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{{d|Financialisation|/faɪˈnænʃᵊlaɪˈzeɪʃᵊn/|n|}}
{{d|Financialisation|/faɪˈnænʃᵊlaɪˈzeɪʃᵊn/|n|}}
{{L1}}''General'': The increasing importance of financial markets, motives, institutions, and elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions.<ref>Adapted from ''Financialization, Rentier Interests, and Central Bank Policy'', Epstein, 2001.</ref><li>   
{{L1}}''General'': The increasing importance of financial markets, motives, institutions, and elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions.<ref>Adapted from ''Financialization, Rentier Interests, and Central Bank Policy'', Epstein, 2001.</ref><li>   
''JC’s own meaning'': The [[high-modernist]] goal of reducing ''[[ineffable]]'' things to calculable, and manipulable ''quantities''. So: [[David Graeber]]’s ''social'' indebtedness — the nebulous set of cross pollinating reciprocal favours we do to each other that both define our “community of interest” and bind it together , with a view that ''our debts to each other are never discharged — versus ''monetary'' [[indebtedness]] — specific, delimited obligations that have a defined value, time cost and term, and whose price must be paid in full. (It is if course an irony that the very continued existence of a financial market depends on ongoing “trust” — exactly the sort of unmeasurable, ineffable thing that financialisation would seek to eradicate with devices like the [[distributed ledger]] and permissionless [[Blockchain]])</ol>
''JC’s own meaning'': The [[high-modernist]] goal of reducing ''[[ineffable]]'' things to calculable, and manipulable ''quantities''. </ol>
====Machine-legible====
 
The most manipulable, [[fungible]], calculable, aggregatable articulation of [[value]] known to Western society is [[cash]] — [[degenerate fiat capitalism|''fiat'']] cash, sorry [[cryptobro]]s — and it is the common language in which we describe our interrelationships. Hence “financialisation”.  
====The financialising world====
{{drop|W|e take it}} as not needing detailed argument that we are amidst — a long way through — a generational stampede towards ''the financialisation of everything''. This is to commoditise, rationalise, systematise and scale activities, artefacts, goods, services and cultural experiences and measure them by standard, simplified scales. To lose intractable ineffability and reduce things to computable units.
 
This is, for example, to convert what [[David Graeber]] might call “''social'' indebtedness” — the nebulous set of cross-pollinating reciprocal favours we do to each other that both define our “community of interest” and bind it together, with a view that ''our debts to each other are never discharged'' into “''monetary'' [[indebtedness]]— specific, delimited obligations that have a defined value, time cost and term, and whose price must be paid in full. To try to jettison that ineffable social dimension, notwithstanding the irony that the very continued existence of a ''financial'' indebtedness depends on the ongoing “social” indebtedness and undischarged reciprocity — exactly the sort of unmeasurable, ineffable relationships of ''trust'' that financialisation would seek to eradicate.
 
The ultimate financialisation: the dispensation with the need for ''trust'' in a system with devices like the [[distributed ledger]] and permissionless [[Blockchain]]
 
{{Drop|E|ven those who}} warn us most cogently about system intractability tend to financialise their analysis, so management consultants can grok it: hence by way of articulating this intractability, Russell Ackoff breaks the world down into
“[[messes, problems and puzzles]]”:
 
====Helping the machines to read us====
{{drop|T|he most manipulable}}, [[fungible]], calculable, aggregable articulation of [[value]] known to Western society is [[cash]] — [[degenerate fiat capitalism|''fiat'']] cash, sorry [[cryptobro]]s — and it is the common language in which we describe our interrelationships. Hence “financialisation”.  
 
But we are talking metaphorically here: there is “financialisation” in a broader sense that need not involve ''money'' as such: SAT scores, A-level grades, Out-of-five product reviews, [[performance appraisal]]s, [[RAG status]]es, [[net promoter score]]s, QR codes, implied carbon footprints, gender pay differentials — any numerically measurable criteria that convert the messy, idiosyncratic, intractable ''life experience'' into ordered columns, pivot tables, and scatter plots that can be averaged, extrapolated, enriched, [[Pareto triage]]d, [[standard deviation]] plotted, and put into ranked, tranched ''order''.
 
