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{{a|cosmology|<br>
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[[File:Havid Dilbert.png|thumb|center|Havid Dilbert in 1897]]
{{image|Havid Dilbert|png|Havid Dilbert in 1897}}
{{subtable|<big><big><big>'''Đn ⇔ đn'''</big></big></big>}}}}[[Dilbert’s programme]] is a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist [[Havid Dilbert]]<ref>The programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to [[William Archibald Spooner]], by the way.</ref> in the early part of the 19th century.  
{{subtable|<big><big><big>'''Đn ⇔ đn'''</big></big></big>}}}}{{drop|D|ilbert’s programme is}} a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist [[Havid Dilbert]]<ref>The programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to [[William Archibald Spooner]], by the way.</ref> in the early part of the 19th century.  


Herr Dilbert proposed his programme as a solution to a crisis in the conceptual underpinnings of [[pedantry]], as various attempts to codify the fundamental essence of punctiliousness had foundered, beset by [[paradox]] and inconsistency.  
Herr Rechtanswalt Dilbert proposed his programme as a solution to the “Great Pedantry Crisis”, an unfolding failure in the conceptual underpinnings of [[pedantry]]. By the 1890s, several attempts to codify the fundamental essence of punctiliousness had foundered, beset by [[paradox]] and inconsistency.  


To save the day, Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories of quibblery to a finite, complete set of [[definitions]] and legal propositions, and thereafter formulate a logical proof that these captious fundaments were the irreducible, internally consistent axioms of cavilry.
To save the day, Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories of quibblery to a finite, complete set of [[definitions]] and legal propositions, and thereafter formulate a logical proof that these captious fundaments were the irreducible, internally consistent axioms of cavilry.


The “Dilbert programme”, as it become known, eschewed the undefined use of any expression, however banal or self-evident, in any [[legal instrument]], on the grounds that such uncertainty opens the way to an unstable state of [[Cardozo indeterminacy]].  
Dilbert’s programme eschewed the undefined use of ''any'' legal expression, however banal or self-evident, in ''any'' [[legal instrument]], on the grounds that such uncertainty opens the way to an unstable state of what we now know as [[Cardozo indeterminacy]].  


Wherever Dilbert found nouns, noun phrases or even suggestive adjectives, he defined them. he even launched a public appeal, to the eaglery of the land, asking them to submit canonical definitions for inclusion in his programme. He assembled a small research team and built a corrugated-iron shed in the grounds of Broadmoor Prison called the “Definorium” to house the submissions  (bearing quotations illustrating the expressions to be defined), that began flooding in, and which the team wrote out on little brown cards called “[[rider]]s”.
Wherever Dilbert found [[noun]]s, noun phrases or even suggestive [[adjective]]s, he defined them. In 1903 he launched a public appeal, to the [[Eagles of the law|eaglery]] of the land, asking them to submit canonical legal [[definition]]s for inclusion in his programme. The response was immediate and overwhelming.  
===The [[Dilbert definition]]===
After ten years Dilbert found, to his chagrin, that he had been unable to [[Reductionism|reduce]] a small, stubborn class of expressions where, logically, no better referent (what Dilbert called the “''definand''”) was available than the very referring expression itself (the “''definier''”). These cases he directed the team to define exactly as they were, to [[For the avoidance of doubt|avoid]], he claimed all [[doubt]] of [[Type, kind or variety|any type, kind or variety]], though others suggested that it was more to do with Dilbert’s “strict Lutheran upbringing”.<ref>The consistently waggish librettist [[Otto Büchstein]] wondered aloud, in a self-published pamphlet, whether “Mr Dilbert had been, perhaps, too strongly chastised for accidents sustained during toilet-training (the behavioural consequence of such accidents collectively hereafter “anal retentivity”)”</ref>


Thus Dilbert is credited with inventing the “[[Dilbert definition]]”, where the thing being defined (the “''definand''”, notated ''Đ'') and the label defining it (the “definier”, notated ''đ'') are identical, per the following expression:  
Dilbert assembled a small research team and constructed a corrugated iron shed in the grounds of Broadmoor Prison, which he called the “Glossarorium”, to house the submissions, bearing quotations illustrating expressions to be defined, that began flooding in, and bade his team write them out on little brown cards he called “[[rider]]s”.
===The [[Dilbert Hefinition]]===
After ten full years of the programme’s operation Dilbert found, to his chagrin, that he had yet been unable to [[Reductionism|reduce]] a small, stubborn class of expressions. For these, logically, no better-defined term (what Dilbert called the “''definand''”) was available than the very expression being defined itself (the “''definier''”). These unusual cases he directed his research team to define ''exactly as they were'', to [[For the avoidance of doubt|avoid]], he claimed all [[doubt]] of [[Type, kind or variety|any type, kind or variety]], though others suggested that it was more to do with Dilbert’s “strict Lutheran upbringing”.<ref>The consistently waggish librettist [[Otto Büchstein]] wondered aloud, in a self-published pamphlet, whether “Mr Dilbert had been, perhaps, too strongly chastised for accidents sustained during toilet-training (the behavioural consequence of such accidents collectively hereafter “anal retentivity”)”</ref>
 
