Reports of our death are an exaggeration: Difference between revisions

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Thirdly it is naive in the extreme to prime that regulatory compliance is formalistic, let alone “the easy bit of banking”.
Thirdly it is naive in the extreme to prime that regulatory compliance is formalistic, let alone “the easy bit of banking”.


Park all that. For what Mr Perez overlooks as a core competence in a successful bank is the same thing Mr Cryan did. Its ''people'". They are the irreducible, ineffable, magic difference. The tech stack can give them wings, but they have to decide where to fly. They narratise.the bond, form networks, make connections, ''persuade''. These things a machine cannot do.
Park all that. For what Mr Perez overlooked as a core competence in a successful bank is the same thing Mr Cryan did: its ''people'". They are the irreducible, ineffable, magic difference. The ''informal'' networks by which it works, magically crossing the terrain like some hovering, morphing jellyfish.  Sundar Pichai can’t code that. That human expertise is required to hold the creaking systems together, to work around absurdities and take a pragmatic view — this is not a big in the system, but a feature.
 
Not how modernist a disposition this is. It is to critique an organism by its formal, legible operation. It is the view from the disembodied luminaries who occupy that Cartesian theatre called the executive suite. They see only formal vulnerability, because formal structures are all they can see. Individuals are measurable by floorspace occupied, salary, benefits, pension contributions, revenue generated. Most employees don't generate legible revenue. They show up on the map ''only as a liability''.
 
From the executive suite, the calculus is obvious: why hire a dude to do that, when a machine could do it cheaper, quicker, and more reliably?
 
Therefore the model, articulated by Cryan and implied by Perez: ''prepare for the coming of the machines''. Automate ''every'' process. Reduce the cost line. Remove people, because when they come for us, Amazon won’t be burdened by people
 
 
Now, to be clear, the tech stacks of most banks are dismal. Perez is right about that. Amazon’s tech ''would'' wipe the floor with any banks tech: most are sedimented, interdependent concatenations of old mainframes, Unix servers, Windows terminal servers, and somewhere in the middle of the thicket will be a wang box from 1976 with a CUI interface that can't be switched off without crashing the entire network. These patchwork systems are a legacy of dozens of mergers and acquisitions and millions of lazy, short-term decisions to fix broken systems with sellotape and glue rather than maintaining and overhauling them properly. And banks are tech companies: you can't stop a bank and put it up on the blocks for 6 months while you rebuild it. (though covid: opportunity missed.) it is hard to rebuild the engine of a car while it is barreling down the motorway at 70mph. Banks didn't start thinking of themselves as tech companies until the last twenty years.
 
Per John Gall: temporary patches have a habit of becoming permanent.
We presume Google and Amazon, who always have, are better and more disciplined about their tech infrastructure than that.<ref>See the [[Bezos memo]].</ref>
 
The tech stack can give them wings, but they have to decide where to fly. They narratise.the bond, form networks, make connections, ''persuade''. These things a machine cannot do.
 
So, note the category error bank leaders make in seeing technology as the competitive threat  it is not. It is just the ticket to play.
 
This is bit to say banks employees an unusually are gifted, intelligent bunch. You are invited to read other pages of this site for our views on that.
 
Imagine a bank strategy that said the in


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Revision as of 08:51, 13 January 2023

JC pontificates about technology
An occasional series.
John Cryan's legal department yesterday
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Sign up for our newsletter — or just get in touch: for ½ a weekly 🍺 you get to consult JC. Ask about it here.

A shame you couldn’t say the same for John Cryan. Originally published in 2017, this article, and the grit in the steampunk wheel who wrote it — are still grimly hanging on, whereas the then CEO of Deutsche Bank is now the ex-CEO of Deutsche Bank.

Rumours of our demise are greatly exaggerated

In 2017, then-CEO of Deutsche Bank John Cryan thought his employees’ days are numbered. Machines would do for them. Not just back office grunts: everyone. Even, presumably, Cryan himself.[1]

“Today,” he warned, “we have people doing work like robots. Tomorrow, we will have robots behaving like people”.

You can see. They have displaced us in our routine functions. Soon they will take the good stuff, too. In any case, No bad thing, you might say — who will miss the bankers?

