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So here’s the thing, and I am straining to avoid distracting myself onto my pet subjects of transcendent truth and causal skepticism, so bear with me: | So here’s the thing, and I am straining to avoid distracting myself onto my pet subjects of transcendent truth and causal skepticism, so bear with me: | ||
Even if you accept some [[reductionism|objectivist ]] model where, whether we can know it or not, there ''is'' a true, unique, cause for every effect — and down that rabbit hole are a bunch of consequences you really wouldn’t like, but let’s say — it follows that an event must have but ''one'' cause | Even if you accept some [[reductionism|objectivist ]] model where, whether we can know it or not, there ''is'' a true, unique, cause for every effect — and down that rabbit hole are a bunch of consequences you really wouldn’t like, but let’s say — it follows that an event must have but ''one'' cause (or consistent matrix of causes) to the absolute exclusion of any other explanation. There cannot be alternative, mutually exclusive, causal explanations of the same event, for that would imply ghastly [[relativism]]<ref>Not ghastly.</ref> | ||
That is to say, for every single true cause, there are multiple [[spurious correlation]]s — events that serendipitously ''seem'', by their statistical regularity, to have causal significance to a given effect but, in fact, don’t. | That is to say, for every single true cause, there are multiple [[spurious correlation]]s — events that serendipitously ''seem'', by their statistical regularity, to have causal significance to a given effect but, in transcendent fact, don’t. | ||
How many is “multiple”? ''Depends on how much data, and how much imagination, you’ve got''. Seeing as [[the portion of all data we have collected is nil]], the actual answer is that ''there are | How many is “multiple”? ''Depends on how much data, and how much imagination, you’ve got''. Seeing as [[the portion of all data we have collected is nil| portion of all data we have collected is necessarily nil]], the actual answer is that ''there are infinite spurious correlations and only one correlation to the true cause''. The likelihood, without better evidence,<ref>You are right. This qualification is doing ''a lot'' of work.</ref> that a given correlation is the true cause is therefore 1/∞, which is ''zero''. | ||
A lack of correlation may not increase the likelihood of events being causally related, ''but nor does a correlation''. Especially seeing as there maybe some data, as yet uncollected, or unnarratised, that explains how apparently decorrelated events that are, in fact, causally related. | |||
Where does this leave us? Well, correlation, in the absence of better evidence of causation, is ''meaningless''. It dodges the hard question, which is, “what possible ''better evidence'' of true causation — a “necesary connexion” between cause and effect — could there be?” | |||
This is not a new conundrum. It was first posed by none other than {{author|David Hume}}, in 1739 — “necesary connexion” is his phrase — and he answered it in the negative. There is no evidence of causation. | |||
But, fortunately for the interests of narrow-minded righteousness and [[determinism]], Hume allegedly once met someone who was racist, so we can entirely ignore him and the quarter of a millennium of epistemology that he spurred. | |||
{{sa}} | {{sa}} | ||
*[[In God we trust, all others must bring data]] | *[[In God we trust, all others must bring data]] | ||