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So it is for Ms. Letby. Are we ''really'' to believe that an experienced nurse with no history of mental illness, criminality, sociopathy or familial dysfunction, let alone prior medical misadventure — could suddenly transform herself from a trusted senior medical professional into a killer of such sophistication as to go undetected for eighteen months? ''How'' could she do this? ''Why'' would she do it? Why, in the absence of compelling, hard evidence displacing the usual presumption that ''this is not what normally socialised people do'', would the preferred theory of the case be serial murder, and not “an unusual but not remarkable cluster of accidents”?
So it is for Ms. Letby. Are we ''really'' to believe that an experienced nurse with no history of mental illness, criminality, sociopathy or familial dysfunction, let alone prior medical misadventure — could suddenly transform herself from a trusted senior medical professional into a killer of such sophistication as to go undetected for eighteen months? ''How'' could she do this? ''Why'' would she do it? Why, in the absence of compelling, hard evidence displacing the usual presumption that ''this is not what normally socialised people do'', would the preferred theory of the case be serial murder, and not “an unusual but not remarkable cluster of accidents”?


==Case for the prosecution==
====Case for the prosecution====
{{drop|L|ucy Letby’s case}}, on its face, seems a lot more like Lindy Chamberlain’s than David Bain’s. It is not beyond question that ''none'' of the children — all extremely premature and in an intensive care unit, after all —met with foul play. For each event taken separately, there is a plausible non-criminal explanation. Indeed, Ms. Letby was not ''immediately'' suspected of involvement in ''any'' of the deaths.
{{drop|L|ucy Letby’s case}}, on its face, seems a lot more like Lindy Chamberlain’s than David Bain’s. It is not beyond question that ''none'' of the children — all extremely premature and in an intensive care unit, after all —met with foul play. For each event taken separately, there is a plausible non-criminal explanation. Indeed, Ms. Letby was not ''immediately'' suspected of involvement in ''any'' of the deaths.