You can see where Cryan’s idea comes from: what with high-frequency trading algorithms, AI medical diagnosis, accident-free self-driving cars: the machines are coming for us. Some see technology at a tipping point, at which we will be tipped out. The machines have taken over our routine tasks; soon they will take the hard stuff, too.

A fashionable view. But a big call, all the same.

Technology is not new. As long as there has been the lever, wheel or plough, humans have used machines to do tasks which are tedious, repetitive or require brute strength beyond our frail earthly shells. Because machines follow instructions better than we do, by definition: that’s what means is to be a machine. In the stuff they are good at, they’re quicker, stronger, nimbler, cheaper and less error-prone.

But it’s an important caveat: as George Gilder recently put it: “The claim of superhuman performance seems rather overwrought to me. Outperforming unaided human beings is what machines are supposed to do. That's why we build them.”[2]

The division of labour

Machines can only operate in constrained environments. They make flawless decisions, as long as both question and answer are pre-configured. But take a machine out of its designed environment and it is useless: Good luck getting a Jacquard loom to plough a field.

We sacks of meat are better at handling ambiguity, conflict and novel situations. We’re not perfect, but whatever the conundrum is we can at least produce an answer. We don't hang, or freeze waiting for a dialogue box to be clicked: even though syntax errors are par for the course: humans don’t (easily) crash. That’s the boon and the bane of the meatware: you can’t tell when one makes a syntax error.

But put human and machine together and you have a powerful proposition: the machine handles the rule-following; the human figures out what to do when you run out of road. It’s a partnership. A division of resources. Technology is an extended phenotype. But this is nothing new: this is always how we’ve used technology: the human figures out which field to plough and when; the horse ploughs it.

Now technology has caused the odd short-term dislocation — the industrial revolution put a bunch of hand-weavers out of work — but the long-term prognosis has been benign: “labour-saving devices” have freed us to do things we previously had no time to do, or hadn’t realised you could do, before the technology came along. As technology has developed, so has the world’s population grown, while poverty and indolence have fallen. People have got busier. Whatever technology is doing, with due regard to the risk of confusing correlation and causation, it isn’t putting us out of work.

Technology opens up design-space. It expands the intellectual ecosystem, domesticating the ground we know, and opening up frontiers we don’t. Frontiers are places where we need smart people to figure out new tools and new ways of operating. Machines can’t do it.

But it also creates space and capacity to care about detail. Parkinson’s law states: it frees us up to care about things we never used to care about. The microcomputer made generate duplicate and distribute documents far, far easier.

So, if you want to say this has all changed — that now the machines will put us out of work — you have to explain how. What has changed? Why is this time different? We’ve heard this record before: twenty years ago, the wizards told us the internet had changed start-up valuations forever. Didn’t work out so well.

So, are the robots coming for us?

Firstly, remember Cryan is talking his own book. Banking is a hard business to make money in these days. Opportunities to develop new businesses (read: opening new frontiers) are diminished; managing to margin is de rigeur. Mr. Cryan needs to fire as many people as he can. What he doesn’t automate, his competitors will, and they’ll take his lunch. “We’re ditching the meat sacks”: that is what DB’s investors want to hear.

And banking requires less novel judgment than it used to. The West has been — well, won: ploughed over and converted into shopping malls. Much of it can be boiled down to formulating rules and following them by rote.[3] Only the edge cases — where pioneers stand on the frontier gazing into the horizon — require judgment. That is no place for an algorithm. These are the situations of real risk: the “unknown unknowns”.

As a strategy for coping with “known knowns” automation is good business. Humans are bad at following rules. They are expensive. They occupy real estate. They require human resources departments. They misunderstand. They screw up. They leave. They don't write things down. Machines are much better on all of these measures.

But, still the race to automate “known knowns” is a race to the bottom. The value in a product is the resources and skill required in producing it. Banking products need no fields, raw materials or warehouses: only skills.

Two types of skills, categorically: computational, analytical skills and interpersonal, imaginative skills.

Computational skills — those suited the symbolic manipulation — can and should be automatic algorithms, high-frequency trading strategies, data analytics, neural networks and machine learning. But the value of computational “skills”, once automated, tends to zero. Even those requiring artificial intelligence. The margins they generate will tend to zero, too: everyone with a decent PC will be at it.