When you are building a technologised process — seeking inputs and calculating outputs — ''[[free text is not your friend]]''. You can’t ''do'' anything with free text, beyond bucketing it as “other”. “Other” conceals an infinitude of richness and variability. So does “A*”, “Male”, “needs improvement”, “amber” and “British Asian”.
 
By our process design, we are elect to assign that variability a numerical value of zero within a category, and 1 beyond it, even though the actual variability might transgress the original categorisation. A “male” and a “female” might have more in common than they differ, depending on the reason for categorisation. (For example, when the categorisation is of “financial services professionals” this is almost certainly the case.)
 
In this way, our own model determines the types of biases we see as much as the data. (We will never know if recreational cricketers, left-handers, introverts, or people who live more than twenty kilometres away are discriminated against because this data is not gathered).
 
====In data we trust====
{{Quote|“In God we trust. All others must bring data. ”}}{{Drop|T|he fatuous “truism”}}, allegedly but not actually coined by [[W. Edwards Deming]] brings this whole thing to a head.
 
Firstly, as has been observed anon, data tells you a limited, and coloured , ''story'' about the past, not a comprehensive picture of the future.
 
Secondly, that word: “trust”. It is the ''sine qua non'' of commercial enterprise — of ''society''. This has even been proven out by game theorists, in a limited case, between people who do not know when their next interaction will be, or whether there will be one. This is a dependency on an unknown ''future''. Data plays no part in it.
 
But part of the assessment you must make in a game is as to the state of your opponent’s mind. You must assess whether she understands the rules, whether she recognises the longer term benefits of repeated cooperation over the short term sugar rush of defection, and whether she believes there will be future interactions. One must, that is, ''trust'' your opponent. That is a delicate assessment. It requires knowledge of history — it might seem that data can help there, but the important knowledge is informal — of the depth of your relationship, your interconnections and mutual dependencies, your shared history, shared values and that ineffable assessment of ''whether this is someone I can trust''.
 
No large language model can do that. As information technology always does at all points where humans react in ineffably human ways, an algorithm must run some kind of proxy calculation of that assessment. At scale you might make a numerical assessment that, say, seventy percent of transactors will honour their bargain, and elect to go one, but this is gamable.
Computers cannot trust. They don't have


But we are talking metaphorically here: this is financialisation in a broader sense that need not involve ''money'' as such: Out-of-five product reviews, [[performance appraisal]]s, [[RAG status]]es, [[net promoter score]]s, tac codes — any numerically measurable criteria — anything which can convert the messy, idiosyncratic, intractable experience of life into ordered columns, pivot tables, and scatter plots that can be averaged, extrapolated, enriched, [[Pareto triage]]d, and put into ranked, tranched ''order''.


====There are no straight lines in nature====
====There are no straight lines in nature====
''[[There is no machine for judging poetry]]''.
{{drop|I|n which we}} call to mind Robin Williams’ great scene in {{br|Dead Poets Society}}, and restate it: just as ''[[there is no machine for judging poetry]]'', there is no machine for judging ''commerce'' either.
 
Any [[metrics]], balance sheets, [[org chart]]s, projections or discounted cashflow analysis — ''any'' [[formal]] accounting for the intensely human activity of doing business — jettisons much of potential value. The [[map]] can never be more than a brief schematic: it cannot convey the grandeur — or the ''horror'' — of the [[territory]]. The jettisoning is part of the exercise: it is, itself to judge what is and is not important. It is to extract a [[signal]] from [[hubbub|noise]]. That signal is ''ad hoc'', imaginary, a creative work, and by no means exclusive to the hubbub: there are ''infinite'' array of signals we could take out of the hubbub; the ones we do are determined by our cultural fabric, which is made of all the decisions, signals, and institutions we have already built.
 
This relativity terrifies “right-thinking people”, but there is no way around it: it is best just to ''[[ignore]]'' it: bucket it up with all that other irrelevant and inconvenient stuff, as “other”.


In which JC reminds us of Robin  Williams’ great scene in {{br|Dead Poet’s Society}} and invites us to, well take it [[metaphor]]ically. [[Peotry]], right? It’s ''meant'' to be taken figuratively.  
====Map and territory====
{{Drop|T|hat much is}} obvious: it is not the lesson we should draw. We should already know it.


