwise be forbidden, but rather buttresses residual doubt about the effectiveness of netting during insolvency as a result of looseness in insolvency regulations that aren’t categorical that you ''can'' net. The view is generally it ''should'' be okay in insolvency, but there are just some freaky discretions that ''may'' make life awkward if used maliciously. This is not legal advice.)
We will talk about at great length in the premium section.


====Why not just switch it on, to be on the safe side?====
====Why not just switch it on, to be on the safe side?====

Latest revision as of 20:48, 1 October 2024

HAL 9000: Just a moment — just a moment — I just picked up a fault in the AET-87 Unit.

Frank Poole: What is it?

HAL 9000: It’s a device for optimising regulatory capital, but that’s not important right now.

David Bowman: What’s the problem, HAL?

HAL 9000: It’s going to go one hundred per cent. failure, within 72 hours.

Poole: Surely, you can’t be serious?

HAL 9000: I am serious. And don’t call me “Shirley”.

Bowman: (sticking to the script) I don’t know what you’re talking about, HAL?

Cue musical introduction

HAL9000: Well, I’ll tell you.

Chorus: He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell! —

Poole: Stop that! Stop that! No singing!

Carries on for three hours in this vein

Monty Python and the Magnetic Anomaly from Airplane!

{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is an odd and misunderstood concept. It sits buried at the back end of Section {{{{{1}}}|6(a)}} ({{{{{1}}}|Right to Terminate Following Event of Default}}). In essence it provides that where a party to whom {{{{{1}}}|AET}} applies suffers an in-scope {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} event, all outstanding {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s are instantly terminated, without the need for any action by the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}.

This inverts the normal order of things under the ISDA Master Agreement wherein the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} generally has the right, but not the obligation, to call an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}. Being automatic, therefore {{{{{1}}}|AET}} even obliterates the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}’s ability to waive this event, since by the time it is in a position to do so, the event has already happened.

(Could a {{{{{1}}}|NDP}} pre-waive in anticipation? See “anticipatory waiver?” in the premium section if that is the sort of thing that keeps you up at night.)

JC’s general view is that {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bad solution to an unlikely problem, but since it is intractably embedded in every ISDA on the planet, after thirty-five years of folly, we are pretty much stuck with it.

Others — for example the learned author of Cluley on Close-Outs — have a different view. But, look: JC has to depart ways with the cool crowd every now and then, just to maintain his membership with the Worshipful Company of Contrarians. This is one of those times.

It’s not about the window

Triago: Herewith, hereinafter and hereinbefore-confirmed:
A custom aperture. Wall-inlaid,
Well-glazed and fringed by lintel stone.
A device to shed upon us light!

Regolamento: Oh, a window?

Triago: Good heavens, No! Not that!
(Whispering) There are ways and means of saying ’t, ser —
Prithee, gird thy verbiage about with care
Lest th’Exchequer’s like for “levies upon transparency”
Untimely drains th’excess from our meagre chancelry—
Catcheth thou the drift?

Regolamento: It is not a window, then? These sound like solid facts?

Nuncle: ’Tis not so much a window
As a means of dodging tax.

Büchstein, Talentdämmerung

{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is as much to do with managing regulatory capital — in particular, vouching safe close-out netting — as it is about substantive credit risk mitigation.

Banks — those who calculate regulatory capital in banks, or are obliged to read netting opinions on their behalf at any rate, care a lot about it.

Other market counterparties, perhaps less so. Given that its potential effect is likely to be “iatrogenic” — worse than the risk it addresses — a non-bank counterparty could be forgiven for being a little blasé.[1]

The theory

Where a {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}}’s insolvency regime allows its administrator to suspend its contractual terms or cherry-pick which of its {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} to honour, it would help the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} if the ISDA were to automatically terminate before the administrator had a chance to do any such thing. To be safe, termination should happen at the exact moment — or even an infinitesimal moment before — that insolvency regime kicks in.

There are two things such a suspension could affect:

  1. Discretionary termination right itself: Firstly, insolvency rules may prevent the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} closing out {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} at all. They may give the administrator the discretion to affirm or avoid individual {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}. This bigly messes with the fundamental philosophy of the ISDA Master Agreement:

    A swap counterparty to a portfolio of swap transactions scheduled to mature over the next five years may have no present obligation to pay any cash under those {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s even if, from a mark-to-market perspective, the net present value of that portfolio is significantly negative. Who knows? Things may come right.

    All those hopes and dreams would be crushed if the {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} were terminated on grounds of {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}}. The {{{{{1}}}|Defaulting Party}} would immediately be liable to pay that full mark-to-market value in cash. A bankruptcy suspension right prevents the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} from crushing the bankrupt party’s dreams. Well, its other unsecured creditors’ dreams, at any rate.
  2. Netting right: Beyond that, having exercised its early termination right, the “single agreement” operates to net all {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may have a right to enforce some contracts and set aside others. that netting right is prejudiced.

History

{{{{{1}}}|AET}} It was introduced in the 1987 ISDA, but was not labelled “{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}}”: it just sat there and applied across the board. Unlike in later editions, it was not conceived as an election to be used with caution only when needed against counterparties in jurisdictions vulnerable to bankruptcy shenanigans.

