Template:M intro work jobsworthism: Difference between revisions

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Created page with "The JC complains a lot about the modern world’s obsession with technology and reducing everything to data. Data modernism’s rap-sheet is long. It is ''historical'': finite, and blind to the unfolding possibilities of an infinite universe. It ''cuts corners'': it relies on scale to deliver ''averagarian'' solutions to suit the majority, and cares less about..."
 
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It ''cuts corners'': it relies on [[scale]] to deliver ''[[Averagarianism|averagarian]]'' solutions to suit the majority, and cares less about outliers, edge cases and odd-bods (sorry, all you people at the margins, you are just not worth our lazy while).
It ''cuts corners'': it relies on [[scale]] to deliver ''[[Averagarianism|averagarian]]'' solutions to suit the majority, and cares less about outliers, edge cases and odd-bods (sorry, all you people at the margins, you are just not worth our lazy while).


It is ''disingenuous'': it sells a better, faster, more effective service while deliverying a poorer, less flexible one. In this regard it is [[premium mediocre]]: it sells the appearance of quality, with none of its cost.  
It is ''disingenuous'': it sells a better, faster, more effective service while delivering a poorer, less flexible one. It is thereby [[premium mediocre]]: it sells the appearance of quality, with none of its cost.  


It ''depersonalises'': it works when consumers fall easily into general and broad categories, is incentivised to encourage consumers to identify ''themselves'' in categories that suit suppliers do that work for you, and as such ''polarises'' and tribalises the market — in asking people to reduce their priorities to broad, basic, emotional issues, ''infantilises'' the market.
It ''depersonalises'': because it works best when consumers fall easily into broad, simple categories, it incentivises consumers to identify ''themselves'' in broad, simple categories, and as such ''polarises'' and tribalises the market.


Boy that all just came out in one great big gush.
It ''infantilises'':  In its push for consumers to articulate themselves by reference to its simplified categories, it reduces consumers to their broad, basic, emotional issues.


This is not to claim some great conspiracy, or to call for some great social manifesto kicking back against our overlords, by the way, but just to point out system effects. This is ''bound'' to happen to some degree, without any mendacity by anyone. This is how complex systems will tend to work where there is the means to reap the benefits to be gained from automation. What has changed is our tools: our capacity for automation is geometrically greater than it was a generation ago.
Boy, that all just came out in one great big gush. That wasn’t even the point of this article. But there it is: is it any wonder we are are in the state we are?


Bound to happen because it is a Darwinian market and those who don't do it will die, unless they devise a new way of surviving. And there is scope for playing at the edges of market — going [[off piste]], playing in the rich and uninterrupted back country. The rewards are collossal — but so are the risks. And there is no ski patrol. If you go over, you are on your own.
The JC claims no great conspiracy, by the way, nor a small one. He does not seek some great reforming social manifesto. He does not calls for an uprising to kick back against the overlords. For these are simple system effects. They are ''bound'' to happen, to some degree, without mendacity, where the incentives are set up in a certain way.  


We are where we are.
This is how complex systems will work where there is the means to reap the easy benefits of automation. We have always taken the benefits of technology, and always given away peripheral qualities. This is bound to happen in an evolving market. Those who don't follow suit will die, unless they can contrive ''a new way of thriving''.


Another charge to  the rapsheets
There is scope for playing at the edges of market — going [[off piste]], playing in the rich and uninterrupted back country. The rewards are collossal — but so are the risks. And there is no ski patrol. If you go over, you are on your own.
 
What has changed is our ''capacity'' for automation. It is exponentially greater than it was a generation ago. It feels exponentially greater than it was a ''year'' ago.
 
 
Another charge to  the rapsheet:


Automation removes the scope for ''discretion''. Discretion implies expertise, judgment, worldliness, all of which is expensive. The underlying theory of data modernism is [[Pareto triage]] — to separate the world, operations, the market into the codable, easy boring, lay-up 80 percent, that can be safely handed over to the chatbots — and the rich, complicated, risk 20 percent that requires special attention.
Automation removes the scope for ''discretion''. Discretion implies expertise, judgment, worldliness, all of which is expensive. The underlying theory of data modernism is [[Pareto triage]] — to separate the world, operations, the market into the codable, easy boring, lay-up 80 percent, that can be safely handed over to the chatbots — and the rich, complicated, risk 20 percent that requires special attention.


There is a kind of averagarisnism at play here. If your enterprise is a production line, a kind of nomological machine you can control from beginning to end, but even then the production line requires adjustment and ongoing optimisation and expertise on the line is vital.
There is a kind of averagarisnism at play here. If your enterprise is a production line, a kind of nomological machine you can control from beginning to end, but even then the production line requires adjustment and ongoing optimisation and expertise on the line is vital.

Revision as of 08:05, 23 June 2023

The JC complains a lot about the modern world’s obsession with technology and reducing everything to data.

Data modernism’s rap-sheet is long.

It is historical: finite, and blind to the unfolding possibilities of an infinite universe.

It cuts corners: it relies on scale to deliver averagarian solutions to suit the majority, and cares less about outliers, edge cases and odd-bods (sorry, all you people at the margins, you are just not worth our lazy while).

It is disingenuous: it sells a better, faster, more effective service while delivering a poorer, less flexible one. It is thereby premium mediocre: it sells the appearance of quality, with none of its cost.

It depersonalises: because it works best when consumers fall easily into broad, simple categories, it incentivises consumers to identify themselves in broad, simple categories, and as such polarises and tribalises the market.

It infantilises: In its push for consumers to articulate themselves by reference to its simplified categories, it reduces consumers to their broad, basic, emotional issues.

Boy, that all just came out in one great big gush. That wasn’t even the point of this article. But there it is: is it any wonder we are are in the state we are?

The JC claims no great conspiracy, by the way, nor a small one. He does not seek some great reforming social manifesto. He does not calls for an uprising to kick back against the overlords. For these are simple system effects. They are bound to happen, to some degree, without mendacity, where the incentives are set up in a certain way.

This is how complex systems will work where there is the means to reap the easy benefits of automation. We have always taken the benefits of technology, and always given away peripheral qualities. This is bound to happen in an evolving market. Those who don't follow suit will die, unless they can contrive a new way of thriving.

There is scope for playing at the edges of market — going off piste, playing in the rich and uninterrupted back country. The rewards are collossal — but so are the risks. And there is no ski patrol. If you go over, you are on your own.

What has changed is our capacity for automation. It is exponentially greater than it was a generation ago. It feels exponentially greater than it was a year ago.


Another charge to the rapsheet:

Automation removes the scope for discretion. Discretion implies expertise, judgment, worldliness, all of which is expensive. The underlying theory of data modernism is Pareto triage — to separate the world, operations, the market into the codable, easy boring, lay-up 80 percent, that can be safely handed over to the chatbots — and the rich, complicated, risk 20 percent that requires special attention.

There is a kind of averagarisnism at play here. If your enterprise is a production line, a kind of nomological machine you can control from beginning to end, but even then the production line requires adjustment and ongoing optimisation and expertise on the line is vital.