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That Ms. Letby searched online for the parents of the deceased is consistent with ''either'' breathtaking malevolence — if you take it that she ''is'' a serial killer — ''or'' affecting compassion — if you take it that she is ''not''. By itself, it is ''evidence'' of neither. We all search online for individuals we meet in real life — even people we know we probably shouldn’t: this is perfectly normal behaviour. We are curious, imperfect animals.
That Ms. Letby searched online for the parents of the deceased is consistent with ''either'' breathtaking malevolence — if you take it that she ''is'' a serial killer — ''or'' affecting compassion — if you take it that she is ''not''. By itself, it is ''evidence'' of neither. We all search online for individuals we meet in real life — even people we know we probably shouldn’t: this is perfectly normal behaviour. We are curious, imperfect animals.
====Doubt====
Whatever the reason for it, a lack of [[direct evidence]]  of the defendant’s foul play — of ''any'' foul play — means there will always be ''some'' [[doubt]]. ''No one saw anything.'' ''[[Inference]]'' is needed. The question is whether the inference is justified. Has the prosecution done enough to remove all ''reasonable'' doubt?
In some types of crime — burglary, say — we should expect no [[direct evidence]]: competent burglars target unmonitored environments where there are no witnesses.
Burglars, we fancy, would steer well clear of the intensive care unit in a neonatal hospital. For there could hardly be a worse environment to get away with crime. Entries and exits are monitored and audited. Medicine is logged, controlled, secured and signed in and out. Medical experts conduct routine rounds and check on patients around the clock. Biochemistry is complex and its signals are delicate. There are specialists at hand with deep expertise and sophisticated machinery who can detect the merest traces of the unusual or sinister.
So the lack of such evidence is a curious feature of the “[[healthcare serial murder]]” cases. This one is no exception. ''No-one saw Ms. Letby doing any harm''.
Avoiding eyewitnesses, let alone forensic detection, would require great skill, caution and planning. You would expect a malign perpetrator to refine and perfect a careful technique — a ''modus operandi'' — and stick with it.
You would ''not'' expect a skilful murderer to make opportunistic attacks, to use multiple, unrelated methods or to improvise on the spot to suit the circumstances.
Certainly not one under active suspicion. The hospital’s lead consultants raised concerns with management about Ms. Letby as early as October 2015.
Yet this is what Ms. Letby is supposed to have done, and still left no implicating evidence. Over 13 months, Ms. Letby is alleged to have variously injected air intravenously, injected it via nasogastric tube, caused blunt force trauma to internal organs (quite how, is not clear), overfed with milk, dislodged breathing tubes, poisoned with insulin, and physically throttled.
Ms Letby was described in the court as premeditated, calculating and cunning, using a number of different methods, thereby misleading clinicians into believing the collapses had a natural cause.
Perhaps — or maybe the collapses did just have a natural cause. There is one other germane feature of an intensive care unit: visitors tend, by unfortunate necessity, to be ''very, very sick''. They have an unusually high probability of dying. If they did not, they would not be there.
====Onus====
And that is a heavy onus. Between prosecution and defence it is not a straight fight: the prosecution must prove its case [[beyond reasonable doubt]]. If it is incumbent on a defendant to prove ''anything'' — technically it isn’t, but practically it would be a brave defendant who did not — it is simply that there is ''some'' credible doubt.
When a seriously ill patient dies in intensive care, even unexpectedly, and nothing beyond mere presence implicates any perpetrator, ''there is credible doubt.''
For each of the Countess of Chester collapses ''taken in isolation'' there is reasonable doubt that the victim was the subject of foul play, let alone that Ms. Letby was responsible for it. Indeed, foul play was not initially suspected in any of them.
How can a series individual cases which have reasonable doubt turn into a collection of cases where there is none?
====Probability====
{{quote|Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action.
:—Ian Fleming, ''Goldfinger''}}
The answer is ''probability''.
It is sometimes said that Ms. Letby was “not tried by statistics”, the implication being that probabilities did therefore not influence her conviction. But this is not right: a case depending on [[circumstantial evidence]] is necessarily about probabilities. The “probative value” of circumstantial evidence is: “Does this make it more or less likely that an event, which no one witnessed, happened?”
True, statistics are not always an appropriate lens to assess probabilities, especially where data are limited or collected in unusual circumstances. But the shift data ''are'' statistics. The Crown may not have framed its arguments about them that way, but its arguments ''were'' statistical: the shift data have no probative value ''other than as statistics''.
Now: flip a fair coin once and heads is as likely as tails — that’s “happenstance”. Flip it twice and, while two heads are less likely, they still carry a one-in-four chance — that’s “coincidence”.
But flip it ''twenty-five'' times and you have a ''less than one in thirty million'' chance of getting twenty-five heads. If you get this result, it is most unlikely your coin is “fair”.<ref>This makes the outrageous assumption that the “base rate” of “unfair coins” in a given sample is more than one in thirty million.</ref>
This is why the shift data is so important: it is the equivalent of a string of twenty-five coin flips that all came up heads. It can dispel those “credible doubts” in individual cases: okay, ''one'' collapse may have been innocent. Two, a coincidence. But ''twenty five''?
If there is a single clinching argument in the evidence presented against Ms. Letby, this was surely it.
But it only holds ''if the “flips” really were consecutive'': If there were ''fifty'' flips, and only twenty-five came up heads, that would not be unusual at all.<ref>To be precise, not quite: there would be 49.65% chance of happening, a [[chatbot]] I know reliably informs me.</ref>
And here we come to the statistical problems with the shift data. It was a small selection from a much bigger sample of over 700 shifts in the “suspect period”.<ref>The thirteen-month period between June 2015 and July 2016 in which the charges were laid. There is an argument that even this period brings an element of confirmation bias about it, and the enquiry should be extended to Ms. Letby’s entire tenure at the hospital.</ref> It records only the events for which Ms. Letby was charged. These all occurred, [[Q.E.D.]], while she was on duty. There is necessarily, therefore, an X by her name for every incident. The chart tells us simply that Ms. Letby was on duty ''every time she was on duty''.<ref>{{plainlink|https://triedbystats.com/|''TriedbyStats''}} has an excellent interactive feature to demonstrate the vanishing unlikelihood of ''another'' nurse being on duty for every one of Ms. Letby’s shifts.</ref> 
