Can’t we just ask the regulator?: Difference between revisions

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{{a|devil|{{image|Conundrum with Whiteboard|png|“Conundrum with Whiteboard”. {{vsr|1995}}}}}}It is well known and widely reported that regulations have grown in scope, density, interrelation and complication since those mad, dreamy Eighties days when rules were for birds and the Randian spirit of Aleister Crowley was the dominant fingerpost showing the way towards market governance.   
{{a|devil|{{image|Conundrum with Whiteboard|png|“Conundrum with Whiteboard”. {{vsr|1995}}}}}}It is well-known and widely reported that regulations have grown in scope, density, interrelation and complication since those mad, dreamy Eighties days when rules were for birds and the Randian spirit of Aleister Crowley was the dominant fingerpost showing the way towards market governance.   


“Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”.  
“Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law”.  
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This, contemporary [[thought leader]]<nowiki/>s believed, was best for everyone, in the long run. “Government is not the solution to our problem; government ''is'' the problem,” as Ronald Reagan famously put it.
This, contemporary [[thought leader]]<nowiki/>s believed, was best for everyone, in the long run. “Government is not the solution to our problem; government ''is'' the problem,” as Ronald Reagan famously put it.


In recent times this carefree impulse has fallen on stony ground. Of course it has: to survive its own auto-destruction, any new programme must self-organise: that founding spirit of optimistic anarchy will resolve to well-meant gentle governance which in time will calcify into impenetrable rules, etiquettes and ways of operating [[calculated]] to maintain the emergent power structure around the programme. This happened to the fifties, to rock ’n’ roll, in the noughties to the internet, it’s happening to crypto right now and will happen to AI at some point in the future — as long as Skynet doesn’t happen first.  
In recent times this carefree impulse has fallen on stony ground. Of course, it has: to survive its auto-destruction, any new programme must self-organise: that founding spirit of optimistic anarchy will resolve to well-meant gentle governance which in time will calcify into impenetrable rules, etiquettes and ways of operating [[calculated]] to maintain the emergent power structure around the programme. This happened to the fifties, to rock ’n’ roll, in the noughties to the internet, it’s happening to crypto right now and will happen to AI at some point in the future — as long as Skynet doesn’t happen first.  


The financial markets are the same: the libertine laissez-faire of the eighties that made all this possible has given way to utter technocracy.  
The financial markets are the same: the libertine laissez-faire of the eighties that made all this possible has given way to utter technocracy.  


A freedom that once seemed hopeful and elegant now seems barbaric in its simplicity. We have become inured to the idea that our every or financial impulse should be minutely monitored, reported, and regulated.  
A freedom that once seemed hopeful and elegant now seems barbaric in its simplicity. We have become inured to the idea that our every financial impulse should be minutely monitored, reported, and regulated.  
===The theory===
===The theory===
And that is fine. Being a pragmatist, it is not the [[Jolly Contrarian|JC]]’s motive to take sides in the cosmic debate: rather, to say, however heavily we frame our rules, good governance and our well-rehearsed imperative of juridical [[certainty]] requires them to be as plain, clear and actionable as they can be. The world is [[Certainty|uncertain]] and [[Complexity|non-linear]] enough: the guardrails we erect to protect each other from it should not be. We should not be left in doubt what we can and cannot do. We should not be held hostage for the consequence of acting in a case of genuine doubt.   
And that is fine. Being a pragmatist, it is not the [[Jolly Contrarian|JC]]’s motive to take sides in the cosmic debate: rather, to say, however heavily we frame our rules, good governance and our well-rehearsed imperative of juridical [[certainty]] requires them to be as plain, clear and actionable as they can be. The world is [[Certainty|uncertain]] and [[Complexity|non-linear]] enough: the guardrails we erect to protect each other from it should not be. We should not be left in doubt about what we can and cannot do. We should not be held hostage for the consequence of acting in a case of genuine doubt.   


