Delegation of depositary’s functions - AIFMD Provision: Difference between revisions
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{{ | {{aifmdanat|21(11)|}}On what on earth this is all about. | ||
[[AIFMD]], requires an [[AIF]] to appoint a [[depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositary]] to perform certain administrative functions: managing cashflows, supervising subscriptions and redemptions, and [[custody]] of the AIF’s assets labelled “safekeeping” in the argot of European Regulation. The depositary cannot have any financial transactions or other conflicts of interest with the fund and must be organised in the fund’s home jurisdiction. Therefore a prime broker cannot be an [[AIF]] [[depositary]]: it is (usually) not incorporated in the right jurisdiction, and in any case is definitely involved in financial transactions with the [[AIF]]. That’s what it is there for. | |||
{{ | Now a big part of a [[prime broker]]’s business is [[margin lending]], which depends on the prime broker having not only custody but rights of reuse over the AIF’s assets. What to do? Well, [[AIFMD]] allows a depositary to ''[[delegate]]'' its custody/safekeeping function (but ''only'' that function) to a third party ''where there are [[objective reason]]s for it doing so''. There is more commentary [[Objective reason - AIFMD Provision|elsewhere]], but take it as read that “because the PB need to hold assets for [[margin lending]], [[reuse]], [[security]] and so on” ''does'' count as an objective reason. | ||
Right. So [[AIFMD]] says a depositary may (with an [[Objective reason - AIFMD Provision|objective reason]]) delegate that responsibility to a third party and may even (with another [[Objective reason - AIFMD Provision|objective reason]]) ''discharge'' its liability for safekeeping by transferring it to its delegate: see Article [[21(13) - AIFMD Provision|21(13)]]: the depositary can only discharge its liability where | |||
(i) it was entitled to delegate responsibility per [[21(11)(d) - AIFMD Provision|21(11)]] | |||
(ii) there is an express written transfer of liability to the delegate, so the AIF can claim directly against it, and | |||
(iii) the AIF expressly discharges the [[Depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositary]]’s liability under a written contract and there is an [[objective reason]] for doing so. | |||
==== Risk to depositary ==== | |||
The risk to the depositary is: | |||
(i) That its delegation of the custody function is not permitted; or | |||
(ii) It ''is'' permitted, but that having delegated, it is held responsible under AIFMD for the loss of assets by its delegate, for some reason (i.e., that its purported discharge of liability is invalid) | |||
Therefore: | |||
==== Depositary’s objectives ==== | |||
What the depositary needs to achieve is in its inter-contractual relations: | |||
(i) Actually delegating custody function to the prime broker (and establishing a valid “[[Objective reason - AIFMD Provision|objective reason]]” for doing so).<ref>This is tried, true and not controversial: [[AIF]] [[Depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositaries]] delegate safekeeping to [[Prime broker|PB]]<nowiki/>s all the time. </ref> | |||
(ii) Transferring its liability for safekeeping losses to the prime broker so that the [[Alternative investment fund|AIF]] has a direct claim against the delegate [[prime broker]]; | |||
(iii) Expressly discharging its liability to the AIF for delegated safekeeping to the AIF (and establishing a valid [[Objective reason - AIFMD Provision|objective reason]] for doing so). | |||
(iv) In case the [[Depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositary]]’s intended discharge of liability does not work, being indemnified by the prime broker for liabilities the depositary incurs ''directly to the AIF'' as a result of safekeeping losses incurred by the prime broker (or its sub-custody network). | |||
==== Prime broker’s objectives ==== | |||
The prime broker wants to achieve the following: | |||
(i) A direct custody relationship with the AIF, on its regular terms, so that it can finance the AIF’s assets, reuse them, and take security over them. | |||
(ii) It wants to hold the [[Depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositary]] [[Hold harmless|harmless]] against only the direct liabilities it suffers as a result of the [[prime broker]]’s mis-performance of the delegated custody function by [[AIFMD]]. It does ''not'' want to underwrite other liabilities (e.g. contractual ones) that the [[Depositary - AIFMD Provision|depositary]] may have volunteered to the AIF, and ''nor does it want to agree to the depositary’s own custody terms''. | |||
{{aifmddepositarydelegation}} | |||
{{Ucits delegaton versus aifmd delegation}} | |||
{{sa}} | |||
*[[Delegation]] under [[AIFMD]]: Art. {{aifmdprov|21(11)}} | |||
*[[Delegation]] under [[UCITS]]: Art. {{ucits5prov|22a}} | |||
{{ref}} |
Latest revision as of 13:29, 14 August 2024
AIFMD Anatomy™
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On what on earth this is all about.
AIFMD, requires an AIF to appoint a depositary to perform certain administrative functions: managing cashflows, supervising subscriptions and redemptions, and custody of the AIF’s assets labelled “safekeeping” in the argot of European Regulation. The depositary cannot have any financial transactions or other conflicts of interest with the fund and must be organised in the fund’s home jurisdiction. Therefore a prime broker cannot be an AIF depositary: it is (usually) not incorporated in the right jurisdiction, and in any case is definitely involved in financial transactions with the AIF. That’s what it is there for.
Now a big part of a prime broker’s business is margin lending, which depends on the prime broker having not only custody but rights of reuse over the AIF’s assets. What to do? Well, AIFMD allows a depositary to delegate its custody/safekeeping function (but only that function) to a third party where there are objective reasons for it doing so. There is more commentary elsewhere, but take it as read that “because the PB need to hold assets for margin lending, reuse, security and so on” does count as an objective reason.
