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JC’s view is that {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bad solution to an unlikely problem, but since it is embedded in every ISDA on the planet, and remains present in the minds of those who mandate capital calculations, we are stuck with it.
JC’s view is that {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bad solution to an unlikely problem, but since it is embedded in every ISDA on the planet, and remains present in the minds of those who mandate capital calculations, we are stuck with it.
====It’s not about risk: it’s about capital calculations====
{{dialogue|
{{dkt windows}}
—{{buchstein}}, {{br|Talentdämmerung}}
}}
{{sdrop|A|utomatic Early Termination}} is as much to do with managing [[Tier 1 capital|regulatory capital]] — in particular, vouching safe [[close-out netting]] — as it is about substantive [[credit risk mitigation]].
If you don’t have to hold regulatory capital — as a rule, [[swap dealer]]s do, [[end user]]s don’t — you could be forgiven for being a little sanguine: the risk AET addresses that is that:
{{quote|{{hbullet|Your counterparty goes bankrupt without an intervening Failure to Pay '' and''<li>
It is significantly net  [[out-of-the-money]] on a  collateralised basis when it does so '' and''<li>
Its receiver cherry-picks its in-the-money Transactions and gets a local judgment against you for those '' and''<li>
''Your'' home courts enforce the foreign judgment even though the netting is robust in your jurisdiction. }}}}
This risk is ''low''. It does not seem to have happened yet, in the 43-year history of the global OTC derivatives market.
Against that contingency pit the ''present'' risk that you are, without notice, prematurely catapulted out of adequately margined {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} you were happy to remain in, that were perhaps even [[out-of-the-money]] to you, and for which you might have preferred to roll the dice in the optimistic hope that reasonableness and consensus might yet prevail at a time of lower volatility, thereby reducing the risk of off-market loss for both parties.


====The theory====
====The theory====
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'''Netting right''': Having exercised its early termination right, the “[[single agreement]]” operates to net all {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may enforce some contracts and set aside others, that netting right is prejudiced.</ol></li>
'''Netting right''': Having exercised its early termination right, the “[[single agreement]]” operates to net all {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may enforce some contracts and set aside others, that netting right is prejudiced.</ol></li>
====History====
====History====
{{sdrop|A|utomatic Early Termination}} was introduced in the {{1987ma}}, but was not labelled “{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}}”: it just sat there and applied across the board. Unlike in later editions, it was not conceived as an election to be used cautiously and only when needed against counterparties in jurisdictions vulnerable to [[bankruptcy shenanigans]].  
{{sdrop|A|utomatic Early Termination}} was introduced, uncredited, in the {{1987ma}}. It was not an election, to be engaged judiciously, when needed against counterparties in jurisdictions vulnerable to [[bankruptcy shenanigans]]. It just sat there and applied across the board.  
 
While under the [[Modern ISDAs]] {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is only triggered by ''certain'' events under the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} [[Events of Default - ISDA Provision|event of default]], in the {{1987ma}} ''any'' Bankruptcy Event triggered it, against ''any'' counterparty in any jurisdiction. This is just one more reason not to use the {{1987ma}}, if there are any [[Burmese Junglers]] still out there looking for a way back to civilisation.
 
By 1992, {{icds}} had realised that the risk of “[[bankruptcy shenanigans]]” largely arose in ''formal'' bankruptcy procedures and not as a result of “soft” economic events tending to indicate mere ''[[insolvency]]''. As we note [[Bankruptcy as a phase transition|elsewhere]], the ISDA’s {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition somewhat jumbles the distinct concepts of “[[bankruptcy]]” and “[[insolvency]]”.
 
In any case, a Counterparty’s “[[Insolvency#cashflow insolvency|cashflow insolvency]]”, its “[[Insolvency#balance-sheet insolvency|balance-sheet insolvency]]” or a creditor’s enforcement of security — is no more of a risk to close-out netting than any other {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}, so the {{1992ma}} reduced the scope of AET by excluding these soft “insolvency” events captured in limbs (2) and (7) of the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition.
 
