Plausible deniability: Difference between revisions
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{{A|devil|}}How much of a firm’s risk management capability and infrastructure is dedicated, as a first priority, to plausible deniability? | {{A|devil|}}How much of a firm’s risk management capability and infrastructure is dedicated, as a first priority, to ''plausible deniability''? This might sound a fatuous, rather cynical question, but the scorecard of corporate catastrophe against individual responsibility over the last 30 years tells a different story. Whatever should go wrong, however disastrous, it never seems to be anybody’s fault. ''Anywhere''. | ||
Not, at least, in the management layer. Stooges and patsies abound in the ranks of subject matter | Not, at least, in the management layer. Stooges and patsies abound in the ranks of [[subject matter expert]]s who are, as {{author|Sidney Dekker}} comprehensively catalogues,<ref>{{fieldguide}}</ref> routinely found at fault and eviscerated for corporate shortcomings whose root cause was plainly poor [[Design principles|design]] in [[System|systems]] and controls. Proactively mendacious employees — while, of course, not unheard of — are the exception and not the rule: most folks who show up are earnest, want to do a solid day’s graft, be recognised for it, and go home. Those with an instinct for survival learn the [[Buttocratic oath]], and will act as a first priority in preservation of their own posterior, but as they rise through the ranks, the stakes get higher, the number of diffusion avenues inevitably grows, the priority of ensuring, above all else, plausible deniability. | ||
Now defenestration of executives certainly happens, but you sense it is rarely a product of a forensic investigation of the path of an ill-fated buck to find where it stops —bucks, in a modern corporation, do not stop anywhere: they just ''diffuse'' into thin air, mercurial wills-o’-the-wisp, eluding all attempts to snatch at them — but rather it happens through a far more visceral, less analytical. One day you’re about to become a ''made man'', the next there is a double-tap to the base of the skull. | |||
As ever, I digress. But is any of this a surprise in a a deterministic culture so relentlessly focused on corporate liability for unwanted outcomes, rather than practical day-to-day ''management'' of outmodes to avoid them being unwanted in the first place? | |||
And so an entire professional subculture has emerged to, er, ''buttress'' the arse-covering instinct. Auditors, [[Ratings notches|credit rating agencies]], [[Magic circle law firm|providers of legal opinions]], to whom the individuals inside the organisation and whose job, you would think, it is to manage those risks, can point should they come up short. | |||
“No one got fired for hiring IBM” – or [[Linklaters]], Deloitte or Moody’s – has more than a grain of truth to it. | |||
{{sa}} | |||
*[[Agency problem]] | |||
*[[The dog in the night time]] | |||
*[[Buttocratic oath]] | |||
Revision as of 14:18, 19 January 2021
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How much of a firm’s risk management capability and infrastructure is dedicated, as a first priority, to plausible deniability? This might sound a fatuous, rather cynical question, but the scorecard of corporate catastrophe against individual responsibility over the last 30 years tells a different story. Whatever should go wrong, however disastrous, it never seems to be anybody’s fault. Anywhere.
Not, at least, in the management layer. Stooges and patsies abound in the ranks of subject matter experts who are, as Sidney Dekker comprehensively catalogues,[1] routinely found at fault and eviscerated for corporate shortcomings whose root cause was plainly poor design in systems and controls. Proactively mendacious employees — while, of course, not unheard of — are the exception and not the rule: most folks who show up are earnest, want to do a solid day’s graft, be recognised for it, and go home. Those with an instinct for survival learn the Buttocratic oath, and will act as a first priority in preservation of their own posterior, but as they rise through the ranks, the stakes get higher, the number of diffusion avenues inevitably grows, the priority of ensuring, above all else, plausible deniability.
Now defenestration of executives certainly happens, but you sense it is rarely a product of a forensic investigation of the path of an ill-fated buck to find where it stops —bucks, in a modern corporation, do not stop anywhere: they just diffuse into thin air, mercurial wills-o’-the-wisp, eluding all attempts to snatch at them — but rather it happens through a far more visceral, less analytical. One day you’re about to become a made man, the next there is a double-tap to the base of the skull.
As ever, I digress. But is any of this a surprise in a a deterministic culture so relentlessly focused on corporate liability for unwanted outcomes, rather than practical day-to-day management of outmodes to avoid them being unwanted in the first place?
And so an entire professional subculture has emerged to, er, buttress the arse-covering instinct. Auditors, credit rating agencies, providers of legal opinions, to whom the individuals inside the organisation and whose job, you would think, it is to manage those risks, can point should they come up short.
“No one got fired for hiring IBM” – or Linklaters, Deloitte or Moody’s – has more than a grain of truth to it.