It has been widely criticised, perhaps most eloquently by Rachel Aviv in her ''New Yorker'' article. Aviv raises the prospect of the [[prosecutor’s fallacy]], also known as the “[[Texas sharpshooter]]”.<ref>Having peppered the side of a barn with gunshots, a marksman finds a cluster of five bullet holes within a foot of each other. Ignoring all the other bullet holes he paints a target around them and claims to be a sharpshooter.</ref> Are all the incidents included? Did any relevant events happen when Ms. Letby was not on duty? What even counts as a “relevant event”? Has inconvenient data that does not fit the narrative been omitted?
There were ten ''other'' deaths in the suspect period for which Ms. Letby was not charged. We do not know why she was not charged, nor whether she was on duty for these events. (A few commentators claim to have seen evidence that Ms. Letby was on duty for ''every'' death in the suspect period — but that evidence is not made public, and importantly was not presented at trial.)<ref>Notably {{plainlink|https://tinyurl.com/5advchd2|BBC Panorama}}: “The jury was only asked to consider seven murder charges. We’ve discovered that 13 babies died during Lucy Letby’s last year on the neonatal unit. She was on duty for every one of them.”</ref>
Had the Crown submitted a comprehensive table including ''every'' shift in the suspect period, and marked ''every'' incident on it, whether Ms. Letby was implicated or not, we might have a better story. But they did not.
The Police have hinted “further charges may be forthcoming” as they continue to review thousands of historical cases dating back to 2012,<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.scotsman.com/news/crime/nurse-lucy-letby-found-guilty-of-murdering-seven-babies-and-attempting-to-kill-six-others-in-hospital-unit-4260551|''The Scotsman''}}, 18 August 2023.</ref> but you would expect they would have found something after nine years.
====On tonewood and prosecutor’s tunnel vision====
{{quote|
{{Dsh a little learning capsule}}}}
{{drop|J|C has, [[Prosecutor’s tunnel vision|elsewhere]]}} waxed long and lyrical about the collection of cognitive biases called [[prosecutor’s tunnel vision]]. These biases tend to show up where clinching evidence does not: if there were any clinchers, things would be ''clinched''. Therefore those prosecuting — and, for that matter, defending — start to fixate on finer and finer technical details to win isolated arguments. Once one side goes down a rabbit hole, the other is obliged to follow. Insulin assay tests, entry card swipe data, the significance of skin discolourations — all have been cited as smoking guns for prosecution and defence when they are transparently nothing of the sort.
{{Quote|{{Neil postman information glut}}
:—{{author |Neil Postman}}}}
Information is fractal. The more you look at it, the more you can create: it subdivides infinitely — there is no bottom — and the more raw information you create, the more possible arguments you can have about it. This is the implication of information theory: the more data points there are, the more unique patterns you can make from them.<ref>Simply put, if you have one data point, you can make one possible combination. If you have two, you can make three (A, B, AB). If you have three, you can make seven (A,B, C, AB, BC, AC, ABC), and so on.</ref> If we take it that a theory is simply “a pattern of consistent data drawn from available information from which we can draw a valid inference”  then the more information you have, the more ''plausible'' alternative theories of the case you can make.
In other words, you cannot win an argument by simply descending further into the [[weeds]]. Those who have drunkenly debated evangelical Christians, resolute atheists, real ale connoisseurs, or [[tonewood]] freaks — JC has done all of these — will know this. The thing about descending into the oubliette is that as the points atomise, the arguments grow more heated and ''the less difference they can possibly make''.
This is the “[[tonewood]]” debate in a nutshell: sure, ''in theory'' the harmonic resonance of nitrocellulose varnish ''could'' affect the sound of an electric guitar, but not so as a mere human could possibly hear it in perfect conditions ''let alone in the moshpit at the Roxy on a sweaty night in 1976''.
Whatever did make Steve Jones’ Les Paul sound like a screaming chainsaw, that is, ''it wasn’t the varnish''.
''Zeroing in'' to draw further inferences will not help. The only way to do it is by zooming ''out''.
====Oh come on ref====
It is a common enough trajectory: we start with an ''instinct'' that a popular, diligent, young, female nurse from a stable background is the ''last'' person you would expect to be a serial murderer.
We might quietly chide ourselves about our [[unconscious bias]] in favour of ''people like us''. We might remind ourselves that natural sympathy with our in-group is not scientific, let alone ''legal evidence''. The law requires one to set that kind of prejudice — literally, prejudgment— aside and consider the evidence as it accumulates in the abstract and on its merits.
But hold on: if [[circumstantial evidence]] “changes the prior probability of an event”, it adjusts the inferences we can reasonably draw from baseline facts. Inasmuch as Ms. Letby’s background, socialisation and mental health reflect the prior improbability that she would be a murderer, and they are not displaced by [[direct evidence]] that she ''is'' a murderer, then our intuitions ''are'' useful. ''They are all we have''. If we ignore them, our [[The Patterning Instinct: A Cultural History of Humanity’s Search for Meaning|pattern-making instincts]] may lead us down rabbit-holes where we wind up chasing down tendentious circumstantial minutiae at the expense of basic common sense.
''This is how miscarriages of justice happen''.
The Northern Territory Coroner’s report to [[Lindy Chamberlain]]’s trial is perhaps a high watermark of [[Prosecutor’s tunnel vision|this kind of thing]]. A week after her disappearance, Azaria’s torn and bloodstained jumpsuit was discovered in the desert, 4 km from the campsite. Rather than seeing this as corroborating Ms. Chamberlain’s story the coroner arrived at precisely the opposite conclusion:
{{quote|The evidence in relation to the clothing is consistent with an attempt to simulate a dingo attack on a child by person or persons who recovered the buried body, removed the clothing, damaged it by cutting, rubbed it in vegetation and deposited the clothes for later recovery. Such deposition is indicative that the deposition was made with the knowledge that dingos were in the area.
In addition, there is no evidence to positively support the involvement of a dingo in the taking of the child, the carrying of the body some four Kilometers and removing the body from the area where the clothes were found.}}
Prior probabilities, again: not only did [[Lindy Chamberlain]] have no ''opportunity'' to fabricate this evidence and make the eight-kilometre round trip to plant it, and not only did no-one witness her doing so, it was in any case vanishingly unlikely that a sane, well-adjusted and happily married mother of three children would do ''any'' of the horrendous things of which she was accused.
Before even entertaining the possibility of foul play, the coroner should have asked himself, and satisfactorily answered, a far simpler question: ''why on Earth would any normal, well-adjusted mother do that?''
Now, barristers will remind us that motive is never required for a criminal conviction, and this is true. ''But''. If there is no [[direct evidence]] of wrongdoing ''and'' there is a plausible innocent explanation — in Ms. Letby’s case, natural causes — we should be able to plausibly answer that question.
''Why on Earth would any normal, well-adjusted nurse do that?''


