Delegation: Difference between revisions

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*[[Delegatus non potest delegare]] - someone to whom you have delegated a power cannot, unless you have specifically empowered that person to do so, onwardly delegate it;
*[[Delegatus non potest delegare]] - someone to whom you have delegated a power cannot, unless you have specifically empowered that person to do so, onwardly delegate it;
*[[Nemo dat quod non habet]] one cannot give, or delegate, a right you don't have.  
*[[Nemo dat quod non habet]] one cannot give, or delegate, a right you don't have.  
This latter one ought, but does not, nix that tedious drafting construction: “neither X, ''[[nor anyone acting on its behalf]]'', may do Y”. For if, by the lights of the law, X has no right to do a thing, it follows as a matter of ineffable Latin logic that nor may any of X’s servants, [[agent]]s, [[attorney]]s, [[nominee]]s or [[delegate]]s, unless that person happens independently to have {{sex|her}} own right to do it, conferred by some other means — in which case this stipulation will singularly fail to prevent that person from doing that thing anyway.
This latter one ought, but does not, nix that tedious drafting construction: “neither X, ''[[nor anyone acting on its behalf]]'', may do Y”. For if, by the lights of the law, X has no right to do a thing, it follows as a matter of ineffable Latin logic that nor may any of X’s servants, [[agent]]s, [[mediocre lawyer|attorney]]s, [[nominee]]s or [[delegate]]s, unless that person happens independently to have {{sex|her}} own right to do it, conferred by some other means — in which case this stipulation will singularly fail to prevent that person from doing that thing anyway.
{{seealso}}
{{seealso}}
*[[Circle of delegation]]
*[[Circle of delegation]]

Revision as of 16:54, 7 June 2018

delegation, and agency, is a fertile source of legal maxim. Two crackers:

This latter one ought, but does not, nix that tedious drafting construction: “neither X, nor anyone acting on its behalf, may do Y”. For if, by the lights of the law, X has no right to do a thing, it follows as a matter of ineffable Latin logic that nor may any of X’s servants, agents, attorneys, nominees or delegates, unless that person happens independently to have her own right to do it, conferred by some other means — in which case this stipulation will singularly fail to prevent that person from doing that thing anyway.

See also