''There is no machine for judging commerce either''.  
The lesson is this: if we mistake the map for the territory — if we organise our interests and judge outcomes only by reference to the map we have made, ''we thereby change the territory''. There is a feedback loop  at work here. Gradually, by degrees, behaviour will change and territory will converge on the map.  


Any set of [[metrics]], any balance sheet, any [[org chart]], any [[formal]] accounting for the intensely human activity of doing business jettisons much of what is important about it. The [[map]] can never be more than a schematic. It cannot convey the grandeur — or the ''horror'' — of the [[territory]].
This appears to be excellent news, in the short term, for machines and those who deploy them — cartographers — as it makes their life easier in the “ordinary run” of things. The mountain comes to Mohammed. For those out in the territory, it leads to two kinds of bad outcomes.


This much is obvious: this is not the lesson we should be drawing it is already imprinted in our cultural fabric, however determined the modernists may be to forget it
{{L1}} Making life easier for devices that work by “algorithm” and see the world in terms of numbers — call these “financialisation machines” — thus removing variability does not make our lives richer. It makes them generic. It diminishes the benefit of network nodes that ''can'' handle ineffability this is good, right, because those nodes — call them [[subject matter expert]]s, or even humans — are expensive, slow and unpredictable.


The lesson is this. If we mistake the map for the territory — if we organise our interests and judge our outcomes exclusively by reference to the map, ''we thereby change the territory''. The territory more closely resembles the map. This is only convenient for cartographers. It is bad for the people in the territory whose interests the cartographers are supposedly trying to represent. It leads to two kinds of bad outcomes.
Now of course we can assign humans to algorithmic roles — where there is peripheral intractability in a system, we have no choice — and as the territory redraws itself to the map, we further marginalise that intractability, and can deploy cheaper, more interchangeable humans, and at the limit, we can replace them altogether.  


{{L1}}It makes life easier for “algorithmic” business units that can only work in terms of numbers — call these “machines”. It enhances financialisation be reducing ineffability. The benefit of network nodes that ''can'' handle ineffability — that tend to be more expensive and less predictable — we call these [[subject matter expert]]s, or even humans — is diminished. Now of course we can assign humans to algorithmic roles where there is peripheral intractability in a network function, we have no choice — but as the territory redraws itself to the map, we can further marginalise that ineffability, and deploy cheaper humans, and at the limit, replace them altogether. Where intractability is hard, but not important — by interpreting unstructured inputs, as in a consumer helpline and triaging easy/low value queries— then techniques like AI can already handle it. By agreeing to behave like machines, to be categorised according to numerical terms, to be financialised — we ''surrender'' to machines<li>
Where the “intractability” is relatively low-risk for example, interpreting, triaging and responding to unstructured requests from low-value customers, as in a consumer helpline then techniques like AI can already handle it. It doesn’t much matter if the AI isn’t much good. (For a complaints line, it is ''ideal'' if the AI isn’t much good — it is a perfect [[accountability sink]]). By agreeing to behave like machines, to be categorised according to numerical terms, to be financialised — we ''surrender'' to machines. If you are worried that your job will be replaced by tech, then this is the way it will happen.<li>
It leads to actual bad outcomes in the territory. No better example than the [[Post Office Horizon]] scandal.
But in those exceptional cases that turn out not to be the ordinary course it leads to bad outcomes in the territory. No better example than the [[Post Office Horizon]] scandal, the internal territory — how managers behave had so closely converged on the map as to utterly lose sight of the territory. As long as the territory was unaligned, scattered, unconnected and could not fight back, this did not matter at all. But the territory has a habit of overwhelming mapmakers who lose sight of their original purpose, which was to functionally reflect the territory. Our [[roll of honour]] refers.
</ol>
</ol>