==Resources==
==Resources==

Revision as of 16:24, 24 August 2024

The JC’s amateur guide to systems theory
“What makes you think she’s a witch?”
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“We’ve found a witch. May we burn her?”

Monty Python and the Holy Grail

Herculio: ’Tis neither malice, spite, nor virtue
Whose ledger swells, or plucks, the seedy fruits of progress —
But mainly accident.
Lest thee with surety know aught else —
Withhold thy assignations.

Triago: Pish upon thee, Nuncle. Pish!
Dost thou mean to say
Things peel this way
Through doughty misadventure?

Herculio: Peradventure —

Triago: Pish abeam!
Has thou no more to say than that?
Wouldst thou on this shaky surmise
Withhold rebuke?

Herculio: Perchance, per case, mayhap dear Triago
’Twas but a fluke?

Triago: O! This nuisant planet weighs upon my soul!

Herculio: If ’tis this and nought beside
That flies you to a vernal rage
Our fickle globe in its manifold confound’ry
Lies prettily indeed
For thy alignment.

On herd minds, groupthink and narrative biases

Lucy Letby is back in the news in 2024. On 24 May, the Court of Appeal denied her leave to appeal against her convictions. On 10 June, her retrial for the attempted murder of “Child K” began in Manchester, and on 2 July she was found guilty. On 3 July the Court of Appeal released its judgment on its dismissal of her appeal. All of this came against a backdrop wherein, on 13 May, New Yorker magazine published Rachel Aviv’s “A British Nurse Was Found Guilty of Killing Seven Babies. Did she do it?”, a 13,000-word investigative piece questioning the safety of Ms. Letby’s original convictions.

Since then, a slew of media outlets have leapt into the fray, from Private Eye to Channel 5 and almost everyone in between, with some — notably the Daily Mail — backing both sides of the argument, running pieces in the same week by Liz Hull, who sat through the trial and is certain that Ms. Letby is guilty, and Peter Hitchens who has read the New Yorker article and is certain she is not.

Having been convicted of multiple infant murders, the general public’s view is — or perhaps was — clear: justice has been done. The sooner Ms. Letby’s name fades from the commonplace the better.

But look a bit closer and the picture is complicated. The physical evidence implicating Ms. Letby is all circumstantial: eyewitness evidence does little more than put Ms. Letby at the scene of the alleged incidents, and this may not say very much: it was a place she was, after all, contractually obliged to be.

Nor did anyone see Ms. Letby do any of the acts of which she has been accused. The medical evidence indicating foul play is in all cases highly technical and in most notably conjectural. Some of the stronger parts of it — and they are not all that strong — relate to children who survived. The evidence that resonates most strongly with the public — the shift rota and Ms. Letby’s alleged “confessional note” in particular — are not quite what they seems.

Nor is the evidence that any of the infants were the victims of foul play, by anyone, overwhelming. They were, after all, premature infants in an intensive care unit. If they were not at high risk of mortality, they would not have been there.

The case for conviction thus emerges from a preponderance of small pieces of evidence that all seem to point towards Ms. Letby. But there is no smoking gun. The most compelling proposition seems to be Ms. Letby’s opportunity: she alone was rostered on and onsite during all the alleged incidents.

The circumstantial argument from the shift rota is founded on improbability — what are the odds that the one person present at all of the incidents did not have something to do with them? But neither prosecution or defence framedthe argument of one about probabilities, and none brought any statistical analysis to bear on the question. This, as a number of statisticians have noted, is a great pity. Especially given the criminal law’s chequered history with statistical reasoning.

A binary status

Now she is in prison for the whole of her life, all appeals exhausted and all pending retrials completed, just two narratives remain. The simple one, that Ms. Letby is the personification of unspeakable evil: a serial murderer of defenceless, premature infants. The more unsettling one is that she is the victim of a breathtaking, and no less unspeakable, miscarriage of justice.

Advocates on both sides grow increasingly entrenched, and bitter.

But on the very same probabilities, this is a most unfortunate place for the public debate to have landed.

