Wilful default: Difference between revisions

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{{a|negotiation|}}The one, bastard part of that sainted triplet [[negligence, fraud or wilful default]], “wilful default” without  an obvious legal meaning.  
{{a|negotiation|}}The one, bastard part of that sainted triplet [[negligence, fraud or wilful default]], “wilful default” without  an obvious legal meaning.  


Whereas “negligence” and “fraud” are terms of forensic science  — the former hailing from the common law of [[tort]], and being the failure to observe the standards of the [[Reasonable person|sort of fellow one might encounter]] on the [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|Clapham omnibus]], and the latter hailing from criminal law<ref>Interestingly, the there is no [[tort|''tort'']] of fraud; it is called “[[deceit]]” and was ably summarised in {{casenote1|The Kriti Palm|2006|EWCACiv|1601}} as follows: “The elements of the tort of [[deceit]] are well known. In essence they require (1) a representation, which is (2) false, (3) dishonestly made, and (4) intended to be relied on and in fact relied on.”</ref> and involving a false representation, knowingly made, with the intent to profit from it — wilful default has no such lineage. “Default” suggests a contractual breach, but we feel there is a rather better word for that — “breach” — but the wilfulness, wantonness or licentiousness of one’s behaviour under a contract has never been of any great concern to those who sit on the Queen’s Bench Division: what matters is whether you have breached it. If you have, you are apt to be put in a stockage and pelted with cabbages, however obstreporous your frame of mind while you did, or didn’t.
Whereas “[[negligence]]” and “[[fraud]]” are terms of forensic science  — the former hailing from the common law of [[tort]], being the failure to observe the standards of the [[Reasonable person|sort of fellow one might encounter]] on the [[Man on the Clapham Omnibus|Clapham omnibus]]; the latter hailing from criminal law<ref>Interestingly, the there is no [[tort|''tort'']] of fraud; it is called “[[deceit]]” and was ably summarised in {{casenote1|The Kriti Palm|2006|EWCACiv|1601}} as follows: “The elements of the tort of [[deceit]] are well known. In essence they require (1) a representation, which is (2) false, (3) dishonestly made, and (4) intended to be relied on and in fact relied on.”</ref> and involving a false representation, knowingly made, with the intent to profit from it — “[[wilful default]]” has no such lineage.  


The “default” part suggests a ''contractual'' breach, but we feel there is a rather better word for that — “breach” — and in any case the wilfulness, wantonness or licentiousness of one’s behaviour under while misperforming a contract has never been of any great interest to those who sit on the [[Queen’s Bench Division]]: what matters is ''that'' you have breached it. If you have, you are for it, however obstreperous your frame of mind while you did, or didn’t, do what you shouldn’t, or should, have done. The release from exactly that anxiety is the very beauty of contractual relations: one need not care a jot about your counterparty’s intentions; what matters is her actions. That she does what she must do through gritted teeth or with the heaviest of hearts need not bother you.


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Revision as of 17:09, 30 June 2021

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The one, bastard part of that sainted triplet negligence, fraud or wilful default, “wilful default” without an obvious legal meaning.

Whereas “negligence” and “fraud” are terms of forensic science — the former hailing from the common law of tort, being the failure to observe the standards of the sort of fellow one might encounter on the Clapham omnibus; the latter hailing from criminal law[1] and involving a false representation, knowingly made, with the intent to profit from it — “wilful default” has no such lineage.

The “default” part suggests a contractual breach, but we feel there is a rather better word for that — “breach” — and in any case the wilfulness, wantonness or licentiousness of one’s behaviour under while misperforming a contract has never been of any great interest to those who sit on the Queen’s Bench Division: what matters is that you have breached it. If you have, you are for it, however obstreperous your frame of mind while you did, or didn’t, do what you shouldn’t, or should, have done. The release from exactly that anxiety is the very beauty of contractual relations: one need not care a jot about your counterparty’s intentions; what matters is her actions. That she does what she must do through gritted teeth or with the heaviest of hearts need not bother you.

See also

References

  1. Interestingly, the there is no tort of fraud; it is called “deceit” and was ably summarised in The Kriti Palm as follows: “The elements of the tort of deceit are well known. In essence they require (1) a representation, which is (2) false, (3) dishonestly made, and (4) intended to be relied on and in fact relied on.”