Things that can’t be ranked and counted — that aren’t “legible” to this great high powered information processing system — have no particular [[value]] ''to the system, in the system’s terms'' — it can't digest them, extract value out of them which it does by processing — this is so whether or not these have any value to ''us''.  
Things that can’t be ranked and counted — that aren’t “legible” to this great high powered information processing system — have no particular [[value]] ''to the system, in the system’s terms'' — it can't digest them<ref>The digestion metaphor is apt: processing intractable things is like trying to digest flax.</ref> or extract value out of them it literally cannot “process” them  — this is so whether or not these have any value to ''us''.  
=====Value=====
====Value====
''[[Value]]'' if a function of cultural and linguistic context — the richer the language, the more figurative, the more scope for imagination, the more scope for value. Conversely, inflexible languages, with little scope for imaginative reapplication are much harder to articulate values in — much harder to capture all that richness of meaning. (This is a highly relativistic sense of value by the way. Guilty as charged.)
{{Drop|F|orgive me a}} [[postmodern]] moment but ''[[value]]'' is a function of cultural and linguistic context — sorry, Professor Dawkins, but it just ''is'' — the richer the language, the more figurative, the more scope for imagination, the more scope for alternative formulations of ''value''.  
 
Conversely, inflexible languages, with little scope for imaginative reapplication have much less scope for articulating values — it is much harder to capture all that richness of meaning. The closer a language is to one-way symbol processing, the more it resembles ''code''.
 
Ineffability is that “[[betweenness]]”, the [[informal]], the uncountable, it follows that machine languages cannot handle ineffability. (This is a highly [[relativistic]] sense of value by the way. Guilty as charged.)


If you render suman experience in machine language, much less in the constrained parameters of internal financial reporting standards, you are losing something. You are losing ''a lot''.
If you render human experience in machine language, let alone in the constrained parameters of international financial reporting standards, you are losing something. You are losing ''a lot''.


But if energy is free you can afford to be wasteful with it. If your financialising techniques generate enough financial value (that is, money) for the same amount of effort, who ''cares'' how much extra ineffable value leaks out of the system as you go? This is the promise of scale, and the interconnected network promises a ''lot'' of scale. Go Taylor Swift, forget about the Nietzsche-loving doom metal merchant from Austin.
But if energy is free, you can afford to be wasteful with it. If your financialising techniques generate enough financial value — ''money'' — for the same amount of effort, who ''cares'' how much extra ineffable value leaks out of the system as you go? This is the promise of scale, and the interconnected network promises a ''lot'' of scale. Go Taylor Swift, forget about the Nietzsche-loving doom metal merchant from Austin.


In the eyes of the financialising machine the unique differing pleasures we derive from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations — or listening to Keegan Kjeldsen talking about Robert Michel's [[iron law of oligopoly]]'' — or, damnit ,even Taylor Swift —reduce ''precisely'' to the unit cost for which items of that cultural artefact can be sold, over the cost of producing and distributing it. Any greater value — the life lesson, aphorisms and fortitude it magically confers that guide you through through your heaviest seas and blackest storms count for nothing. It is hardly a novel idea to regret that something is being lost hereby.
In the eyes of the financialising machine the unique differing pleasures we derive from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations — or listening to Keegan Kjeldsen talking about Robert Michel's [[iron law of oligopoly]]'' — or, damnit, even Taylor Swift —reduce ''precisely'' to the unit cost for which items of that cultural artefact can be sold, over the cost of producing and distributing it. Any greater value — the life lesson, aphorisms and fortitude it magically confers that guide you through through your heaviest seas and blackest storms count for nothing. It is hardly a novel idea to regret that something is being lost hereby.


Conversely, things that ''can'' be counted can acquire “value” even if they don't have ''value''. There are plenty
Conversely, things that ''can'' be counted can acquire “value” even if they don't have ''value''. There are plenty
Line 54: Line 94:
The [[modernist]] yen — imperative — ''need'' — to reduce uncertainty to risk, and the false comfort this gives. The Viniar problem.
The [[modernist]] yen — imperative — ''need'' — to reduce uncertainty to risk, and the false comfort this gives. The Viniar problem.


But non-linear loss is the consequence, and corollary of non-linear opportunity and vice versa. If we put our selves on a linear track that approximates the non-linear reality we will be fine until there is actual event at either end. Persuading everyone else to get on the linear track is a good strategy. As long as it works. If you can persuade everyone in the system to behave, the system will “behave” — in the sense of not producing unexpected outcomes, and not necessarily optimising, or producing particularly ''good'' outcomes. Volatility will drop. ''As long as everyone behaves''.
But non-linear loss is the consequence, and corollary of non-linear opportunity and vice versa. If we put ourselves on a linear track that approximates the non-linear reality we will be fine until there is actual event at either end. Persuading everyone else to get on the linear track is a good strategy. As long as it works. If you can persuade everyone in the system to behave, the system will “behave” — in the sense of not producing unexpected outcomes, and not necessarily optimising, or producing particularly ''good'' outcomes. Volatility will drop. ''As long as everyone behaves''.
 
