Limited recourse
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Of a contract, that the obligor’s obligations under it are limited to a defined pool of assets. You see this a lot in repackagings, securitisations and other structured transactions involving espievies.
In a nutshell
Security and limited recourse are fundamental structural aspects of contracts with Special purpose vehicles and investment funds. They look significant but, in fact, aren’t. They are boilerplate. So, if you are feeling especially ornery, and have the urge to challenge these provisions, do yourself and everyone else on the deal a favour: don’t. In the immortal words of the East Enders: “Leave it Phil! Leave it! He's not worth it.”
Limited recourse and investment funds
Investment funds tend to be single corporations which and issue shares or units to investors and use the issue proceeds to buy securities investments and enter swaps, loans and other transactions with brokers. Here the brokers, being creditors, are structurally senior to the fund’s investors, who rank as equityholders. So the main reason for limiting the broker’s recourse to the SPV’s assets is to stop the broker putting the SPV into formal bankruptcy procedures once all its assets have been liquidated and distributed pari passu to creditors.
Now, why would a broker want to put an empty SPV — one which has already handed over all its worldly goods — into liquidation? Search me. Why, on the other hand, would the directors of that empty SPV, bereft as it is of worldly goods, be anxious for it not to go into liquidation? Because their livelihoods depend on it: being directors of a bankrupt company opens them to allegations or reckless trading, which may bar them from acting as directors in their jurisdiction. Since that’s their day job, it’s a bummer.
But haven’t they been, like, reckless trading? No. Remember, we are in the parallel universe of SPVs. Unlike normal commercial undertakings, SPVs run on autopilot. They are designed to give exposure, exactly, to the pools of assets and liabilities they hold. That’s the deal. Everyone trades with SPVs on that understanding.
The directors are really nominal figures: they outsource executive and trading decisions to an investment manager. Their main job is to ensure accounts are prepared and a return filed each year. They are not responsible for the trading strategy that drobve the espievie into the wall.Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag or may not[1] have their own legal personality (if the SPV is a segregated portfolio company or an incorporated cell company);
- No set-off or netting between cells: Netting and set-off will be limited to the specific cell you are facing: this means if your deal goes down, others issued from the same SPV can continue unaffected — boo — and vice versa — hooray.
- Extinction (or non-existence) of outstanding debt: Following total exhaustion of all assets after enforcement, appropriation, liquidation and distribution, and realisation of all claims subsequently arising form those assets, your outstanding unpaid debt will be “extinguished”.
- Here the intention is that you will never have legal grounds for seeking judgment, and thereafter commencing bankruptcy proceedings, for that unpaid amount once your own cell is fully unwound and its proceeds distributed.
- Pendantry alert: some sniff at this “extinction” language, fearing it implies that there was once upon a time, until extinction, a debt for an amount which the company was theoretically unable to pay — meaning that the company was, for that anxious moment in time, technically insolvent. These people — some hail from Linklaters — prefer to say “no debt is due” than “the debt shall be extinguished”.
- A proceedings covenant: You must solemnly promise never to set to put the SPV into insolvency proceedings. If you agree to all the foregoing, you should have concluded you have no literal right to do so, so this shouldn't tax your conscience too greatly.
See also
References
- ↑ Such a company a [[segregated portfolio company