Serial murderers of any kind are vanishingly rare in Britain. Wikipedia lists fifty-five, since 1600. But so are miscarriages of justice. Wikipedia lists fifty-four, since 1255.

Both narratives are highly improbable. Of all the things that might explain this, they are the least plausible as a matter of “prior probabilities”: all else being unknown, it is highly unlikely there was a serial murderer at work in the Countess of Chester Hospital. But, one having been convicted, all else being unknown it is highly unlikely there was a miscarriage of justice. This is why tempers run high. Both positions seem utterly unreasonable.

And they leave untouched a vast range of more likely explanations, but which provide no closure on a series of tragic events. We seek narratives that explain the world to us. We do not find useful ones that say, “well, we just don’t know”. Few of us happily occupy that indeterminate space. We prefer conclusions, however unlikely they may be.

So our institutions persuade us to deprive Ms.Ms. Letby of that wide middle ground the rest of us occupy, in which she was an ordinary person, with pluses and minuses, virtues and failings: neither angel nor devil but who just had the misfortune to be involved in these tragic events.

especially where, as here, there is no direct evidence, the criminal justice system forces us into an odd kind of anecdotal reductionism: wemust focus on discrete actions and isolated pieces of highly technical evidence: literally, microscopic observations: implied levels of insulin and c-peptide; unusual skin blotching patterns and so on. We expected to thread these atoms together and be able to deduce from them a compelling picture of emergent human, moral actions.

We are pattern-matching machines. We use whatever morsels we find to build a narrative. Once we are primed with a theory, we dive deeper into the details to prove out our case. We strive to fit the remaining facts into our model. We are risk tunnel vision, when our immersion in those atomic details crowds out a wider perspective.

Only later, if at all, do we ask the “big picture” question: leaving aside the microscopic details how plausible is it that this was murder?

Take Lindy Chamberlain: leaving aside the circumstantial forensic minutiae[1] are we really to believe a sane mother in good spirits and without any history of violence or psychiatric illness could absent herself from the close company of strangers and, nearby, silently murder her own infant, dispose of the body, obliterate all evidence of murder before raising the alarm within a period of five minutes? How could she do it? Why would she do it? Yet a tunnel-visioned coroner built just such an elaborate forensic case that saw Lindy Chamberlain convicted whilst never, it seems, asking that basic question.

So it is for Ms. Letby. Are we really to believe that an experienced nurse with no history of mental illness, criminality, sociopathy or familial dysfunction, let alone prior medical misadventure — could suddenly transform herself from a trusted senior medical professional into a killer of such sophistication as to go undetected for eighteen months? How could she do this? Why would she do it? Why, in the absence of compelling, hard evidence displacing the usual presumption that this is not what normally socialised people do, would the preferred theory of the case be serial murder, and not “an unusual but not remarkable cluster of accidents”?

Case for the prosecution

Lucy Letby’s case, on its face, seems a lot more like Lindy Chamberlain’s than David Bain’s. It is not beyond question that none of the children — all extremely premature and in an intensive care unit, after all —met with foul play. For each event taken separately, there is a plausible non-criminal explanation. Indeed, Ms. Letby was not immediately suspected of involvement in any of the deaths.

The case for Ms. Letby’s innocence has been well-stated enough. The New Yorker piece describes the statistical problems. Peter Elston and Michael McConville’s We need to talk about Lucy Letby podcast goes into great detail about the credibility of the technical medical case — it is not very credible — and the excellent TriedbyStats website does a tremendous job of conveying just how unintuitive the statistical implications of the evidence are.

Of course, individuals committed to the proposition that there has been a miscarriage of justice may suffer their own form of “defender’s” tunnel vision — but in the main, their arguments are clear, well-grounded and compelling.

Yet this was no kangaroo court: the British justice system is rightly a thing of international renown. Over centuries, the common law has developed principles that avoid injustice. Clearly, they are not perfect, but the presumption of innocence, the burden and standard of proof, rules of criminal procedure regulating admissible evidence, pre-trial disclosure and acceptable methods of examination and cross-examination are specifically designed to ensure fairness. Ms. Letby certainly got her day in court — ten months worth of them — and spent 14 days giving evidence during her trial, at which she was represented by a King’s Counsel who left few stones unturned.

Still, there ought to be clear, well-grounded and compelling arguments to displace the presumption that Ms. Letby was simply unlucky, implicated by circumstantial evidence but fundamentally just in the wrong place at the wrong time, and instead set her out as a demonstrable serial murderer. We might expect tunnel-vision-inflicted innocence campaigners to overlook inconvenient facts — half of confirmation bias is blindness to what you do not want to see — but not those persuaded of Ms. Letby’s guilt. They must surely be able to clearly articulate these “clinchers”.