====Misbehaviour as arbitrage====
Misbehaviour is ''[[arbitrage]]'': exploiting structural differentials you are not, by the rules of the game, meant to see, and that the loyal behavers ''cannot'' see (or ''refuse to look at''). They may be obscured by the behaver’s internal model/narrative, or by moral principles. In either case arbitrage behaviour is destructive to the present configuration of the system, and those who stand to gain from the present configuration will be hostile to arbitrage. Arbitrage is ''defection''. The system will be set up to make arbitrage difficult, and to eradicate it, that is to say. The system will self purge. To the extent it doesn’t this will be because of novelty — a previously undetected arbitrage opportunity has arisen. This could be a latent arbitrage — that was always there, but no-one noticed, or one arising from new technology, new language or a new independent event presenting itself to the system
 
The longer the system has been in play the less likely a latent arbitrage is to have lain undiscovered, and the fewer existentially threatening independent, non-agent events (non-directed, [[force majeure]] style events) there will be. This is the [[Lindy effect]]. New technology and new language arising spontaneously within the system can largely be controlled, if you so wish, but ''extraneous'' technology and language cannot, and for these the Lindy effect does not apply.
 
So, totalitarian states can survive as long as they have the wherewithal to enforce rules internally, and that is in large part a function of keeping external ideas out. Prime example: North Korea - self imposed — Gaza (externally imposed)


Across the wider system, open architecture, tolerance, pluralism, a plurality of narratives enhance the resilience of the overall system, but jeopardise the resilience of individual actors at the top of the system, who will, hence take steps to close architecture, mute plurality and shut down “arbitrageurs”, whom we can call malcontents. Strong open architecture systems have to have rules and feedback loops that protect that open architecture — entrenched rights of freedom of expression, limits on executive and corporate power, robust antitrust enforcement and so on.


It is not necessarily causative, but also no accident, that The places most obviously associated with those features have had the strongest economies: UK and US. But in both cases these principles are currently stressed.




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The informal and formal lines of information in any organisation - in this take [[Jane Jacobs]], [[desire lines]]
The informal and formal lines of information in any organisation - in this take [[Jane Jacobs]], [[desire lines]]
====Countability====
The conversion of ineffable things into fundamental fungible countable things comes at the cost of being able to quantify them for stop they become a subject to arithmetical manipulation colon maxima comma median mean mode, upper courtyards and lower quartiles. They become comparable with each other and once comparable hey cannot help but being evaluated.
This is perhaps the fundamental lesson of the Israeli daycare experiment: the quantification of a moral obligation fundamentally changes it.
Things that are fungible and countable and comparable appear as redundancies rather than strengths.


====battleground: onworld v offworld====
====battleground: onworld v offworld====

Latest revision as of 16:57, 27 October 2024

“There’s a war going on. The battlefield’s in the mind, and the prize is the soul. So be careful.”

— Prince, Don’t Be Fooled By The Internet (1999)[1]

Financialisation
/faɪˈnænʃᵊlaɪˈzeɪʃᵊn/ (n.)

  1. General: The increasing importance of financial markets, motives, institutions, and elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions.[2]
  2. JC’s own meaning: The high-modernist goal of reducing ineffable things to calculable, and manipulable quantities.

The financialising world

We take it as not needing detailed argument that we are amidst — a long way through — a generational stampede towards the financialisation of everything. This is to commoditise, rationalise, systematise and scale activities, artefacts, goods, services and cultural experiences and measure them by standard, simplified scales. To lose intractable ineffability and reduce things to computable units.

This is, for example, to convert what David Graeber might call “social indebtedness” — the nebulous set of cross-pollinating reciprocal favours we do to each other that both define our “community of interest” and bind it together, with a view that our debts to each other are never discharged — into “monetary indebtedness” — specific, delimited obligations that have a defined value, time cost and term, and whose price must be paid in full. To try to jettison that ineffable social dimension, notwithstanding the irony that the very continued existence of a financial indebtedness depends on the ongoing “social” indebtedness and undischarged reciprocity — exactly the sort of unmeasurable, ineffable relationships of trust that financialisation would seek to eradicate.

