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| There is no perfect marketplace. <br> | | There is no perfect marketplace. <br> |
| ==={{risk|Ecosystem}}=== | | ==={{risk|Ecosystem}}=== |
| =====Shortcomings with each model=====
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| Neither model describes an equilibrium state among human beings.
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| *'''Information is inherently valuable''': Information is not universal, immediate, or homogeneous. Therefore those who have it have a distinct advantage over those who do not. ''Therefore it is economically rational to hoard information''.
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| *'''{{risk|market}} conditions and cooperation strategies are interdependent'''
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| {{risk|Cooperation}}
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| '''We do cooperate'''. In the right conditions individuals form natural alliances to share and protect valuable assets (like information). Cooperation rigs the {{risk|market}} in favour of the cooperators against those who don’t.
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| Nepotism is an instance of this kind of cooperation. It also ''changes'' the {{risk|market}}: where there were ten equal players, now there are nine: Eight equal small ones, and a bigger one.
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| *'''{{risk|trust}}''': Basic rule: wherever there is cooperation there must first be {{risk|trust}}: credit, reputation, one’s word being one’s bond. It has to mean something, practically. But, in a brutish {{risk|market}}, {{risk|trust}} is a scarce commodity. A brutish {{risk|market}} is characterised by nasty exchanges: one-offs, negative sum games, predators and prey.
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| ==={{risk|Prisoner’s dilemma}}=== | | ==={{risk|Prisoner’s dilemma}}=== |
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