And a strident segment of the commentariat is persuaded of her guilt. A Reddit community of yeoman amateur investigators numbers 11,000 members and is replete with theories.[2] Journalists who covered the trial in detail have published films, podcasts and have forthcoming books about the “Killer Nurse” (notably Liz Hull from the Mail and Judith Moritz from the BBC). The prosecution’s main expert witness, Dr Dewi Evans, has gone to unusual lengths to dismiss the concerns of innocence campaigners whom he feels to be unfairly targeting him.

But if they can articulate these damning facts, in their voluminous reporting to date, they haven’t, particularly well. The timid voice of protest grows louder.

Confirmation bias

“Angel” and “devil” narratives become self-fulfilling: once you’ve adopted one, you can panel-beat almost any subsequent information to suit your view.

The little definitive peripheral evidence there is about Ms. Letby gets coloured dramatically by whomever is looking at it. For example, her social media activity. Here is BBC Panorama reporter Judith Moritz, in a piece to camera:[3]

“Sparky, full of fun, popular — she looks like the life and soul of the party in these photos. I don’t know what Britain’s most prolific child killer should look like — I’m pretty sure it’s not this, though.

And then, a few moments later:

“She comes across as — mousy; a bit normal — you can’t really marry that with the enormity of what she’s been accused of.”

If and only if we are persuaded of her guilt, an outwardly vivacious personality and busy social life notwithstanding her malign nature mark her out as a monster. It corroborates and amplifies her wickedness.

But if we are prepared to give Ms. Letby the benefit of the doubt, this is perfectly normal behaviour. It tells us nothing: it places Ms. Letby in that ordinary space, with the rest of us, within a standard deviation of the mean. There have been very, very few serial killer nurses. We have no idea what, as a rule, they are like. This information does not help us.

That Ms. Letby searched online for the parents of the deceased is consistent with either breathtaking malevolence — if you take it that she is a serial killer — or affecting compassion — if you take it that she is not. By itself, it is evidence of neither. We all search online for individuals we meet in real life — even people we know we probably shouldn’t: this is perfectly normal behaviour. We are curious, imperfect animals.

Doubt

Whatever the reason for it, a lack of direct evidence of the defendant’s foul play — of any foul play — means there will always be some doubt. No one saw anything. Inference is needed. The question is whether the inference is justified. Has the prosecution done enough to remove all reasonable doubt?

In some types of crime — burglary, say — we should expect no direct evidence: competent burglars target unmonitored environments where there are no witnesses.

Burglars, we fancy, would steer well clear of the intensive care unit in a neonatal hospital. For there could hardly be a worse environment to get away with crime. Entries and exits are monitored and audited. Medicine is logged, controlled, secured and signed in and out. Medical experts conduct routine rounds and check on patients around the clock. Biochemistry is complex and its signals are delicate. There are specialists at hand with deep expertise and sophisticated machinery who can detect the merest traces of the unusual or sinister.

So the lack of such evidence is a curious feature of the “healthcare serial murder” cases. This one is no exception. No-one saw Ms. Letby doing any harm.

Avoiding eyewitnesses, let alone forensic detection, would require great skill, caution and planning. You would expect a malign perpetrator to refine and perfect a careful technique — a modus operandi — and stick with it.

You would not expect a skilful murderer to make opportunistic attacks, to use multiple, unrelated methods or to improvise on the spot to suit the circumstances.

Certainly not one under active suspicion. The hospital’s lead consultants raised concerns with management about Ms. Letby as early as October 2015.

Yet this is what Ms. Letby is supposed to have done, and still left no implicating evidence. Over 13 months, Ms. Letby is alleged to have variously injected air intravenously, injected it via nasogastric tube, caused blunt force trauma to internal organs (quite how, is not clear), overfed with milk, dislodged breathing tubes, poisoned with insulin, and physically throttled.

Ms Letby was described in the court as premeditated, calculating and cunning, using a number of different methods, thereby misleading clinicians into believing the collapses had a natural cause.

Perhaps — or maybe the collapses did just have a natural cause. There is one other germane feature of an intensive care unit: visitors tend, by unfortunate necessity, to be very, very sick. They have an unusually high probability of dying. If they did not, they would not be there.

Onus

And that is a heavy onus. Between prosecution and defence it is not a straight fight: the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. If it is incumbent on a defendant to prove anything — technically it isn’t, but practically it would be a brave defendant who did not — it is simply that there is some credible doubt.

When a seriously ill patient dies in intensive care, even unexpectedly, and nothing beyond mere presence implicates any perpetrator, there is credible doubt.

For each of the Countess of Chester collapses taken in isolation there is reasonable doubt that the victim was the subject of foul play, let alone that Ms. Letby was responsible for it. Indeed, foul play was not initially suspected in any of them.

How can a series individual cases which have reasonable doubt turn into a collection of cases where there is none?

Probability

Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. Three times is enemy action.

—Ian Fleming, Goldfinger

The answer is probability.

