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| :::(v) So in an environment we have many dynamics – brutish competitions, opportunities for wealthy collaboration, each interaction shapes the {{risk|market}}. <br> | | :::(v) So in an environment we have many dynamics – brutish competitions, opportunities for wealthy collaboration, each interaction shapes the {{risk|market}}. <br> |
| :(b) The {{risk|market}} is a direct analog for the ecosystem. <br>
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| :::(i) The two competing views, [[Hobbes]]ian and Smithian, are not incompatible. In many ways they say the same thing. <br>
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| :::(ii) OK not quite. If the {{risk|market}} is a game of whist, the biosphere is a game of black bitch. <br>
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| ::::(1) The biological competition for resources is a straight fight between predators to find prey. The winner gets to EAT the prey. <br>
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| :::::(a) This is a desired outcome for the winning predator only. It’s a bad outcome for the prey. The competition among the prey is to avoid being the one who gets eaten. <br>
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| :::::(b) It is asymmetric. It doesn’t work in reverse (prey do not compete among themselves for the best predator; quite the reverse – though the extended phenotype, a cow selects its farmer, perhaps they do?) <br>
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| :::::(c) That’s a zero to negative sum game: there is some loss of thermal energy or increase in entropy. <br>
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| :::::(d) It is not iterative: <br>
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| ::::::(i) it has no memory <br>
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| ::::::(ii) eaten prey are not in a position to learn or remember. <br>
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| ::::::(iii) Predators don’t care about their reputation. <br>
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| :::::(e) Therefore it’s Gaussian: there’s no interdependence between hunting trips. <br>
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| ::::(2) The commercial competition for resources is a fight between sellers to find a buyer (and vice versa). The winner gets to transact. <br>
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| :::::(a) That is a desired outcome for both parties. Both are winners <br>
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| :::::(b) It is therefore a zero to positive sum game (it is only negative if one or other has traded in error) <br>
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| :::::(c) It is symmetrical – you can view it from either buyer or seller’s perspective and it looks the same <br>
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| :::::(d) It is iterative. Each party remembers its treatment at the hands of the other, and can learn from and communicate its experience. Also transactions act as {{risk|market}} signals : if everyone sells, so do I. Transactions influence each other. The statistical analyses are not normal. <br>
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| ::::(3) A transaction is, therefore, a cooperation. A cooperation is in a fundamental sense a strike against the open {{risk|market}} (even though it is the essence of the {{risk|market}} – paradox alert. A transaction is its own mini cartel. It will often be wrapped up in anticompetitive terms:<br>
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| :::::(a) Confidentiality <br>
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| :::::(b) Exclusivity <br>
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| :::::(c) Licencing <br>
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| :::::(d) Intellectual property <br>
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| ::::(4) These cartel terms derogate from the fundamental conditions of the {{risk|market}}. They undermine the [[nomological machine]]. <br>
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| :(c) Basic unit of commercial replication is the individual. <br> | | :(c) Basic unit of commercial replication is the individual. <br> |
| :::(i) Again, the analogy is close but not perfect<br> | | :::(i) Again, the analogy is close but not perfect<br> |