====It is now an election====
{{sdrop|T|hough the 1987}} ISDA triggered automatic termination upon ''any'' {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} event happening to ''any'' counterparty in ''any'' jurisdiction, it has since turned out that the mischief against which {{{{{1}}}|AET}} guards does not arise at all in most jurisdictions, and where it does, only to certain counterparty types and certain Bankruptcy events.<ref>The ones where it does are the Germanic ones ([[Germany]], Austria, [[Switzerland]]) and also Japan. though, of course, check your netting opinions!</ref>
 
The [[’squad]] corrected this in 1992. Since the {{1992ma}}, {{{{{1}}}|AET}} has been an election that you toggle on or off for each counterparty in Part 1 of the {{{{{1}}}|Schedule}}.
 
====It only has limited use====
{{sdrop|A|utomatic Early Termination}} is only really useful to a ''regulated institution'': one, like a bank or an insurer, that must hold [[regulatory capital]] against its ISDA exposures. Basel rules allow a bank to treat its ISDA exposures against a counterparty as “net” only if it can find a law firm that will give an opinion that in all conceivable circumstances ''including on the counterparty’s bankruptcy'', those exposures would net down on close-out. In a very few cases, the legal opinion will say something like:
{{quote|“Well, if your Counterparty goes bankrupt and then you try to close out, it won’t work. ''Unless'' you activate that sneaky AET trigger. If you do that, you’ll be fine, because it will magically close at at the point of calamity, and you will never actually have a live ISDA versus a bankrupt counterparty. So, yes: in that case your close-out will always work.” }}


If you don’t hold regulatory capital, you won’t get hit with a reg cap charge, and you may take the view that your counterparty’s bankruptcy is a risk worth running.
And ''any'' {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}  — under the {{1987ma}} there were eight — triggered it, against ''any'' counterparty in any jurisdiction.<ref>This is just one more reason not to use the {{1987ma}}, if there are any [[Burmese Junglers]] still out there looking for a way back to civilisation.</ref> As we note [[Bankruptcy as a phase transition|elsewhere]], the ISDA’s {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition somewhat jumbles the distinct concepts of “[[bankruptcy]]” — a formal status involving a legal [[Bankruptcy as a phase transition|phase transition]], where [[Bankruptcy shenanigans|bankruptcy shenanigans]] were on the cards — and “[[insolvency]]” — an accounting fact with no formal legal status, in which they are not.  
====A shade ''cynical''?====
This may strike you as a cynical view, but it is not really.  


Actual, direct bankruptcy losses are a deep [[tail risk]]. Only a very small portion of your portfolio will ever go bankrupt, its trajectory towards that forsaken state will usually be well-telegraphed and, your credit guys being the vigilant professionals they are, most likely they will have long-since trimmed lines, managed down positions and closed the counterparty out, well ahead of formal bankruptcy. And even if they haven’t, the practical chance that the adminstrator tries on, let alone succeeds with, the worst case cherry-picking scenario is low. It has not, yet, happened in the financial markets.
By 1992, {{icds}} limited AET to circumstances with a live risk of [[bankruptcy shenanigans]].  The “soft” economic ''[[insolvency]]'' events were excluded. It also does not apply across the board. The {{1992ma}} converted {{{{{1}}}|AET}} into an election that you toggle on or off for each counterparty in Part 1 of the {{{{{1}}}|Schedule}}. For most parties, in most jurisdictions, it stays off.


A regulatory capital charge against that risk, on the other hand, is an immediate, present running cost to your business. It applies against every affected counterparty whether or not it eventually goes bankrupt. Given that the disaster scenarios the capital charge contemplates,the regulatory capital charge not necessarily the ''risk'' itself — would make the business uneconomic for the bank.  
In 2002 a further refinement was implemented in the definition of “bankruptcy petition”. {{icds}} split Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vii)(4)}} in two: a bankruptcy petition instituted by a regulator was not subject to a [[grace period]]. A bankruptcy petition instituted by anyone else such as a creditor — would only mature into an Event of Default if ordered by the Court, or not otherwise discharged within a 15-day [[grace period]].  


These considerations do not apply if you do not have to hold regulatory capital.  
If a regulator is taking formal action against you, the game is certainly up. A grace period serves no real purpose. A mere creditor doing so is a fairly ordinary debt-collection tactic: it may not indicate a genuine inability to pay debts, but in that case can be fairly easily discharged. Hence the grace period.