While under the Modern ISDAs {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is only triggered by certain events under the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} event of default, in the 1987 ISDA any Bankruptcy Event triggered it, against any counterparty in any jurisdiction. This is just one more reason not to use the 1987 ISDA, if there are any Burmese Junglers still out there looking for a way back to civilisation.

By 1992, ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ had realised that the risk of “bankruptcy shenanigans” largely arose in formal bankruptcy procedures and not as a result of “soft” economic events tending to indicate mere insolvency. As we note elsewhere, the ISDA’s {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition somewhat jumbles the distinct concepts of “bankruptcy” and “insolvency”.

In any case, a Counterparty’s “inability to pay its debts as they fall due”, its “technical insolvency” or a creditor’s enforcement of security — is no more of a challenge to close-out netting than any other Event of Default, so the 1992 ISDA reduced its scope by excluding the soft insolvency events captured in limbs (2) and (7) of the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition.

It is now an election

Though the 1987 ISDA triggered automatic termination upon the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} ofany counterparty in any jurisdiction, it has since turned out that the mischief against which {{{{{1}}}|AET}} guards does not really arise in most jurisdictions. [2]

Since the whole point of the {{{{{1}}}|Single Agreement}} and the close-out netting concept is to get to a market exposure as close as possible to zero before launching any recovery actions, this kind of cherry-picking would completely demolish the entire capital theory on which the ISDA Master Agreement is founded. Hence, Automatic Early Termination!

In any case, since the 1992 ISDA {{{{{1}}}|AET}} has been an election that you toggle on or off for each counterparty in Part 1 of the {{{{{1}}}|Schedule}}.

It only has limited use

Automatic Early Termination is only really useful to a regulated financial institution, which would incur a capital charge if it doesn’t have a netting opinion, and where it wouldn’t get that netting opinion for a particular counterparty unless {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} applied to its ISDA.

There are only a few counterparty types in a few jurisdictions where these conditions prevail. There are not many because {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bit of an oh-do-me-a-favour-no-one-will-seriously-fall-for-that-will-they? gambit. This sort of thing passed for sport in the eighties and nineties — I’ll be gone; you’ll be gone — but only really passes muster these days because AET is so deeply ingrained into our documents and our way of doing things that no-one has the gorm to know any better.

A piece of time-travelling contractual magic —deeming an ISDA to have terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before the event that, on expiry of a grace period would later trigger it, purely so that the termination would not be problematic for one creditor under discretionary rules designed to ensure fairness and avoid just that kind of preference seems rather optimistic.

The benign view is still a bit hopeful: {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} delivers netting not where otherwise unequivocally it would be forbidden, but rather it buttresses a permitted outcome, dispelling residual doubt about the effectiveness of netting during bankruptcy as a result of looseness in regulation following the phase transition from solvency.

The pragmatic view is blunter: derivatives master agreements were weird innovations that might not compute for official assignees in the 1990s. Now, they are not. Everyone knows what ISDAs are, why they net, and why the single agreement is a sensible plank in the capital structure of the financial system, and why allowing administrators to cherry pick Transactions under an arm’s length ISDA would not lead to a fair result for anyone, and this is reflected in the fact that no single agreement has been challenged in 40 years.

The question is whether, unwittingly, {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} creates more practical risk now than ever it avoided in the derivative dark ages of superstition, fear and nightmare.

We will talk about at great length in the premium section.

Why not just switch it on, to be on the safe side?

Master trading agreements are unusual in that upon an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}, there is no guarantee a given portfolio of {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} will be in-the-money to the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}.

The last thing an {{{{{1}}}|NDP}} will want to do is accelerate {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s under ISDA if that means it winds up realising mark-to-market losses. Indeed, the “flawed asset” provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement are designed precisely to allow a {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} to suspend its own performance — therefore not make its position any worse — without crystallising its {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures.

Having {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s automatically accelerate is undesirable: one would only choose that if the alternative was catastrophically worse.

In the minds of those who framed the early ISDAs, mendacious application of discretions by foreign bankruptcy administrators was just such a catastrophic worseness.

But —time having passed, water flowed under the bridge and tempers mellowed with age and wisdom — JC wonders whether there are not better things the world’s risk officers to be fretting about instead of the capital implications of general rules of governance that apply to local corporations.

There is an extended rant on the close-out netting page.

  1. For the little it is worth, I get to that conclusion as follows: the risk that is that:
    1. Your counterparty goes bankrupt without an intervening Failure to Pay and
    2. It is significantly net out-of-the-money on a collateralised basis when it does so and
    3. Its receiver cherry-picks its in-the-money Transactions and gets a local judgment against you for those and
    4. Your home courts enforce the foreign judgment even though the netting is robust in your jurisdiction.

    This risk is, I think, vanishingly low. It does not seem to have happened even once in the 43-year history of the global OTC derivatives market.

    Against that contingency pit the present risk that you are, without notice, prematurely catapulted out of adequately capitalised Transactions you were happy to remain in, that were perhaps even out of the money to you, and for which you might have preferred to roll the dice and risk not being able to close out later in the optimistic hope that reasonableness and consensus might yet prevail at a time of lower volatility, thereby reducing the risk of off-market loss for both parties.

  2. The ones where it does are the Germanic ones (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) and also Japan. though, of course, check your netting opinions!