Right. So AIFMD says a depositary may (with an objective reason) delegate that responsibility to a third party and may even (with another objective reason) discharge its liability for safekeeping by transferring it to its delegate: see Article 21(13): the depositary can only discharge its liability where
(i) it was entitled to delegate responsibility per 21(11)
(ii) there is an express written transfer of liability to the delegate, so the AIF can claim directly against it, and
(iii) the AIF expressly discharges the depositary’s liability under a written contract and there is an objective reason for doing so.
Risk to depositary
The risk to the depositary is:
(i) That its delegation of the custody function is not permitted; or
(ii) It is permitted, but that having delegated, it is held responsible under AIFMD for the loss of assets by its delegate, for some reason (i.e., that its purported discharge of liability is invalid)
Therefore:
Depositary’s objectives
What the depositary needs to achieve is in its inter-contractual relations:
(i) Actually delegating custody function to the prime broker (and establishing a valid “objective reason” for doing so).[1]
(ii) Transferring its liability for safekeeping losses to the prime broker so that the AIF has a direct claim against the delegate prime broker;
(iii) Expressly discharging its liability to the AIF for delegated safekeeping to the AIF (and establishing a valid objective reason for doing so).
(iv) In case the depositary’s intended discharge of liability does not work, being indemnified by the prime broker for liabilities the depositary incurs directly to the AIF as a result of safekeeping losses incurred by the prime broker (or its sub-custody network).
Prime broker’s objectives
The prime broker wants to achieve the following:
(i) A direct custody relationship with the AIF, on its regular terms, so that it can finance the AIF’s assets, reuse them, and take security over them.
(ii) It wants to hold the depositary harmless against only the direct liabilities it suffers as a result of the prime broker’s mis-performance of the delegated custody function by AIFMD. It does not want to underwrite other liabilities (e.g. contractual ones) that the depositary may have volunteered to the AIF, and nor does it want to agree to the depositary’s own custody terms.
Delegation of depositary’s functions
You will see from 21(4) the depositary’s role in toto is not really suitable for a prime broker. However, the depositary may delegate some of its functions, and a prime broker may act as:
- A custodian, but will have certain conditions to that appointment (set out in Art 21(11), including the famous “objective reason”), and you may expect the depositary will seek to delegate the safe-keeping function on those exact conditions, and (as far as it can) transfer outright its liability for those responsibilities to the prime broker, on exactly the terms required by AIFMD and AIFMR.
- A “depositary lite” to certain non-EU domiciled AIFs who aren’t obliged to have a full-blown depositary. The depo-lite regime, and the delegated safe-keeping regime, are different but in many respects quite similar things and it is easy to conflate them.
“Delegation” versus “sub-contracting”
These terms are easily conflated. Indeed, AIFMD conflates them. But, in this commentator’s view, they are different in important ways. Read more about this here. But in any case our — well, contrarian — view is that a custodian who appoints a sub custodian in its sub custody network is not “delegating” its AIFMD custody obligations “at the first level of the custody chain”, as Art 21(11)contemplates, and hence sub-custodians do not have to:
- Segregate the AIF’s assets from the depositary’s assets in their books (as would be required of a delegate custodian under Art 21(11)(d)(iii)),
- Hold assets in their books in the name of the AIF (or the AIFM acting on behalf of the AIF) (as would be required of a delegate custodian under Art 21(11)(d)(v), incorporating as it does Art 21(8)(a)(ii)).
Conditions to delegation by a depositary
The depositary can only delegate in certain circumstances:
- It must have an “objective reason” for the delegation.
- it must exercise due skill, care and diligence in the selection, appointment and ongoing monitoring of the delegate;
- The delegate:
- must have structures and expertise proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the assets of the AIF
- must be subject, in acting as a custodian, to effective prudential regulation and supervision in its local jurisdiction and periodic external audits;
- must segregate AIF assets from its own and the depositary’s assets
- may not reuse the AIF’s assets without the AIF’s express consent.
We read this as referring only to a delegation of the “head” custody function, not to a custodian’s holding of assets in its own sub-custody network: it can’t do; sub-custodians operate on an omnibus basis and don’t segregate assets belonging to the main custodian’s individual clients’ interests in their books (so can’t segregate, for example, the depositary’s assets from the AIF’s assets: they don’t have enough information to do this.
Conditions to discharge of liability when delegating by a depositary
It is one thing for a depositary to delegate performance of a safekeeping function to a prime broker (21(11)); it is another for it to discharge its liability for the safekeeping of assets (21(13)). That can only happen if:
- All the conditions to delegation are met;
- There is a written contract transfers that liability so the AIF can claim directly against the PB — which contractual privity freaks will immediately realise will require either artful use of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, or that the AIF should be party to that contract. In practice the AIF will of course be party to a contract with its prime broker.
Custody delegation under UCITS and AIFMD looks kind of similar doesn’t it?
Yes, it does. The textual differences betwixt UCITS (Art 22a) and AIFMD (Art 21(11)) are largely formal, or mutatis mutandis in style. The substantive differences are that a UCITS depositary:
- cannot reuse the UCITS’ assets at all, whereas an AIFMD depositary can, with prior notification and consent;
- must take all necessary steps to ensure UCITS’ assets aren’t caught up in the bankruptcy estate of an insolvent delegate custodian — there isn’t an equivalent provision under AIFMD, though perhaps you might imply it;
- must notify UCITS investors of the risks of delegation where a non-EEA jurisdiction requires use of a local custodian and no local entities satisfy the delegation requirements and not just the fact of, and circumstances justifying, it.
See also
- Delegation under AIFMD: Art. 21(11)
- Delegation under UCITS: Art. 22a
References
- ↑ This is tried, true and not controversial: AIF depositaries delegate safekeeping to PBs all the time.