The ultimate financialisation: the dispensation with the need for trust in a system with devices like the distributed ledger and permissionless Blockchain

Even those who warn us most cogently about system intractability tend to financialise their analysis, so management consultants can grok it: hence by way of articulating this intractability, Russell Ackoff breaks the world down into “messes, problems and puzzles”:

Helping the machines to read us

The most manipulable, fungible, calculable, aggregable articulation of value known to Western society is cashfiat cash, sorry cryptobros — and it is the common language in which we describe our interrelationships. Hence “financialisation”.

But we are talking metaphorically here: there is “financialisation” in a broader sense that need not involve money as such: SAT scores, A-level grades, Out-of-five product reviews, performance appraisals, RAG statuses, net promoter scores, QR codes, implied carbon footprints, gender pay differentials — any numerically measurable criteria that convert the messy, idiosyncratic, intractable life experience into ordered columns, pivot tables, and scatter plots that can be averaged, extrapolated, enriched, Pareto triaged, standard deviation plotted, and put into ranked, tranched order.

When you are building a technologised process — seeking inputs and calculating outputs — free text is not your friend. You can’t do anything with free text, beyond bucketing it as “other”. “Other” conceals an infinitude of richness and variability. So does “A*”, “Male”, “needs improvement”, “amber” and “British Asian”.

By our process design, we are elect to assign that variability a numerical value of zero within a category, and 1 beyond it, even though the actual variability might transgress the original categorisation. A “male” and a “female” might have more in common than they differ, depending on the reason for categorisation. (For example, when the categorisation is of “financial services professionals” this is almost certainly the case.)

In this way, our own model determines the types of biases we see as much as the data. (We will never know if recreational cricketers, left-handers, introverts, or people who live more than twenty kilometres away are discriminated against because this data is not gathered).

In data we trust

“In God we trust. All others must bring data. ”

The fatuous “truism”, allegedly but not actually coined by W. Edwards Deming brings this whole thing to a head.

Firstly, as has been observed anon, data tells you a limited, and coloured , story about the past, not a comprehensive picture of the future.

Secondly, that word: “trust”. It is the sine qua non of commercial enterprise — of society. This has even been proven out by game theorists, in a limited case, between people who do not know when their next interaction will be, or whether there will be one. This is a dependency on an unknown future. Data plays no part in it.

But part of the assessment you must make in a game is as to the state of your opponent’s mind. You must assess whether she understands the rules, whether she recognises the longer term benefits of repeated cooperation over the short term sugar rush of defection, and whether she believes there will be future interactions. One must, that is, trust your opponent. That is a delicate assessment. It requires knowledge of history — it might seem that data can help there, but the important knowledge is informal — of the depth of your relationship, your interconnections and mutual dependencies, your shared history, shared values and that ineffable assessment of whether this is someone I can trust.

No large language model can do that. As information technology always does at all points where humans react in ineffably human ways, an algorithm must run some kind of proxy calculation of that assessment. At scale you might make a numerical assessment that, say, seventy percent of transactors will honour their bargain, and elect to go one, but this is gamable.

Computers cannot trust. They don't have


There are no straight lines in nature

In which we call to mind Robin Williams’ great scene in Dead Poets Society, and restate it: just as there is no machine for judging poetry, there is no machine for judging commerce either.

Any metrics, balance sheets, org charts, projections or discounted cashflow analysis — any formal accounting for the intensely human activity of doing business — jettisons much of potential value. The map can never be more than a brief schematic: it cannot convey the grandeur — or the horror — of the territory. The jettisoning is part of the exercise: it is, itself to judge what is and is not important. It is to extract a signal from noise. That signal is ad hoc, imaginary, a creative work, and by no means exclusive to the hubbub: there are infinite array of signals we could take out of the hubbub; the ones we do are determined by our cultural fabric, which is made of all the decisions, signals, and institutions we have already built.

This relativity terrifies “right-thinking people”, but there is no way around it: it is best just to ignore it: bucket it up with all that other irrelevant and inconvenient stuff, as “other”.

Map and territory

That much is obvious: it is not the lesson we should draw. We should already know it.

