Flawed asset: Difference between revisions

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You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} of the {{isdama}}.
You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} of the {{isdama}}.
More generally, following an event of default, this concept allows an innocent, but out-of-the-money, party to a derivative or securities finance transaction to suspend performance of its obligations without terminating the transaction and thereby crystallising a mark-to-market loss. Section {{2(a)(iii)}} entered the argot in a simpler, more peaceable time, when zero threshold, daily margined {{tag|CSA}}s were an uncommon, rather fantastical sight. They're more or less obligatory now, so it's hard to see the justification for a flawed asset provision.
===Master trading agreements===
*'''{{isdama}}''': You can find it all, in gruesome detail, in the article on Section {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}}. The ISDA provision has generated some case law, including [[Metavante]], and [[Firth Rixson]], which the truly insatiable amongst you may care to read.
*'''{{gmsla}}''': As far as I can see there is no {{isdaprov|2(a)(iii)}} equivalent in the GMSLA. Nor would you expect one. It makes little ense in a master agreement for transactions that generally have zero or short tenors, and are inherently margined daily as a matter of course – i.e., there is no “uncollateralised, large, [[out-of-the-money]] exposures” an innocent stock lender would want to protect such a flawed asset provision.
*'''{{gmsla}}''': Now here's the funny thing. Even though the {{tag|GMRA}} is comparable to the {{tag|GMSLA}} in most meaningful ways, it '''does''' have a flawed asset provision. I don't understand it, but that is true about much of the world of international finance.


{{anat|isda}}
{{anat|isda}}

Revision as of 17:39, 26 April 2016

You'll be most likely wanting to see the discussion on this wonderfully baffling subject under Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. More generally, following an event of default, this concept allows an innocent, but out-of-the-money, party to a derivative or securities finance transaction to suspend performance of its obligations without terminating the transaction and thereby crystallising a mark-to-market loss. Section ===Section 2(a)(iii) litigation=== There is a (generous) handful of important authorities on the effect under English law or New York law of the suspension of obligations under the most litigationey clause in the ISDA Master Agreement, Section 2(a)(iii). They consider whether flawed asset provision amounts to an “ipso facto clause” under the US Bankruptcy Code or violates the “anti-deprivation” principle under English law. Those cases are:

Master trading agreements

  • ISDA Master Agreement: You can find it all, in gruesome detail, in the article on Section 2(a)(iii). The ISDA provision has generated some case law, including Metavante, and Firth Rixson, which the truly insatiable amongst you may care to read.
  • 2010 GMSLA: As far as I can see there is no 2(a)(iii) equivalent in the GMSLA. Nor would you expect one. It makes little ense in a master agreement for transactions that generally have zero or short tenors, and are inherently margined daily as a matter of course – i.e., there is no “uncollateralised, large, out-of-the-money exposures” an innocent stock lender would want to protect such a flawed asset provision.
  • 2010 GMSLA: Now here's the funny thing. Even though the GMRA is comparable to the GMSLA in most meaningful ways, it does have a flawed asset provision. I don't understand it, but that is true about much of the world of international finance.


ISDA Anatomy™

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Index: Click to expand:Navigation
See ISDA Comparison for a comparison between the 1992 ISDA and the 2002 ISDA.
The Varieties of ISDA Experience
Subject 2002 (wikitext) 1992 (wikitext) 1987 (wikitext)
Preamble Pre Pre Pre
Interpretation 1 1 1
Obligns/Payment 2 2 2
Representations 3 3 3
Agreements 4 4 4
EODs & Term Events 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSTCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityFMTax EventTEUMCEUMATE 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSTCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityTax EventTEUMCEUMATE 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSSCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityTax EventTEUMCEUM
Early Termination 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculations; Payment DatePayments on ETSet-off 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculationsPayments on ETSet-off 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculationsPayments on ET
Transfer 7 7 7
Contractual Currency 8 8 8
Miscellaneous 9 9 9
Offices; Multibranch Parties 10 10 10
Expenses 11 11 11
Notices 12 12 12
Governing Law 13 13 13
Definitions 14 14 14
Schedule Schedule Schedule Schedule
Termination Provisions Part 1 Part 1 Part 1
Tax Representations Part 2 Part 2 Part 2
Documents for Delivery Part 3 Part 3 Part 3
Miscellaneous Part 4 Part 4 Part 4
Other Provisions Part 5 Part 5 Part 5
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