It is sometimes said that Ms. Letby was “not tried by statistics”, the implication being that probabilities did therefore not influence her conviction. But this is not right: a case depending on circumstantial evidence is necessarily about probabilities. The “probative value” of circumstantial evidence is: “Does this make it more or less likely that an event, which no one witnessed, happened?”

True, statistics are not always an appropriate lens to assess probabilities, especially where data are limited or collected in unusual circumstances. But the shift data are statistics. The Crown may not have framed its arguments about them that way, but its arguments were statistical: the shift data have no probative value other than as statistics.

Now: flip a fair coin once and heads is as likely as tails — that’s “happenstance”. Flip it twice and, while two heads are less likely, they still carry a one-in-four chance — that’s “coincidence”.

But flip it twenty-five times and you have a less than one in thirty million chance of getting twenty-five heads. If you get this result, it is most unlikely your coin is “fair”.[4]

This is why the shift data is so important: it is the equivalent of a string of twenty-five coin flips that all came up heads. It can dispel those “credible doubts” in individual cases: okay, one collapse may have been innocent. Two, a coincidence. But twenty five?

If there is a single clinching argument in the evidence presented against Ms. Letby, this was surely it.

But it only holds if the “flips” really were consecutive: If there were fifty flips, and only twenty-five came up heads, that would not be unusual at all.[5]

And here we come to the statistical problems with the shift data. It was a small selection from a much bigger sample of over 700 shifts in the “suspect period”.[6] It records only the events for which Ms. Letby was charged. These all occurred, Q.E.D., while she was on duty. There is necessarily, therefore, an X by her name for every incident. The chart tells us simply that Ms. Letby was on duty every time she was on duty.[7]

It has been widely criticised, perhaps most eloquently by Rachel Aviv in her New Yorker article. Aviv raises the prospect of the prosecutor’s fallacy, also known as the “Texas sharpshooter”.[8] Are all the incidents included? Did any relevant events happen when Ms. Letby was not on duty? What even counts as a “relevant event”? Has inconvenient data that does not fit the narrative been omitted?

There were ten other deaths in the suspect period for which Ms. Letby was not charged. We do not know why she was not charged, nor whether she was on duty for these events. (A few commentators claim to have seen evidence that Ms. Letby was on duty for every death in the suspect period — but that evidence is not made public, and importantly was not presented at trial.)[9]

Had the Crown submitted a comprehensive table including every shift in the suspect period, and marked every incident on it, whether Ms. Letby was implicated or not, we might have a better story. But they did not.

The Police have hinted “further charges may be forthcoming” as they continue to review thousands of historical cases dating back to 2012,[10] but you would expect they would have found something after nine years.

On tonewood and prosecutor’s tunnel vision

Triago: Ho, Ho.
Let not thy witty fool, nor his foolish wit
Besmirch the fruited science of th’ academy.
“A little learning is a dangerous thing” —

Nuncle: Yet not half so dangerous as a lot.

Triago: — So sayeth Pope, you know.

Nuncle: But not the one in Rome:

Queen: Good ser knight: art thou drunk upon the Pierian spring:
A hypoxic draft that suffocates the brain,
So deep no shaft of light can bring it round again?

Triago: My conjecture comports a grain of truth
As pure and true and golden—

Nuncle: — but yet no more roundly causative
Than are the month-past flappings of a Latin papillon
Upon a brewing Filipino typhoon.

JC has, elsewhere waxed long and lyrical about the collection of cognitive biases called prosecutor’s tunnel vision. These biases tend to show up where clinching evidence does not: if there were any clinchers, things would be clinched. Therefore those prosecuting — and, for that matter, defending — start to fixate on finer and finer technical details to win isolated arguments. Once one side goes down a rabbit hole, the other is obliged to follow. Insulin assay tests, entry card swipe data, the significance of skin discolourations — all have been cited as smoking guns for prosecution and defence when they are transparently nothing of the sort.

The fact is, there are very few political, social, and especially personal problems that arise because of insufficient information. Nonetheless, as incomprehensible problems mount, as the concept of progress fades, as meaning itself becomes suspect, the Technopolist stands firm in believing that what the world needs is yet more information.[11]

Neil Postman

Information is fractal. The more you look at it, the more you can create: it subdivides infinitely — there is no bottom — and the more raw information you create, the more possible arguments you can have about it. This is the implication of information theory: the more data points there are, the more unique patterns you can make from them.[12] If we take it that a theory is simply “a pattern of consistent data drawn from available information from which we can draw a valid inference” then the more information you have, the more plausible alternative theories of the case you can make.

In other words, you cannot win an argument by simply descending further into the weeds. Those who have drunkenly debated evangelical Christians, resolute atheists, real ale connoisseurs, or tonewood freaks — JC has done all of these — will know this. The thing about descending into the oubliette is that as the points atomise, the arguments grow more heated and the less difference they can possibly make.