The lesson is this: if we mistake the map for the territory — if we organise our interests and judge outcomes only by reference to the map we have made, we thereby change the territory. There is a feedback loop at work here. Gradually, by degrees, behaviour will change and territory will converge on the map.

This appears to be excellent news, in the short term, for machines and those who deploy them — cartographers — as it makes their life easier in the “ordinary run” of things. The mountain comes to Mohammed. For those out in the territory, it leads to two kinds of bad outcomes.

  1. Making life easier for devices that work by “algorithm” and see the world in terms of numbers — call these “financialisation machines” — thus removing variability does not make our lives richer. It makes them generic. It diminishes the benefit of network nodes that can handle ineffability — this is good, right, because those nodes — call them subject matter experts, or even humans — are expensive, slow and unpredictable. Now of course we can assign humans to algorithmic roles — where there is peripheral intractability in a system, we have no choice — and as the territory redraws itself to the map, we further marginalise that intractability, and can deploy cheaper, more interchangeable humans, and at the limit, we can replace them altogether. Where the “intractability” is relatively low-risk — for example, interpreting, triaging and responding to unstructured requests from low-value customers, as in a consumer helpline — then techniques like AI can already handle it. It doesn’t much matter if the AI isn’t much good. (For a complaints line, it is ideal if the AI isn’t much good — it is a perfect accountability sink). By agreeing to behave like machines, to be categorised according to numerical terms, to be financialised — we surrender to machines. If you are worried that your job will be replaced by tech, then this is the way it will happen.
  2. But in those exceptional cases that turn out not to be the ordinary course it leads to bad outcomes in the territory. No better example than the Post Office Horizon scandal, the internal territory — how managers behave had so closely converged on the map as to utterly lose sight of the territory. As long as the territory was unaligned, scattered, unconnected and could not fight back, this did not matter at all. But the territory has a habit of overwhelming mapmakers who lose sight of their original purpose, which was to functionally reflect the territory. Our roll of honour refers.

Things that can’t be ranked and counted — that aren’t “legible” to this great high powered information processing system — have no particular value to the system, in the system’s terms — it can't digest them[3] or extract value out of them — it literally cannot “process” them — this is so whether or not these have any value to us.

Value

Forgive me a postmodern moment but value is a function of cultural and linguistic context — sorry, Professor Dawkins, but it just is — the richer the language, the more figurative, the more scope for imagination, the more scope for alternative formulations of value.

Conversely, inflexible languages, with little scope for imaginative reapplication have much less scope for articulating values — it is much harder to capture all that richness of meaning. The closer a language is to one-way symbol processing, the more it resembles code.

Ineffability is that “betweenness”, the informal, the uncountable, it follows that machine languages cannot handle ineffability. (This is a highly relativistic sense of value by the way. Guilty as charged.)

If you render human experience in machine language, let alone in the constrained parameters of international financial reporting standards, you are losing something. You are losing a lot.

But if energy is free, you can afford to be wasteful with it. If your financialising techniques generate enough financial value — money — for the same amount of effort, who cares how much extra ineffable value leaks out of the system as you go? This is the promise of scale, and the interconnected network promises a lot of scale. Go Taylor Swift, forget about the Nietzsche-loving doom metal merchant from Austin.

In the eyes of the financialising machine the unique differing pleasures we derive from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations — or listening to Keegan Kjeldsen talking about Robert Michel's iron law of oligopoly — or, damnit, even Taylor Swift —reduce precisely to the unit cost for which items of that cultural artefact can be sold, over the cost of producing and distributing it. Any greater value — the life lesson, aphorisms and fortitude it magically confers that guide you through through your heaviest seas and blackest storms count for nothing. It is hardly a novel idea to regret that something is being lost hereby.

Conversely, things that can be counted can acquire “value” even if they don't have value. There are plenty of examples of this — things that sell at a greater margin than they cost — carbonated soft drinks, bottled water — or bitcoin, fashion, cosmetics professional sports, commercial music. Followers. Subscribers. Eyeballs. Clicks. Diversity reduced to a set of arbitrary criteria, characteristics, that can then be catalogued, categorised and analysed. The system can only understand diversity by homogenising it. I mean, talk about irony.

