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Are these really anomalies? That, in the vernacular, is the elephant in the room. | Are these really anomalies? That, in the vernacular, is the elephant in the room. | ||
In focusing on the minutiae of the Madoff investigation - and you can’t really blame Harry Markopolos for doing that; it’s what he knows. He | In focusing on the minutiae of the Madoff investigation - and you can’t really blame Harry Markopolos for doing that; it’s what he knows. He doesn’t ask, let alone answer, that question: what is it structurally, systemically, even sociologically about our financial system that can allow these “anomalies” to persist? That they can recur suggests that the [[paradigm]] in crisis; that something about our assumptions and parameters; about [[Risk taxonomy|the way we we collectively look at the financial risk]], is fundamentally misconceived. | ||
The book that identifies that error is yet to be written. This one simply enlightens and entertains. {{author|Harry Markopolos}} is particularly scathing of the [[SEC]]. Its astoundingly poorly judged appearance before Congress, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqwCxUKVfXo in which its general counsel attempted to plead executive immunity ''from having to testify before a branch of the executive''] — must be seen to be believed. | The book that identifies that error is yet to be written. This one simply enlightens and entertains. {{author|Harry Markopolos}} is particularly scathing of the [[SEC]]. Its astoundingly poorly judged appearance before Congress, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqwCxUKVfXo in which its general counsel attempted to plead executive immunity ''from having to testify before a branch of the executive''] — must be seen to be believed. |