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*'''[[Downgrading]] employees''': ''removing'' subject matter experts and replacing them with lower calibre (i.e., cheaper) employees with ''even less'' autonomy to follow the ''even more complicated'' rules and processes now introduced. | *'''[[Downgrading]] employees''': ''removing'' subject matter experts and replacing them with lower calibre (i.e., cheaper) employees with ''even less'' autonomy to follow the ''even more complicated'' rules and processes now introduced. | ||
But blaming the [[meatware]] is to ignore history and | But blaming the [[meatware]] is to ignore history and condemn yourself to repeat it. Changing the make-up of your workforce won’t help if the basic conditions under which they are obliged to operate aren’t fixed. Simply adding more, increasingly detailed, policies — “codified over-reactions to situations that are unlikely to happen again” in {{author|Jason Fried}}’s elegant words<ref>{{author|Jason Fried}}, {{br|ReWork: Change the Way You Work Forever}}</ref> — will only make the gap between theory and practice wider. | ||
{{Work to rule capsule}} | {{Work to rule capsule}} | ||
===Reacting to failure=== | ===Reacting to failure=== | ||
Reactions to accidents tend | Reactions to accidents tend: | ||
*'''Retrospective''': made with the benefit of hindsight and full knowledge of inputs and outputs, and with ample time to construct a narrative that neatly links events into a causal chain | *'''Retrospective''': To be made with the benefit of hindsight and full knowledge of inputs and outputs, and with ample time to construct a [[narrative]] that neatly links events into a causal chain ''that was not at all clear to the actors at the time''. This may be an impressive feat of imagination from a [[middle manager]] not normally known for their creative skills, but it ''is'' a feat of imagination. | ||
*'''Proximal''': | *'''Proximal''': To blame the [[meatware]] at the sharp end, closest to the accident — the operators, traders, [[negotiator]]s — and not so much on those at the “blunt end” — the executive, its goals, target end-states, its strategic management of the process, how it balances risk and reward, what tools tools and equipment it provides, its rules and [[policy|policies]] and the constraints and pressures it imposes on those [[subject matter expert]]s to get the job done. | ||
*'''Counterfactuals''': | *'''Counterfactuals''': To construct alternative sequences of events — where operators “zigged”, but could have “zagged” — which might have avoided the incident. “''Forks in the road stand out so clearly to you, looking back. But when inside the tunnel, when looking forward and being pushed ahead by unfolding events, these forks were shrouded in the uncertainty and [[complexity]] of many possible options and demands; they were surrounded by time constraints and other pressures.” | ||
*'''Judgmental''': To explain failure | *'''Judgmental''': To explain failure by seeking failure: incorrect analyses, mistaken perceptions, misjudged actions. Again, hindsight is king. In each case, if you presented the operator with the facts as they were available to the investigator, in the same unpressurised environment, you might expect the “correct” outcome. | ||
====Common canards==== | ====Common canards==== |