If Mr. Cryan thinks that is the future of his business, he needs his head read.

Your future, sir, is in your people: those ones who stand at the frontier, staring resolutely into the horizon. They may have robots at their disposal, but only your human pioneers can set them to work.

Perez’ Folly

Not long before departing the ship erstwhile head of UBS Evidence Labs Juan Luis Perez — not himself by background a Banker — was heard to remark that UBS competition was not from start-up challenger banks, but from Apple, Amazon, or Google.

His argument was this: a bank’s business success is mostly down to three components: its technology stack, its reputation and goodwill, and its regulatory status. Two of these — tech and reputation — are hard, substantial problems, he proposed, while the other — capital and regulatory compliance — is comparatively formalistic, especially if you have a decent technology stack.

Apple, Amazon, and Google wipe the floor with any bank on technology — I can go with that — and materially better standing with the public. Who doesn't love Amazon? Who does love the Chase Manhattan bank?

So, should the tech giants come for banking, ’’look out.

Let’s park a few uncomfortable facts and give Me Perez the benefit of the doubt:

Firstly, none of Apple, Amazon, or Google as so much as cast a wanton glance in the direction of banking, despite the revenue opportunities dwarfing those in tech. There must be some reason for that.

Secondly a company that makes cool gadgets has as much change of keeping its branding following a pivot to banking as does it is a toy factory could that moves into dentistry.

Thirdly it is naive in the extreme to prime that regulatory compliance is formalistic, let alone “the easy bit of banking”.

Park all that. For what Mr Perez overlooked as a core competence in a successful bank is the same thing Mr Cryan did: its people'". They are the irreducible, ineffable, magic difference. The informal networks by which it works, magically crossing the terrain like some hovering, morphing jellyfish. Sundar Pichai can’t code that. That human expertise is required to hold the creaking systems together, to work around absurdities and take a pragmatic view — this is not a big in the system, but a feature.

Not how modernist a disposition this is. It is to critique an organism by its formal, legible operation. It is the view from the disembodied luminaries who occupy that Cartesian theatre called the executive suite. They see only formal vulnerability, because formal structures are all they can see. Individuals are measurable by floorspace occupied, salary, benefits, pension contributions, revenue generated. Most employees don't generate legible revenue. They show up on the map only as a liability.

From the executive suite, the calculus is obvious: why hire a dude to do that, when a machine could do it cheaper, quicker, and more reliably?

Therefore the model, articulated by Cryan and implied by Perez: prepare for the coming of the machines. Automate every process. Reduce the cost line. Remove people, because when they come for us, Amazon won’t be burdened by people


Now, to be clear, the tech stacks of most banks are dismal. Perez is right about that. Amazon’s tech would wipe the floor with any banks tech: most are sedimented, interdependent concatenations of old mainframes, Unix servers, Windows terminal servers, and somewhere in the middle of the thicket will be a wang box from 1976 with a CUI interface that can't be switched off without crashing the entire network. These patchwork systems are a legacy of dozens of mergers and acquisitions and millions of lazy, short-term decisions to fix broken systems with sellotape and glue rather than maintaining and overhauling them properly. And banks are tech companies: you can't stop a bank and put it up on the blocks for 6 months while you rebuild it. (though covid: opportunity missed.) it is hard to rebuild the engine of a car while it is barreling down the motorway at 70mph. Banks didn't start thinking of themselves as tech companies until the last twenty years.

Per John Gall: temporary patches have a habit of becoming permanent.

We presume Google and Amazon, who always have, are better and more disciplined about their tech infrastructure than that.[4]

The tech stack can give them wings, but they have to decide where to fly. They narratise.the bond, form networks, make connections, persuade. These things a machine cannot do.

So, note the category error bank leaders make in seeing technology as the competitive threat it is not. It is just the ticket to play.

This is bit to say banks employees an unusually are gifted, intelligent bunch. You are invited to read other pages of this site for our views on that.

Imagine a bank strategy that said the in

References

  1. The horror! The horror! The irony! The irony!
  2. Life After Google: The Fall of Big Data and the Rise of the Blockchain Economy (2018)
  3. There remain emergent risks, black swans and regulatory complexity, of course, but a lot of stuff could be automated which hasn’t been.
  4. See the Bezos memo.