Thus Dilbert is credited with inventing what is now known as the “[[Dilbert Hefinition]]”, being one where the thing being defined (the “''definand''”, notated ''Đ'') and the label defining it (the “''definier''”, notated ''đ'') are identical, per the following expression:  


:''Đ<sub>n</sub>'' ⇔ ''đ<sub>n</sub>''
:''Đ<sub>n</sub>'' ⇔ ''đ<sub>n</sub>''


Several Dilbert definitions appear in the following example, first identified in Australia:<ref>https://www.andrewpeglermedia.com.au/</ref>
Several Dilbert Hefinitions appear in the following example, first identified in Australia:<ref>https://www.andrewpeglermedia.com.au/</ref>


{{quote|An insured person (the “'''insured person'''”) may cancel (“'''cancel'''”) a policy (the “'''policy'''”) by providing us as insurer (“'''us'''” or the “'''insurer'''”) a written notice (the “'''written notice'''”) of the cancellation (the “'''cancellation'''”).}}
{{quote|An insured person (the “'''insured person'''”) may cancel (“'''cancel'''”) a policy (the “'''policy'''”) by providing us as insurer (“'''us'''” or the “'''insurer'''”) a written notice (the “'''written notice'''”) of the cancellation (the “'''cancellation'''”).}}


Academic debate rages to this day as to whether a [[Dilbert definition]] qualifies as an unusually stable type of [[Biggs hoson]], or whether it simply has null semantic content.
Academic debate rages to this day as to the significance of the Dilbert Hefinition. Does it convey ''some'' sort of [[asymptotic safety]], silently constraining unarticulated [[Metaphor|metaphorical]] dimensions, vouchsafing a kind of literal purity to otherwise unfettered characters of the language? Some say it does; nay, it ''must'': that this effect, however subliminal is there: this is, in effect, a surprising instance of a [[Biggs Hoson]]; and those that say that ''an expression defined as itself cannot exclude anything'': delimiting a textual artefact to ''exactly itself'' cannot convey even that minimal particle of legal meaning that the great [[J. M. F. Biggs]] once so famously discovered.
===The incompleteness [[paradox]]===
===The incompleteness [[paradox]]===
One gray September day in 1907 a postcard apparently containing two new definitions dropped on the doormat of the little iron shed. Hilbert snatched it up.
All this has been rendered long-since academically moot, however, as Dilbert’s entire programme succumbed to unexpected undecidability not long after the Dilbert Hefinition was derived. On a grey September day in 1907, a postcard containing two new definitions dropped on the doormat of the little iron shed. Hilbert snatched it up. The first seemed simple enough


{{quote|“'''Inclusive definier'''” shall mean all definiers whose definand includes that definier. [[For the avoidance of doubt]], the inclusive definier itself shall be, and shall be deemed to be, an inclusive definier.}}
{{quote|“'''Inclusive definier'''” shall mean all definiers whose definand includes that definier. [[For the avoidance of doubt]], the inclusive definier itself shall be, and shall be deemed to be, an inclusive definier.}}
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Stroking his whiskers, the great German jurist read on:
Stroking his whiskers, the great German jurist read on:


{{quote|“'''Exclusive definier'''” shall mean all definiers whose definand does ''not'' includes that definier. [[For the avoidance of doubt]], the exclusive definier itself shall}}
{{quote|“'''Exclusive definier'''” shall mean all definiers whose definand does ''not'' includes that definier. [[For the avoidance of doubt]], the exclusive definier itself shall }}


[[The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank|The remainder of the page was blank.]]
But [[The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank|the remainder of the page was blank.]] The postcard trembled in the old man’s hand and then fell, drifting like an autumn leaf, to the mat.


Dilbert is said to have sat down, quietly, at the corner of his table and, for four or more hours, stared blankly into space.  
Dilbert is said to have sat down, quietly, at the corner of his table and, for four or more hours, stared blankly into space.  


Then, abruptly, he got up and announced, “I am just going outside and may be some time”. He walked out without closing the door, and was never seen again.
Then, abruptly, he got up and announced, “I am just going outside and may be some time”.  
 