====Few and far between====
====Few and far between====
{{sdrop|T|here are only}} a few counterparty types in a few jurisdictions where the conditions for {{{{{1}}}|AET}} prevail. There are not many because — let’s be clear, here — {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is a bit of try on: any self-respecting netting-hostile bankruptcy regime would see straight through it.  It’s a bit cute, in other words. Now this sort of cuteness passed for sport in the eighties and nineties — [[I’ll be gone; you’ll be gone]] and all that — but post the [[Global financial crisis|GFC]] we are reformed characters now. AET only really passes muster these days because it’s so deeply ingrained into the documents and our way of doing things that no-one has the gorm to know any better.
{{sdrop|T|here are only}} a few counterparty types in a few jurisdictions where the conditions for {{{{{1}}}|AET}} prevail. There are not many because — let’s be clear, here — {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is a bit of try on: any self-respecting netting-hostile bankruptcy regime would see straight through it.  It’s a bit cute, in other words.
 
A piece of time-travelling contractual magic — [[deem]]ing an ISDA to have terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before the event that, on expiry of a [[grace period]] would later trigger it, purely so that the termination would not be [[problematic]] for one creditor under discretionary rules designed to ensure fairness and avoid just that kind of preference seems a bit optimistic.


The benign view is still a bit hopeful: {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} delivers netting not where otherwise it would be forbidden, but rather it helps buttress a permitted outcome, dispelling residual doubt as to ambiguous or untested regulatory guidance following the [[phase transition]] to bankruptcy. 
A piece of time-travelling contractual magic — [[deem]]ing an ISDA to have terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before the event that, on expiry of a [[grace period]] would later trigger it, to avoid the ambit of discretionary rules designed to ensure fairness and prevent just that kind of preference seems — a bit optimistic?


The pragmatic view is blunter: {{isdama}}s once were weird innovations that bamboozled and outraged bankruptcy administrators. Now, they are not. Everyone knows what ISDAs are, why they net, and why the [[single agreement]] is a sensible plank in the capital structure of the financial system, and why cherry-picking TSDA Transactions would not lead to a fair result for anyone.  
There is a more benign view, but it is still a bit hopeful: {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} helps buttress what is really a permitted outcome, dispelling residual doubt about ambiguous or untested regulatory provisions that come into force followinging the [[phase transition]] to bankruptcy. Sort of a “better be safe than sorry”.


I rest my case on this: no single [[single agreement]] has been successfully challenged in 40 years.  
Then there is a pragmatic view. This is blunter: {{isdama}}s once were weird innovations that bamboozled and outraged bankruptcy administrators. Now, they are not. Everyone knows what ISDAs are, why they net, and why the [[single agreement]] is a sensible plank in the capital structure of the financial system, and why the [[bankruptcy shenanigans]] they seek to avoid would not produce a fair result for anyone.  


The question is whether, unwittingly, {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} creates more practical risk ''now'' than ever it avoided in the derivative dark ages of superstition, fear and nightmare.  
But, still: this is all well and good. But if, unwittingly, {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} now ''creates'' practical risk where once it avoided theoretical ones, it still should be a source of concern.  


We will talk about that at great length in the premium section.
We will talk about that at great length in the premium section.
Line 102: Line 67:
{{sdrop|M|aster trading agreements}} are unusual in that upon an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}, there is no guarantee the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} will actually be owed any money. If it is net [[out-of-the-money]], it might have to pay.
{{sdrop|M|aster trading agreements}} are unusual in that upon an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}, there is no guarantee the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} will actually be owed any money. If it is net [[out-of-the-money]], it might have to pay.


The last thing an innocent swap counterparty would want is to realise [[mark-to-market]] losses by accelerating a bunch of badly performing swaps. Indeed, the “[[flawed asset]]” provisions of the {{isdama}} are designed precisely to allow it to just suspend performance of Transactions — therefore not make its position any ''worse'' — without crystallising its {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures.
The last thing a solvent swap counterparty wants is to discover its portfolio of swaps terminated ''two weeks ago''. Indeed, the “[[flawed asset]]” provisions of the {{isdama}} are designed precisely to allow it to just suspend performance of Transactions — therefore not make its position any ''worse'' — without crystallising its {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures.  
 
So having {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s ''automatically'' accelerate is undesirable: one would only choose that if the alternative was catastrophically ''worse''.
 
