Candle problem: Difference between revisions

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===Glucksberg===
===Glucksberg===
Enter flamboyant pianist Elton Glucksberg’s, whose addition was to run the [[candle problem]] with two groups, each incentivised differently. One group was not given an incentive but told the experiment was a to test out various problems to decide which to use in a later experiment”. The 25% fastest problem solvers in the other group would win $5 each, the fastest, $25. The rest got a [[donut]].
Enter flamboyant pianist Elton Glucksberg, whose addition was to run the [[candle problem]] with two groups, each incentivised differently. One group was not given an incentive but told the experiment was a to test out various problems to decide which to use in a later experiment”. The 25% fastest problem solvers in the other group would win $5 each, the fastest, $25. The rest got a [[donut]].


You will never guess what happened.
You will never guess what happened.


It turns out those incentivised to be greedy capitalist rent-seekers were disinclined to collaborate, forced themselves into a narrow, white-knuckle footrace towards the goal and ''didn’t do very well''. Those without the pressure to kill or be killed collaborated and, on average, solved the problem far more quickly. This really ought not need a Ted Talk to point out. The incentives are all wrong: they discourage collaboration of the sort which obviously will help in solving the problem.
It turns out those incentivised to be greedy capitalist [[Rent-seeking|rent-seekers]] were disinclined to collaborate, forced themselves into a narrow, white-knuckle footrace towards a goal they didn’t well understand and ''didn’t do very well''. Those without the pressure to kill or be killed collaborated and, on average, solved the problem far more quickly. This really ought not to need a Ted Talk to point out. The incentives are all wrong: they discourage collaboration of the sort which obviously will help in solving the problem.
===The end of history?===
===The end of history?===
Any way, in this way, by the simple expedient of [[libtard|metropolitan liberal]] reasoning, was naked capitalism finally falsified, vanquished and logicked out of existence. As a result, there aren’t any [[Investment bank|investment banks]] any more, the canals of Venice run clear, the sky over Zhengzhou is a brilliant polaroid blue, and unicorns gamble in the wildflower meadows of Rotherhithe.
Anyway, in this way, by the simple expedient of [[libtard|metropolitan liberal]] reasoning, was naked capitalism finally [[Falsification|falsified]], vanquished and logicked out of existence. As a result, there aren’t any [[Investment bank|investment banks]] any more, the canals of Venice run clear, the sky over Zhengzhou is a brilliant polaroid blue, and unicorns gamble in the wildflower meadows of Rotherhithe.


Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens Daniel Pink, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him.
Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens {{author|Daniel Pink}}, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him.
===What motivates bankers===
===What motivates bankers===
But {{author|Daniel Pink}} is proving the wrong point here. The puzzle isn’t understanding how “autonomy, mastery, and purpose” motivates people more than a bit of cash — who didn’t, instinctively, know that? — but why our corporate overlords who, in their reflective moments, surely must know that as well, ignore this plain, ''[[a priori]]'' fact.
But {{author|Daniel Pink}} is proving the wrong point here. The puzzle isn’t understanding how “autonomy, mastery, and purpose” motivates people more than a bit of cash — who didn’t, instinctively, know that? — but why our corporate overlords who, in their reflective moments, surely must know that as well, ignore this plain, ''[[a priori]]'' fact.


[[File:Influence on incentive structure 1.png|400px|thumb|left|Why the leaders of your organisation like to eat what you kill]]
[[File:Influence on incentive structure 1.png|400px|thumb|left|Why the leaders of your organisation like to eat what you kill]]
As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory: it is all about ''personal incentives''. In the same way that the average [[Survivor|wage-slave’s]] major motivator during her career is [[fear]] — and her primal instinct is the covering of her own arse (regardless of the clothedness of the organisation’s as a whole), what propels the captains of our industry is ''personal enrichment''. Solving the organisation’s, and its clients’, problems and achieving general commercial goals of the collective in a way that empowers and energises the rank and file is, you know, ''good'', inasmuch as it generates a healthy pay packet, but it is still a second order priority to ''generating that healthy pay packet''. If, by some unfortunate turn of events, the two should conflict, it does not take a clairvoyant to work out which imperative will prevail.<ref>Hint: It won’t be “the collective betterment of the whole”.</ref>
As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory: it is all about ''personal incentives''. In the same way that the average [[Survivor|wage-slave’s]] major motivator during her career is [[fear]] — and her primal instinct is the covering of her own behind, what propels the captains of our industry is ''personal enrichment''. Solving the organisation’s, and its clients’, problems and achieving general commercial goals of the collective in a way that empowers and energises the rank and file is, you know, ''good'', inasmuch as it generates a healthy pay packet, but it is still a second-order derivative of ''generating that healthy pay packet''. If, by some unfortunate turn of events, the two should conflict, it should not take a clairvoyant to work out which imperative will prevail: it won’t be “the collective betterment of the whole”.  


Now consider the candle incentives. The CEO is in an excellent position to decide whether to go with the ''individual'' incentive or the ''collective'' incentive, because he’s the boss.  
Now consider the candle incentives. The [[CEO]] is in an excellent position to decide whether to go with the ''individual'' incentive or the ''collective'' incentive because ''he’s the boss''. He is also well placed to influence who among the workforce should get that big prize. No need to consult your local clairvoyant on that one, either, nor to predict that his management suite, if they think they might be in for a fiver, are likely to agree with him.  


He is also, should he go with the individual incentive, well placed to influence who among the workforce should get the big prize. Again, no need for your local clairvoyant on that one, either. His management suite, if they think they might get a fiver, are likely to agree with him on that. The remainder of the employee group, who are destined for a [[sugary treat with a hole in it]], may have a different view, but they are in no position it advance it, because ''no-one with any influence is listening to them''. The reason for that is because ''the people with influence are all on the phone to Aston Martin dealers''.  
The remainder of the employee group, who are destined for a [[sugary treat with a hole in it]], may have a different view, but they are in no position it advance it, because ''no-one with any influence is listening to them''. The reason for that is because ''the people with influence are all on the phone to their Aston Martin dealers''.  


If our captains and leaders ''were'' minded to rationalise their decisions — and that would require powers of self-awareness that, as a rule, they lack, but let’s just say — they might look at it this way: to fund the individual incentive model will cost just $150 ($25 for the CEO and 150 between the 25 board members). To fund the collective incentive model, would mean giving everyone — including ourselves— either ''nothing'', or a fiver, or ''the whole twenty five bucks''.
If our captains and leaders ''were'' minded to rationalise their decisions — and that would require powers of self-awareness that, as a rule, they lack, but let’s just say — they might look at it this way: to fund the individual incentive model will cost just $150 ($25 for the CEO and 150 between the 25 board members). To fund the collective incentive model, would mean giving everyone — including ourselves— either ''nothing'', or a fiver, or ''the whole twenty-five bucks''.


Now no-one likes the sound of a rolling [[donut]], so that’s off the table. But funding everyone a fiver would cost $500, and $25 would cost ''two and a half grand''. So, unless the collective incentive would create a ''huge'' increase in productivity, purely in [[cost]] terms, the individual incentive scheme is ''much'' more attractive to our shareholders...
Now no-one likes the sound of a rolling [[donut]], so that’s off the table. But funding everyone a fiver would cost $500, and giving everyone $25 would cost ''two and a half grand''. So, unless the collective incentive would create a ''huge'' increase in productivity, purely in [[cost]] terms, the individual incentive scheme is ''much'' more attractive to our shareholders...


Gentlemen, I move that we do that. All those in favour?
Gentlemen, I move that we do that. All those in favour?

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