[[Havid Dilbert]] exited his beloved Glossarorium, without closing the door, and was never seen again.


{{sa}}
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Latest revision as of 19:47, 27 October 2024

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Havid Dilbert in 1897

Đn ⇔ đn

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Dilbert’s programme is a legal theory formulated by pioneering German jurist Havid Dilbert[1] in the early part of the 19th century.

Herr Rechtanswalt Dilbert proposed his programme as a solution to the “Great Pedantry Crisis”, an unfolding failure in the conceptual underpinnings of pedantry. By the 1890s, several attempts to codify the fundamental essence of punctiliousness had foundered, beset by paradox and inconsistency.

To save the day, Dilbert proposed to ground all existing theories of quibblery to a finite, complete set of definitions and legal propositions, and thereafter formulate a logical proof that these captious fundaments were the irreducible, internally consistent axioms of cavilry.

Dilbert’s programme eschewed the undefined use of any legal expression, however banal or self-evident, in any legal instrument, on the grounds that such uncertainty opens the way to an unstable state of what we now know as Cardozo indeterminacy.

Wherever Dilbert found nouns, noun phrases or even suggestive adjectives, he defined them. In 1903 he launched a public appeal, to the eaglery of the land, asking them to submit canonical legal definitions for inclusion in his programme. The response was immediate and overwhelming.

Dilbert assembled a small research team and constructed a corrugated iron shed in the grounds of Broadmoor Prison, which he called the “Glossarorium”, to house the submissions, bearing quotations illustrating expressions to be defined, that began flooding in, and bade his team write them out on little brown cards he called “riders”.

The Dilbert Hefinition

After ten full years of the programme’s operation Dilbert found, to his chagrin, that he had yet been unable to reduce a small, stubborn class of expressions. For these, logically, no better-defined term (what Dilbert called the “definand”) was available than the very expression being defined itself (the “definier”). These unusual cases he directed his research team to define exactly as they were, to avoid, he claimed all doubt of any type, kind or variety, though others suggested that it was more to do with Dilbert’s “strict Lutheran upbringing”.[2]

Thus Dilbert is credited with inventing what is now known as the “Dilbert Hefinition”, being one where the thing being defined (the “definand”, notated Đ) and the label defining it (the “definier”, notated đ) are identical, per the following expression:

Đnđn

Several Dilbert Hefinitions appear in the following example, first identified in Australia:[3]

An insured person (the “insured person”) may cancel (“cancel”) a policy (the “policy”) by providing us as insurer (“us” or the “insurer”) a written notice (the “written notice”) of the cancellation (the “cancellation”).

Academic debate rages to this day as to the significance of the Dilbert Hefinition. Does it convey some sort of asymptotic safety, silently constraining unarticulated metaphorical dimensions, vouchsafing a kind of literal purity to otherwise unfettered characters of the language? Some say it does; nay, it must: that this effect, however subliminal is there: this is, in effect, a surprising instance of a Biggs Hoson; and those that say that an expression defined as itself cannot exclude anything: delimiting a textual artefact to exactly itself cannot convey even that minimal particle of legal meaning that the great J. M. F. Biggs once so famously discovered.

The incompleteness paradox

All this has been rendered long-since academically moot, however, as Dilbert’s entire programme succumbed to unexpected undecidability not long after the Dilbert Hefinition was derived. On a grey September day in 1907, a postcard containing two new definitions dropped on the doormat of the little iron shed. Hilbert snatched it up. The first seemed simple enough

Inclusive definier” shall mean all definiers whose definand includes that definier. For the avoidance of doubt, the inclusive definier itself shall be, and shall be deemed to be, an inclusive definier.

Stroking his whiskers, the great German jurist read on:

Exclusive definier” shall mean all definiers whose definand does not includes that definier. For the avoidance of doubt, the exclusive definier itself shall —

But the remainder of the page was blank. The postcard trembled in the old man’s hand and then fell, drifting like an autumn leaf, to the mat.

Dilbert is said to have sat down, quietly, at the corner of his table and, for four or more hours, stared blankly into space.

Then, abruptly, he got up and announced, “I am just going outside and may be some time”.

Havid Dilbert exited his beloved Glossarorium, without closing the door, and was never seen again.

See also

References

  1. The programme and its progenitor owe nothing to Scott Adams and everything to William Archibald Spooner, by the way.
  2. The consistently waggish librettist Otto Büchstein wondered aloud, in a self-published pamphlet, whether “Mr Dilbert had been, perhaps, too strongly chastised for accidents sustained during toilet-training (the behavioural consequence of such accidents collectively hereafter “anal retentivity”)”
  3. https://www.andrewpeglermedia.com.au/