This is the “tonewood” debate in a nutshell: sure, in theory the harmonic resonance of nitrocellulose varnish could affect the sound of an electric guitar, but not so as a mere human could possibly hear it in perfect conditions let alone in the moshpit at the Roxy on a sweaty night in 1976.

Whatever did make Steve Jones’ Les Paul sound like a screaming chainsaw, that is, it wasn’t the varnish.

Zeroing in to draw further inferences will not help. The only way to do it is by zooming out.

Oh come on ref

It is a common enough trajectory: we start with an instinct that a popular, diligent, young, female nurse from a stable background is the last person you would expect to be a serial murderer.

We might quietly chide ourselves about our unconscious bias in favour of people like us. We might remind ourselves that natural sympathy with our in-group is not scientific, let alone legal evidence. The law requires one to set that kind of prejudice — literally, prejudgment— aside and consider the evidence as it accumulates in the abstract and on its merits.

But hold on: if circumstantial evidence “changes the prior probability of an event”, it adjusts the inferences we can reasonably draw from baseline facts. Inasmuch as Ms. Letby’s background, socialisation and mental health reflect the prior improbability that she would be a murderer, and they are not displaced by direct evidence that she is a murderer, then our intuitions are useful. They are all we have. If we ignore them, our pattern-making instincts may lead us down rabbit-holes where we wind up chasing down tendentious circumstantial minutiae at the expense of basic common sense.

This is how miscarriages of justice happen.

The Northern Territory Coroner’s report to Lindy Chamberlain’s trial is perhaps a high watermark of this kind of thing. A week after her disappearance, Azaria’s torn and bloodstained jumpsuit was discovered in the desert, 4 km from the campsite. Rather than seeing this as corroborating Ms. Chamberlain’s story the coroner arrived at precisely the opposite conclusion:

The evidence in relation to the clothing is consistent with an attempt to simulate a dingo attack on a child by person or persons who recovered the buried body, removed the clothing, damaged it by cutting, rubbed it in vegetation and deposited the clothes for later recovery. Such deposition is indicative that the deposition was made with the knowledge that dingos were in the area.

In addition, there is no evidence to positively support the involvement of a dingo in the taking of the child, the carrying of the body some four Kilometers and removing the body from the area where the clothes were found.

Prior probabilities, again: not only did Lindy Chamberlain have no opportunity to fabricate this evidence and make the eight-kilometre round trip to plant it, and not only did no-one witness her doing so, it was in any case vanishingly unlikely that a sane, well-adjusted and happily married mother of three children would do any of the horrendous things of which she was accused.

Before even entertaining the possibility of foul play, the coroner should have asked himself, and satisfactorily answered, a far simpler question: why on Earth would any normal, well-adjusted mother do that?

Now, barristers will remind us that motive is never required for a criminal conviction, and this is true. But. If there is no direct evidence of wrongdoing and there is a plausible innocent explanation — in Ms. Letby’s case, natural causes — we should be able to plausibly answer that question.

Why on Earth would any normal, well-adjusted nurse do that?

Resources

Academic

Brave Clarice—healthcare serial killers, patterns, motives, and solutions, Rahma and Esraa Menshawey, 1 December 2022.

Online

Podcasts

The difficult cases

There are excellent podcasts on each of the difficult cases mentioned above.

See also

References

  1. Arterial sprays under the dashboard, unusual perforations on discarded clothing, etc.
  2. Moderators fiercely police contributions: anyone so much as questioning the verdict is summarily banished. JC was banished.
  3. Panorama, 18 August 2023
  4. This makes the outrageous assumption that the “base rate” of “unfair coins” in a given sample is more than one in thirty million.
  5. To be precise, not quite: there would be 49.65% chance of happening, a chatbot I know reliably informs me.
  6. The thirteen-month period between June 2015 and July 2016 in which the charges were laid. There is an argument that even this period brings an element of confirmation bias about it, and the enquiry should be extended to Ms. Letby’s entire tenure at the hospital.
  7. TriedbyStats has an excellent interactive feature to demonstrate the vanishing unlikelihood of another nurse being on duty for every one of Ms. Letby’s shifts.
  8. Having peppered the side of a barn with gunshots, a marksman finds a cluster of five bullet holes within a foot of each other. Ignoring all the other bullet holes he paints a target around them and claims to be a sharpshooter.
  9. Notably BBC Panorama: “The jury was only asked to consider seven murder charges. We’ve discovered that 13 babies died during Lucy Letby’s last year on the neonatal unit. She was on duty for every one of them.”
  10. The Scotsman, 18 August 2023.
  11. Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology, 1992.
  12. Simply put, if you have one data point, you can make one possible combination. If you have two, you can make three (A, B, AB). If you have three, you can make seven (A,B, C, AB, BC, AC, ABC), and so on.