Template:Hypothetical broker-dealer capsule: Difference between revisions

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In some jurisdictions, derivatives are taxed differently — more favourably — than [[Cash equity|cash equities]] (for example [[stamp duty reserve tax]], and in the US, for certain types of underlier, under [[871(m)]]) so it is important that your synthetic position doesn’t look like a tax play. [[Tax attorney|Tax attorneys]] — especially American ones — fret mightily that high-delta [[equity derivatives]] do.
In some jurisdictions, derivatives are taxed differently — more favourably — than [[Cash equity|cash equities]] (for example [[stamp duty reserve tax]], and in the US, for certain types of underlier, under [[871(m)]]) so it is important that your synthetic position doesn’t look like a tax play. [[Tax attorney|Tax attorneys]] — especially American ones — fret mightily that high-delta [[equity derivatives]] do.


One of the key indicators, they intuit, is the degree to which the contract permits a swap counterparty influence or control its [[prime broker]]’s hedge. A swap counterparty should care not one whit about its broker’s hedge — other than its [[cost]]. If it does takes an unhealthy interest, the swap position may be — dramatic look gopher — [[recharacterised]] as a ''disguised [[custody]] arrangement'' of shares the swap counterparty has in reality bought, and on which it should pay tax, [[stamp duty]] and so on. Depending on which tax specialist you ask, an “unhealthy interest” might extend even to the execution price the[[broker-dealer]] achieves on its hedge. (This seems potty to us, by the way, but such is the interior world of the US tax attorney). The attorneys are greatkly calmed by the suggestion that a hedge execution price is imaginary, and not real, even though it happens to be identical to the real one. Thus, you will see much chatter about prices a “[[hypothetical broker-dealer]]” might achieve selling [[fungible]] securities, and [[volume-weighted average price]]s and so on.
One of the key indicators, they intuit, is the degree to which the contract permits a swap counterparty influence or control its [[prime broker]]’s hedge. A swap counterparty should care not one whit about its broker’s hedge — other than its [[cost]]. If it does takes an unhealthy interest, the swap position may be — dramatic look gopher — [[recharacterised]] as a ''disguised [[custody]] arrangement'' of shares the swap counterparty has in reality bought, and on which it should pay tax, [[stamp duty]] and so on. Depending on which tax specialist you ask, an “unhealthy interest” might extend even to the execution price the[[broker-dealer]] achieves on its hedge. (This seems potty to us, by the way, but such is the interior world of the US tax attorney). [[US tax attorney]]s are greatly calmed by the suggestion that a hedge execution price is imaginary, and not real, even though it happens to be identical to the real one. Thus, you will see much chatter about prices a “[[hypothetical broker-dealer]]” might achieve selling [[fungible]] securities, and [[volume-weighted average price]]s and so on.


So who, why, which or what is this '''[[hypothetical broker-dealer]]'''? Well, he’s a fellow just like the ''actual'' [[broker-dealer]] — in the same jurisdiction, having the same taxation status, earning the same income, executing the same hedge transactions, eating at the same restaurants, having the same GSOH and watching the same stuff on Netflix — but ''not'' the actual [[broker-dealer]]. He’s like actual [[broker-dealer]]’s “sober me”, only ''he gets drunk too''. Now this might strike you, as it strikes the [[JC]], as just too cute – too much of a playground argument to hold water. (“I didn’t break the window, sir, honest, sir, it was a boy who looked exactly like me who arrived from out of nowhere and is gone now”). But [[US tax attorney]]s seem to be taken in by it even, if they won’t buy arguments on actual economic substance.
So who, why, which or what is this '''[[hypothetical broker-dealer]]'''? Well, he’s a fellow just like the ''actual'' [[broker-dealer]] — in the same jurisdiction, having the same taxation status, earning the same income, executing the same hedge transactions, eating at the same restaurants, having the same GSOH and watching the same stuff on Netflix — but ''not'' the actual [[broker-dealer]]. He’s like actual [[broker-dealer]]’s “sober me”, only ''he gets drunk too''. Now this might strike you, as it strikes the [[JC]], as just too cute – too much of a playground argument to hold water. (“I didn’t break the window, sir, honest, sir, it was a boy who looked exactly like me who arrived from out of nowhere and is gone now”). But [[US tax attorney]]s seem to be taken in by it even, if they won’t buy arguments on actual economic substance.

Revision as of 09:57, 24 April 2020

In some jurisdictions, derivatives are taxed differently — more favourably — than cash equities (for example stamp duty reserve tax, and in the US, for certain types of underlier, under 871(m)) so it is important that your synthetic position doesn’t look like a tax play. Tax attorneys — especially American ones — fret mightily that high-delta equity derivatives do.

One of the key indicators, they intuit, is the degree to which the contract permits a swap counterparty influence or control its prime broker’s hedge. A swap counterparty should care not one whit about its broker’s hedge — other than its cost. If it does takes an unhealthy interest, the swap position may be — dramatic look gopher — recharacterised as a disguised custody arrangement of shares the swap counterparty has in reality bought, and on which it should pay tax, stamp duty and so on. Depending on which tax specialist you ask, an “unhealthy interest” might extend even to the execution price thebroker-dealer achieves on its hedge. (This seems potty to us, by the way, but such is the interior world of the US tax attorney). US tax attorneys are greatly calmed by the suggestion that a hedge execution price is imaginary, and not real, even though it happens to be identical to the real one. Thus, you will see much chatter about prices a “hypothetical broker-dealer” might achieve selling fungible securities, and volume-weighted average prices and so on.

So who, why, which or what is this hypothetical broker-dealer? Well, he’s a fellow just like the actual broker-dealer — in the same jurisdiction, having the same taxation status, earning the same income, executing the same hedge transactions, eating at the same restaurants, having the same GSOH and watching the same stuff on Netflix — but not the actual broker-dealer. He’s like actual broker-dealer’s “sober me”, only he gets drunk too. Now this might strike you, as it strikes the JC, as just too cute – too much of a playground argument to hold water. (“I didn’t break the window, sir, honest, sir, it was a boy who looked exactly like me who arrived from out of nowhere and is gone now”). But US tax attorneys seem to be taken in by it even, if they won’t buy arguments on actual economic substance.

About the economic substance: synthetic equity derivatives don’t resemble disguised custody arrangements at all:

(i) a synthetic prime broker will hedge delta-one across its whole client portfolio — some of which will be short, and some long — so there is no one-to-one relationship between each client’s long position and the prime broker’s net physical hedge in the first place; and
(ii) even if there were, the prime broker will almost certainly finance the net long portion of its delta anyway, to reduce its funding costs, lending it out for cash, so again the prime broker won’t be holding a physical hedge at allm, let alone one it is covertly custodying for its swap clients.

But US tax attorneys wilfully ignore all this dispiriting logical talk and insist the only thing that can save you are some magic words about you hedge costs being incurred by a hypothetical broker dealer exactly like you, but who isn’t you.