In the minds of [[First Men|those who framed the early ISDAs]], mendacious application of discretions by foreign bankruptcy administrators was just such a catastrophic worseness.


But time’s passed, water’s flowed and tempers have mellowed with age and wisdom: surely now there are better things for the world’s risk officers to fret about.
So having {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s ''automatically'' accelerate is undesirable: one would only choose that if the alternative was catastrophically ''worse''. Unless there is real risk of [[bankruptcy shenanigans]] and for most swap counterparties around the world, there is not — you should not want AET activated, for or against you.

Latest revision as of 11:40, 3 October 2024

HAL 9000: Just a moment — just a moment — I just picked up a fault in the AET-87 Unit.

Frank Poole: What is it?

HAL 9000: It’s a device for optimising regulatory capital, but that’s not important right now.

David Bowman: What’s the problem, HAL?

HAL 9000: It’s going to go one hundred per cent. failure, within 72 hours.

Poole: Surely, you can’t be serious?

HAL 9000: I am serious. And don’t call me “Shirley”.

Bowman: (sticking to the script) I don’t know what you’re talking about, HAL?

Cue musical introduction

HAL9000: Well, I’ll tell you.

Chorus: He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell!
He’s going to tell! —

Poole: Stop that! Stop that! No singing!

Carries on for three hours in this vein

Monty Python and the Magnetic Anomaly from Airplane!

Automatic Early Termination — colloquially, “{{{{{1}}}|AET}}”, but not to be confused with “{{{{{1}}}|ATE}}” or “{{{{{1}}}|ETA}}” — is an odd, feared and misunderstood concept buried at the back end of Section {{{{{1}}}|6(a)}} ({{{{{1}}}|Right to Terminate Following Event of Default}}).

Acclimatisation

In a document stuffed with arcanities, {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is especially abstruse, so if you are hitting this article cold then, firstly: what the hell are you doing; and secondly some background reading is in order:

Recommended background reading

Overview

{{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} provision is triggered when a party to whom it applies suffers an in-scope {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}. If it is triggered, all outstanding {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s are instantly and automatically terminated, without the need for any action by — or even the knowledge of — the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}. This usually means instantly, but in one case, it is even quicker than that.

If the {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} event is the presentation to the court by a creditor of a formal petition seeking the entity’s bankruptcy under Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vii)(4)}} — let us call this a “bankruptcy petition”, some creative warping of lexophysical swaptime is required. We will discuss this at some length and with wistful pedantry, in the premium content section.

In taking things out of the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}’s hands, AET subverts the normal order of things under the ISDA Master Agreement. Normally, the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} is in control. It may, but need not, call an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} if the circumstances justifying one exist. AET is, well, automatic. It even obliterates the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}}’s right to waive designation of an Event of Default, since by the time it is in a position to do so, the Event Default has already been declared.

(Could a {{{{{1}}}|NDP}} pre-waive in anticipation? See “Anticipatory waiver?” in the premium section.)

JC’s view is that {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} is a bad solution to an unlikely problem, but since it is embedded in every ISDA on the planet, and remains present in the minds of those who mandate capital calculations, we are stuck with it.

The theory

“Formal bankruptcy is a “phase transition”: the whole “legal context” surrounding a company changes. Erstwhile certainties vanish: normal rules of contract, debt and credit are suspended; in their place arise uncontrollable vagaries. The court appoints an insolvency administrator and invests her with wide, nightmarish discretions to do as she pleases, within reason, to sort out who gets what while ensuring the right thing is done by all the bankrupt’s creditors, customers, employees and, if there is anything left, shareholders. All, therefore, must fall upon her mercy

The phase transition of bankruptcy

Where a Defaulting Party’s bankruptcy regime allows its administrator to suspend its contractual terms or cherry-pick which of its {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} to honour, it would help the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} if the ISDA were to automatically terminate before that phase transition occurred. To be safe, termination should happen at the exact moment — or even an infinitesimal moment before — that bankruptcy regime comes to life.

A bankruptcy regime could affect an innocent counterparty’s rights in at least two ways:

  1. Discretionary termination right itself: Firstly, bankruptcy rules may prevent the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} closing out {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}} at all. They may give the administrator the discretion to affirm or avoid individual {{{{{1}}}|Transactions}}. This bigly messes with the fundamental philosophy of the ISDA Master Agreement.
  2. Netting right: Having exercised its early termination right, the “single agreement” operates to net all {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures down to a single sum. Since a bankruptcy administrator may enforce some contracts and set aside others, that netting right is prejudiced.

