Flawed asset: Difference between revisions
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You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} of the {{isdama}}. | You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} of the {{isdama}}. | ||
More generally, following an event of default, this concept allows an innocent, but out-of-the-money, party to a derivative or securities finance transaction to suspend performance of its obligations without terminating the transaction and thereby crystallising a mark-to-market loss. Section {{2(a)(iii)}} entered the argot in a simpler, more peaceable time, when zero threshold, daily margined {{tag|CSA}}s were an uncommon, rather fantastical sight. They're more or less obligatory now, so it's hard to see the justification for a flawed asset provision. | |||
===Master trading agreements=== | |||
*'''{{isdama}}''': You can find it all, in gruesome detail, in the article on Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}}. The ISDA provision has generated some case law, including [[Metavante]], and [[Firth Rixson]], which the truly insatiable amongst you may care to read. | |||
*'''{{gmsla}}''': As far as I can see there is no {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} equivalent in the GMSLA. Nor would you expect one. It makes little ense in a master agreement for transactions that generally have zero or short tenors, and are inherently margined daily as a matter of course – i.e., there is no “uncollateralised, large, [[out-of-the-money]] exposures” an innocent stock lender would want to protect such a flawed asset provision. | |||
*'''{{gmsla}}''': Now here's the funny thing. Even though the {{tag|GMRA}} is comparable to the {{tag|GMSLA}} in most meaningful ways, it '''does''' have a flawed asset provision. I don't understand it, but that is true about much of the world of international finance. | |||
{{anat|isda}} | {{anat|isda}} |
Revision as of 17:39, 26 April 2016
You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. More generally, following an event of default, this concept allows an innocent, but out-of-the-money, party to a derivative or securities finance transaction to suspend performance of its obligations without terminating the transaction and thereby crystallising a mark-to-market loss. Section ===Section 2(a)(iii) litigation=== There is a (generous) handful of important authorities on the effect under English law or New York law of the suspension of obligations under the most litigationey clause in the ISDA Master Agreement, Section 2(a)(iii). They consider whether flawed asset provision amounts to an “ipso facto clause” under the US Bankruptcy Code or violates the “anti-deprivation” principle under English law. Those cases are:
- Lomas v Firth Rixson
- Marine Trade v Pioneer
- Pioneer v Cosco
- Pioneer v TMT
- Enron v TXU
- Metavante v Lehman entered the argot in a simpler, more peaceable time, when zero threshold, daily margined CSAs were an uncommon, rather fantastical sight. They're more or less obligatory now, so it's hard to see the justification for a flawed asset provision.
Master trading agreements
- ISDA Master Agreement: You can find it all, in gruesome detail, in the article on Section 2(a)(iii). The ISDA provision has generated some case law, including Metavante, and Firth Rixson, which the truly insatiable amongst you may care to read.
- 2010 GMSLA: As far as I can see there is no 2(a)(iii) equivalent in the GMSLA. Nor would you expect one. It makes little ense in a master agreement for transactions that generally have zero or short tenors, and are inherently margined daily as a matter of course – i.e., there is no “uncollateralised, large, out-of-the-money exposures” an innocent stock lender would want to protect such a flawed asset provision.
- 2010 GMSLA: Now here's the funny thing. Even though the GMRA is comparable to the GMSLA in most meaningful ways, it does have a flawed asset provision. I don't understand it, but that is true about much of the world of international finance.