Mediocrity drift: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 17: Line 17:


How your incoming lateral hires perform will remain to be seen, but remember performance is measured relative to cost, and since by leaving they have marked themselves to market, they leave their old quincunx at the top and enter their new quincunx at the mean Your arriving at a higher cost than the ones you are replacing, they start not as outlier good staff, but average ones.
How your incoming lateral hires perform will remain to be seen, but remember performance is measured relative to cost, and since by leaving they have marked themselves to market, they leave their old quincunx at the top and enter their new quincunx at the mean Your arriving at a higher cost than the ones you are replacing, they start not as outlier good staff, but average ones.
{{sa}}
*[[Lateral quitter]]
*[[Reduction in force]]
*[[Competence phase transition]]

Revision as of 21:30, 22 November 2022

The Human Resources military-industrial complex


The instrument (the “telescreen”, it was called) could be dimmed, but there was no way of shutting it off completely.
Index: Click to expand:

Comments? Questions? Suggestions? Requests? Insults? We’d love to 📧 hear from you.
Sign up for our newsletter.

Mediocrity drift
/ˌmiːdɪˈɒkrɪti drɪft/ (n.)
A curious, unintended, negative feedback loop of lazy human capital management.

Let’s say firms generally run a benign affirmative action policy, to increase representation. This means, when presented with equivalent candidates, it will prioritise candidates of a type it doesn’t have when laterally hiring, and those in over-represented groups when selecting candidates for a RIF.

Since one tends to laterally hire one golden strand at a time, but reduce the workforce in large hanks this creates an odd system effect.

This effect is predicated on three assumptions:

  • That, generally, lateral quitters are relatively good employees.
  • That, generally RIF candidates aren’t.
  • That all personnel are evenly distributed relative to the cost-value threshold, and that any given subgroup, of staff, however classified (except by pure value) will be about as good as each other. So IT professionals will be as good as what they do as will lawyers; young as well as old, men as women and so on. Each will have outperformers and plodders.

If so, then running a system to favour one group over another has a rather counterintuitive effect on the remaining population. On average, the majority will increase in relative value, while minority will decrease in relative value, even though no individual performance changes at all.

On second glance you can see why this should be so. The process systematically weeds out bad majority employees and good majority ones. The “good section” will progressively become majority-dominated — they are not being bid away as frequently — and the “below par” section becomes progressively minority dominated.

Two observations: here is systemantics in its raw natural state; and notice how pernicious the idea of the average is here. On average, the minority is paid progressively less. It looks like minority employees are being discriminated against on pay, but in fact they are being favoured for poor performance.

How your incoming lateral hires perform will remain to be seen, but remember performance is measured relative to cost, and since by leaving they have marked themselves to market, they leave their old quincunx at the top and enter their new quincunx at the mean Your arriving at a higher cost than the ones you are replacing, they start not as outlier good staff, but average ones.

See also