Severability: Difference between revisions

From The Jolly Contrarian
Jump to navigation Jump to search
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
{{t|Profound ontological uncertainty} writ large.  If ''one'' aspect of my {{t|contract}} is illegal, what does that mean for the rest of it? This is really a way of looking at the question of illegality, the general proposition for which is that a contract which obliged its participants to do llegal things is void and unenforceable as a matter of pubic policy.
~{{t|Profound ontological uncertainty}} writ large.  If ''one'' aspect of my {{t|contract}} is illegal, what does that mean for the rest of it? This is really a way of looking at the question of [[illegality]], the general proposition for which is that a {{t|contract}} which obliged its participants to do llegal things is void and unenforceable as a matter of pubic policy.


So if you hire an assassin to kill your wife and the assassin fails to, don’t expect her majesty’s courts to help you find restitution.
So if you hire an assassin to kill your wife and the assassin fails to, don’t expect her majesty’s courts to grant you damages, much less the courts of equity [[specific performance]].


Straightforward enough. But, still hypotheticals fester away in the minds of [[Mediocre lawyer|assiduous draftspeople]] the world over, but not one which often troubles the judiciary. What if only a teeny little bit of it is illegal?
Straightforward enough. But, still hypotheticals fester away in the minds of [[Mediocre lawyer|assiduous draftspeople]] the world over, but not one which often troubles the judiciary. What if only a teeny little bit of it is illegal?


These are the real world concerns to which  modern lawyers turn their minds.
These are the real world concerns to which  modern lawyers turn their minds.

Revision as of 12:36, 16 October 2017

~Profound ontological uncertainty writ large. If one aspect of my contract is illegal, what does that mean for the rest of it? This is really a way of looking at the question of illegality, the general proposition for which is that a contract which obliged its participants to do llegal things is void and unenforceable as a matter of pubic policy.

So if you hire an assassin to kill your wife and the assassin fails to, don’t expect her majesty’s courts to grant you damages, much less the courts of equity specific performance.

Straightforward enough. But, still hypotheticals fester away in the minds of assiduous draftspeople the world over, but not one which often troubles the judiciary. What if only a teeny little bit of it is illegal?

These are the real world concerns to which modern lawyers turn their minds.