Besides, wilfully leaving ''doubt'' in regulation creates an opportunity for doubt alleviators to extract ''rent''. Three-quarters of the UK’s £32bn legal services industry services the corporate sector.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pwc.co.uk%2Findustries%2Fassets%2Fuk-legal-services-market-report-2022.pdf PWC UK Legal Services Market Report 2022]</ref>   
Besides, wilfully leaving ''doubt'' in regulation creates an opportunity for doubt alleviators to extract ''rent''. Three-quarters of the UK’s £32bn legal services industry services the corporate sector.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pwc.co.uk%2Findustries%2Fassets%2Fuk-legal-services-market-report-2022.pdf PWC UK Legal Services Market Report 2022]</ref>   


Nor should rules be above criticism: times change, unintended consequences emerge, people make bad rules. Practitioners at the coal face are the first to apprehend them. They should not be loathe to point them out.   
Nor should rules be above criticism: times change, unintended consequences emerge and people make bad rules. Practitioners at the coal face are the first to apprehend them. They should not be loathe to point them out.   


In any sensible polity, rules carrying sanctions must be easy to understand, follow and challenge. The optimal scenario: everyone abides by the rules, and there is an easy and open process to challenge the ones that don’t work.
In any sensible polity, rules carrying sanctions must be easy to understand, follow and challenge. The optimal scenario: everyone abides by the rules, and there is an easy and open process to challenge the ones that don’t work.


===The reality===
===The reality===
The reality is that global regulation is a ''monstrous'' burden. Even sensible jurisdictions have a habit of mandating multiple regulators overseeing ostensibly the same territory ([[SEC]], [[CFTC]], FRB, FDIC in the US alone), and that is before we deal with the conundrum of cross-border regulation where conflicts and regulatory perimeters come into play, and the actions of supranational bodies such as the [[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision]].
The reality is that global regulation is a ''monstrous, baffling burden''. Even sensible jurisdictions mandate multiple regulators to oversee ostensibly the same territory ([[SEC]], [[CFTC]], FRB, FDIC in the US alone). That is before we deal with the conflicts of cross-border regulation and regulatory perimeters or the actions of supranational bodies such as the [[Basel Committee on Banking Supervision]].


This is licence enough for the military-industrial complex of legal, accounting and compliance advisors that have grown around the markets, but it is made worse by the reluctance of regulators to take a position on what their own rules mean. Continental tax authorities might occasionally issue, and agree to be bound by a tax ruling; the SEC issues the occasional “no-action letter” which is more by way of forbearance from enforcement of rules, rather than an interpretation of them. There are no [[Bright-line test|bright lines]].
This is licence enough for the [[advisory-industrial complex]] of legal, accounting and regulatory advice that has grown around the markets, but it is made worse by regulators’ reluctance to be categorical, or even take a positionon what their own rules mean.


Anyone in the business will know this is the aspiration of an utter fantasist. Anglo Saxon regulators wouldn’t dream of giving guidance, perhaps fearing the [[precedent]] an erroneous ruling night create, perhaps acknowledging that their own staff have no better idea what the rules are meant to mean than anyone else: they are as prone to budget cuts, outsourcing, and the dogma of management by data as anyone else.
Sure, regulators purport to render their rules in plain English, but often by way of aspiration rather than outcome. And, at the end of the day, if regulations ''are'' confusing the market, whether or not regulators believe they ''should'' be, this is reason enough to clarify them. If you can’t just rewrite them — a continually morphing regulatory textscape might be even worse than static rules no one understands — then at least be prepared to clarify, through official guidance, what you take your own rules to mean and how you intend to enforce them.
 
Continental tax authorities might occasionally issue, and be bound by a tax ruling The SEC issues the occasional “no-action letter”, more by way of forbearance from enforcement, rather than interpretation, of its rules. There are no [[Bright-line test|bright lines]], after all.
 
But this is not, in the Anglo-Saxon markets, the done thing. It is as if regulators are keeping the option to retrospectively smack down subjects to suit the political climate. Perhaps they fear the [[precedent]] an erroneous ruling night create: their own staff, as prone to budget cuts and outsourcing as anyone else, might have no better idea what the rules are meant to mean than anyone else. Perhaps the underfunded gamekeeper fears the poacher’s skill in finding loopholes and running around the spirit in which the rules were put in place.
 
Probably all of the above.


== JPMorgan, the NDA and the whistleblowers ==
== JPMorgan, the NDA and the whistleblowers ==