Voidable preference: Difference between revisions

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{{a|glossary|
{{a|glossary|
[[File:Void.jpg|450px|thumb|center|[https://www.artlimited.net/35486/art/image-far-from-void/en/642461 ''Far from Void''], Michael Dunaj]]
[[File:Void.jpg|450px|thumb|center|[https://www.artlimited.net/35486/art/image-far-from-void/en/642461 ''Far from Void''], Michael Dunaj]]
}}{{d|Voidable preference|/ˈvɔɪdəbl/ /ˈprɛfərəns/|n|}}<br>
}}{{d|Voidable preference|/ˈvɔɪdəbl/ /ˈprɛfərəns/|n|}}: What happens if you create a [[security interest]] or generally prefer one creditor to others and then go ''[[tetas arriba]]'' within a short period.


What happens if you create a [[security interest]] over existing [[indebtedness]], or generally prefer one creditor to others and then go ''[[tetas arriba]]'' within a short period — usually specified by statute; 6 months of thereabouts). The [[insolvency]] laws of the land will set aside such a [[preference]], at the petition of your administrator, if it supposes that, in creating it a debtor was acting with base motives: preferring one of his buddies, to whom he owed money, over his legion other creditors, when the writing on the wall or his solvency made itself suddenly all too painfully clear.
Depending on where you are from, the [[insolvency]] laws of your land may set aside any such preference, at the petition of your administrator, if it supposes that in creating, it you acted with base motives: preferring one of your buddies, over your legion of other creditors, when the writing was already on the wall.


Most sophisticated jurisdictions have some kind of “anti-deprivation” principle in their insolvency regime which stops a struggling company from preferring some of its creditors over other ones. There is usually an excpetion for desperate rearguard actions taken in good faith with a genuine aspiration to stave off calamity, notwithstanding that they might have inadvertently caused it.
Most sophisticated jurisdictions have some kind of “anti-deprivation” principle in their insolvency regime which stops a struggling company from preferring some of its creditors over others. There is usually an exception for desperate rearguard actions taken in good faith with a genuine aspiration to stave off calamity, notwithstanding that they might have inadvertently caused it.


In the UK, it is section 239 of the [[Insolvency Act 1986]], and it goes something like this:
In the UK, it is section 239 of the [[Insolvency Act 1986]], and it goes something like this:
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:''(b) the company enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by the company.''<br>}}
:''(b) the company enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by the company.''<br>}}


This is wide and loose, and gives an insolvency administrator power to stop companies preferring, you know, the director’s brother in law’s firm which supplied the copier paper. It shoujld give those extending credit to struggling companies pause for thought, at any rate. But it goes wider than just setting aside security interests. If you have five trade creditors and you pay off one of them a week before you go insolvent, expect the administrator to have a good hard look at that payment.
This gives an insolvency administrator a wide discretion, and should give those extending credit to struggling companies pause for thought.  
 
But it is a well understood part of the corporate credit landscape. Except when it comes to ''[[special purpose vehicle]]<nowiki/>s''.


===[[Limited recourse]] and voidable preferences===
===[[Limited recourse]] and voidable preferences===

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