This will to financialisation distils down to a worldview that the analogue, informal, unique, different, the diverse — all those things that require judgment, patience , understanding, — that take “metis” are therefore expensive, troublesome, irksome, difficult, slow and unscalable and therefore bad.

JC has said this before: if we reorganise our values to suit the machines, we will lose to the machines. Do not surrender before kick-off.

These things used to be premium. Now we have premium mediocre — artificially scarce, disingenuously novel, that sapping word, “content” — generated for its own sake, that we pay for, or value, for its own sake — see above.

We are all out here desperately searching for meaning, and it is up to us what we settle for. But if we settle for the premium mediocre the authentic — the real meaning, value — will wither and die.

Our own attitudes, and the stories we tell ourselves, and each other, matter. If we settle for premium mediocre that is what we will get. Until we are replaced.

The ineffable value of uncertainty and the difference between risk (a calculable probability) and uncertainty (intractable, black box, non-linear).

The modernist yen — imperative — need — to reduce uncertainty to risk, and the false comfort this gives. The Viniar problem.

But non-linear loss is the consequence, and corollary of non-linear opportunity and vice versa. If we put ourselves on a linear track that approximates the non-linear reality we will be fine until there is actual event at either end. Persuading everyone else to get on the linear track is a good strategy. As long as it works. If you can persuade everyone in the system to behave, the system will “behave” — in the sense of not producing unexpected outcomes, and not necessarily optimising, or producing particularly good outcomes. Volatility will drop. As long as everyone behaves.



What if I turn out to be wrong?

Consequences of this instinct

  • Private equity
  • Outsourcing/management consulting


The desire for digital certainty

James C. Scott’s observation that a top-down organisation can only operate by what it sees, which necessarily misses nuance. Centrally planned states have the blessing and the curse of scale. A relatively small governing class can effectively accommodate — satisfice — the needs of a great many people as long as everyone’s needs are suitably generic. The more generic they are the better margins can maintain.

The normal offsetting effects of competition are muted in an interconnected world where the scale advantage can usually drown out market entrants as long as the market/product demand stays relatively constant. There are few but significant disruptions (computers, internet, mobile internet — not yet clear whether AI is another one). Beyond these market dominators can generally defend their positions.

Robert Michelsiron law of oligopoly, that at all organisations concentrate “power” and become top-down

The madness of crowds and our interconnectedness: if it was hard to be exceptional before the internet, it is so much harder now. Yet we kid ourselves that we are all exceptional. If we are all competing at the same thing, we have almost no chance of excelling. These are the Bayesian priors. But everyone of us is different.

Averagarianism

Outsourcing and offshoring as the relentless financialisation of the internal firm.

The Peter Principle that we rise to our own level of incompetence so will be dispositionally bad at the hard parts of our job. The basic narcissism or Dunning Krugerism of those prepared to do what it takes to climb the greasy pole required to want to be a chief executive officer or politician - those who want the job enough to get it

Data modernism and the conviction that everything now can be solved, and mankind is something to be overcome.

Fundamental ineffability

Stand for something, or you’ll fall for anything.

Anon.

It is there but we really have to want it - and stand up for it.

James C Scott: Metis.

Chris Anderson’s The Long Tail: How Endless Choice is Creating Unlimited Demand: there really is a long tail out there — proverbial doom metal merchants lecturing insightfully on Nietzsche — but we are allowing it to wither on the vine. Our moral responsibility, if we want to keep it, is to support it. But are they dying out like local bookstores? We need to nurture them.

The informal and formal lines of information in any organisation - in this take Jane Jacobs, desire lines

Countability

The conversion of ineffable things into fundamental fungible countable things comes at the cost of being able to quantify them for stop they become a subject to arithmetical manipulation colon maxima comma median mean mode, upper courtyards and lower quartiles. They become comparable with each other and once comparable hey cannot help but being evaluated.

This is perhaps the fundamental lesson of the Israeli daycare experiment: the quantification of a moral obligation fundamentally changes it.

Things that are fungible and countable and comparable appear as redundancies rather than strengths.

battleground: onworld v offworld

  1. Yahoo Internet Life Awards, 1999.
  2. Adapted from Financialization, Rentier Interests, and Central Bank Policy, Epstein, 2001.
  3. The digestion metaphor is apt: processing intractable things is like trying to digest flax.