History

Automatic Early Termination was introduced, uncredited, in the 1987 ISDA. It was not an election, to be engaged judiciously, when needed against counterparties in jurisdictions vulnerable to bankruptcy shenanigans. It just sat there and applied across the board.

And any {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}} — under the 1987 ISDA there were eight — triggered it, against any counterparty in any jurisdiction.[1] As we note elsewhere, the ISDA’s {{{{{1}}}|Bankruptcy}} definition somewhat jumbles the distinct concepts of “bankruptcy” — a formal status involving a legal phase transition, where bankruptcy shenanigans were on the cards — and “insolvency” — an accounting fact with no formal legal status, in which they are not.

By 1992, ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ limited AET to circumstances with a live risk of bankruptcy shenanigans. The “soft” economic insolvency events were excluded. It also does not apply across the board. The 1992 ISDA converted {{{{{1}}}|AET}} into an election that you toggle on or off for each counterparty in Part 1 of the {{{{{1}}}|Schedule}}. For most parties, in most jurisdictions, it stays off.

In 2002 a further refinement was implemented in the definition of “bankruptcy petition”. ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ split Section {{{{{1}}}|5(a)(vii)(4)}} in two: a bankruptcy petition instituted by a regulator was not subject to a grace period. A bankruptcy petition instituted by anyone else — such as a creditor — would only mature into an Event of Default if ordered by the Court, or not otherwise discharged within a 15-day grace period.

If a regulator is taking formal action against you, the game is certainly up. A grace period serves no real purpose. A mere creditor doing so is a fairly ordinary debt-collection tactic: it may not indicate a genuine inability to pay debts, but in that case can be fairly easily discharged. Hence the grace period.

Few and far between

There are only a few counterparty types in a few jurisdictions where the conditions for {{{{{1}}}|AET}} prevail. There are not many because — let’s be clear, here — {{{{{1}}}|AET}} is a bit of try on: any self-respecting netting-hostile bankruptcy regime would see straight through it. It’s a bit cute, in other words.

A piece of time-travelling contractual magic — deeming an ISDA to have terminated, without anyone’s knowledge or action, the instant before the event that, on expiry of a grace period would later trigger it, to avoid the ambit of discretionary rules designed to ensure fairness and prevent just that kind of preference seems — a bit optimistic?

There is a more benign view, but it is still a bit hopeful: {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} helps buttress what is really a permitted outcome, dispelling residual doubt about ambiguous or untested regulatory provisions that come into force followinging the phase transition to bankruptcy. Sort of a “better be safe than sorry”.

Then there is a pragmatic view. This is blunter: ISDA Master Agreements once were weird innovations that bamboozled and outraged bankruptcy administrators. Now, they are not. Everyone knows what ISDAs are, why they net, and why the single agreement is a sensible plank in the capital structure of the financial system, and why the bankruptcy shenanigans they seek to avoid would not produce a fair result for anyone.

But, still: this is all well and good. But if, unwittingly, {{{{{1}}}|Automatic Early Termination}} now creates practical risk where once it avoided theoretical ones, it still should be a source of concern.

We will talk about that at great length in the premium section.

Why not just switch it on, to be on the safe side?

Master trading agreements are unusual in that upon an {{{{{1}}}|Event of Default}}, there is no guarantee the {{{{{1}}}|Non-Defaulting Party}} will actually be owed any money. If it is net out-of-the-money, it might have to pay.

The last thing a solvent swap counterparty wants is to discover its portfolio of swaps terminated two weeks ago. Indeed, the “flawed asset” provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement are designed precisely to allow it to just suspend performance of Transactions — therefore not make its position any worse — without crystallising its {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}} exposures.

So having {{{{{1}}}|Transaction}}s automatically accelerate is undesirable: one would only choose that if the alternative was catastrophically worse. Unless there is real risk of bankruptcy shenanigans — and for most swap counterparties around the world, there is not — you should not want AET activated, for or against you.

  1. This is just one more reason not to use the 1987 ISDA, if there are any Burmese Junglers still out there looking for a way back to civilisation.