82,853
edits
Something for the weekend, sir?: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
no edit summary
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
||
| Line 3: | Line 3: | ||
Dilemma of banking matching long term liability to short term risks. Making a spread which is the same thing as maintaining a capital buffer comma when your assets cannot go up in value and your liabilities cannot go down. Well evidence in silicon valley bank which locked itself into long-term assets at low interest rates, meaning it had absolutely no upside and significant Downside on them even without credit loss, while it's liabilities were deposits comma being extremely short term, were very sensitive to interest rates and could be withdrawn at the moment's notice. The trick to making the business work is to manage that gap semicolon this as we have seen it's partly a function of treasury competence and partly a function of market confidence petards and black ducks flap around. | Dilemma of banking matching long term liability to short term risks. Making a spread which is the same thing as maintaining a capital buffer comma when your assets cannot go up in value and your liabilities cannot go down. Well evidence in silicon valley bank which locked itself into long-term assets at low interest rates, meaning it had absolutely no upside and significant Downside on them even without credit loss, while it's liabilities were deposits comma being extremely short term, were very sensitive to interest rates and could be withdrawn at the moment's notice. The trick to making the business work is to manage that gap semicolon this as we have seen it's partly a function of treasury competence and partly a function of market confidence petards and black ducks flap around. | ||
This is of course hardly new to silicon valley bank and has been the perennial problem with which banks must wrestle. The classic bank lending activity is a mortgage | This is of course hardly new to silicon valley bank and has been the perennial problem with which banks must wrestle. The classic bank lending activity is a mortgage: collateralized, secured over real estate, but long dated and something the bank must commit to for a long period of time stop banks generally fund these mortgages with short dated instruments such as deposits. | ||
How to manage that risk? Largely, by diversity on both sides of the ledger. Banks would lend at scale to thousands or hundreds of thousands of homeowners and take deposits, x-scale from thousands hundreds of thousands or millions of depositors. The basic play was that such diversity would give the depositors confidence not to all withdrawal their money at once comma and on the asset side would give the bank confidence that not all homeowners would default on them mortgages at once. It became a matter of actual aerial management; Banks new that some part of its deposit base was liable to withdrawal bracket and deposit); and new that some part of its asset base was liable to default. It didn't need to know which part; it could manage actuarily on the assumption that, say, 5% of a mortgage portfolio might default over a given period. | How to manage that risk? Largely, by diversity on both sides of the ledger. Banks would lend at scale to thousands or hundreds of thousands of homeowners and take deposits, x-scale from thousands hundreds of thousands or millions of depositors. The basic play was that such diversity would give the depositors confidence not to all withdrawal their money at once comma and on the asset side would give the bank confidence that not all homeowners would default on them mortgages at once. It became a matter of actual aerial management; Banks new that some part of its deposit base was liable to withdrawal bracket and deposit); and new that some part of its asset base was liable to default. It didn't need to know which part; it could manage actuarily on the assumption that, say, 5% of a mortgage portfolio might default over a given period. | ||
| Line 9: | Line 9: | ||
Bank regulators would manage for that risk by requiring banks to hold a level of capital against its mortgage book that more than covered that default rate. | Bank regulators would manage for that risk by requiring banks to hold a level of capital against its mortgage book that more than covered that default rate. | ||
Banks | Banks grew more sophisticated, as did bank regulation, and different capital ratios might be applied to different trading and banking books based on this actuarial assessment of the embedded risk. | ||
But how to manage, actuarily, that embedded risk? How, indeed, to know exactly what it was? | But how to manage, actuarily, that embedded risk? How, indeed, to know exactly what it was? As long as this risk was buried in the books of the financial institution there were experts who could model the probabilities based on historical defaults of similar mortgages. It's all very quantitative and analytical. Regulators would scrutinize this actuarial model, because it would determine capital calculations, but other than specific equity analysts, it held little interest outside the institution. | ||
But, | In essence what are bank risk analyst would be doing was analysing the incidence of defaults over a given economic cycle and extrapolating from that a likely worst case scenario for defaults on the portfolio within a “liquidity period” — the time it would take the bank to foreclose on its loan get out of its risk position. | ||
The likelihood of default of course varies through the economic cycle: for most of it, secured lending is very safe: known to value ratios traditionally were not often greater than 70 percent, meaning a bank would be covered for its whole claim in every situation except where the property value dropped more than 30%. and defaults are almost nil. During stressed parts of the cycle (following financial crashes and so on) that default level can rise to five or possibly ten percent of the portfolio. | |||
This meant that even in a stressed situation the great majority of the portfolio was completely safe. | |||
But, which 10% was not? Therein the dilemma; therein the problem. Since I don't know which thousand of my 10,000 mortgages will default,<ref>it is a little more complicated than that because collateralized loans almost never recover at a zero value, so that 10% loss might be spread over 30 or 40% of the portfolio, but the principal remains the same for every $10 invested, 9 comes back.</ref> we must apply a capital charge against to ''all'' of them. If only we could know definitively that these 9000 mortgage would not default we could apply a lower capital rating. | |||
Needless to say, obviously impossible: one cannot predict the future. | Needless to say, obviously impossible: one cannot predict the future. | ||
Banks head to problems then: long-term liabilities that could stretch over several economic cycles and which were hard to quickly liquidate, and which attracted a hefty capital charge despite, in most times, being relatively safe Investments. | |||
Hence the rise of the rating agency: independent Financial experts applying independent models to portfolios and calculating probabilities of default comma from which the rating agencies could derive ratings. Rating methods are of course opaque and in scrutable, but the general idea was that a triple A instrument was unimpeciably safe, and therefore would attract a lower or even zero capital charge) | |||
The independent private rating agencies gradually became embedded into the US regulatory system such that what mattered comma more than one's internal appreciation of risk, was the rating that could be applied to one's security. Near line back to our mortgage portfolios and say one has a mortgage portfolio of 10,000 properties of which any could, conceivably, default in a given period. Even in a period of extreme stress perhaps 10% would be likely to default no more. | |||
===Music royalties=== | ===Music royalties=== | ||