Early Termination - ISDA Provision
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2002 ISDA Master Agreement A Jolly Contrarian owner’s manual™
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Overview
Redlines
- 1987 ⇒ 1992: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1992 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’02 vs. the ’92: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1987 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
Discussion
See section 12 for what this all means in a time of global pandemic lockdown. See also the separate article all about Automatic Early Termination, which features in the 1992 ISDA and the 2002 ISDA and deserves a page all of its own.
Section 6(a)
Redlines
- 1987 ⇒ 1992: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1992 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’02 vs. the ’92: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1987 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
Discussion
No change in the Early Termination Date definition from 1992 ISDA to 2002 ISDA (no real surprise there) but the close-out methodology between the two versions, by which one works out what must be paid and by whom on an Early Termination Date, and which you are encouraged to follow in all its gory detail starting at Section 6(a), is really quite different, and notwithstanding the fact that the 2002 ISDA version was meant to address the many and varied complaints levelled by market practitioners at the 1992 ISDA we still find the 1992 version in use in the occasional market centred in unsophisticated rural backwaters like, oooh, I don’t know, New York.
Those with a keen eye will notice that, but for the title, Section 6(a) of the 2002 ISDA is the same as Section 6(a) of the 1992 ISDA and, really, not a million miles away from the svelte form of Section 6(a) in the 1987 ISDA — look on that as the Broadcaster to the 1992’s Telecaster. There is one key difference, though: the evolution of the Automatic Early Termination provision. And the 1987 ISDA saw no call to have a “Non-Defaulting Party”.
It has its own entire page — Automatic Early Termination — so we have refrained from discussing it here.
Section 6(b)
Between the 1987 ISDA and the 1992 ISDA the changes were very superficial, as this comparison demonstrates.
Between the 1992 ISDA and the 2002 ISDA, there was a but more re-engineering, largely to account for the new Force Majeure Event and some tidying up, but beyond that Section 6(b) works in the same general way under the 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA. Here is a comparison of that.
Section 6(b)(i)
Updated in 2002 with special pleadings relating to the newly-introduced Force Majeure Termination Event.
Section 6(b)(ii)
Note in the 2002 ISDA there is no reference to Illegality (or for that matter Force Majeure, which did not exist under the 1992 ISDA but tends to treated rather like a special case of Illegality and therefore, we think, would have been included in this provision of the 1992 ISDA if it had existed ... if you see what I mean).
When the 2002 ISDA gets on to the topic of Illegality and Force Majeure it allows the Unaffected Party to cherry-pick which Affected Transactions it will terminate, but then seems almost immediately to regret it (see especially in Section 6(b)(iv)). Under the 1992 ISDA if you wanted to pull the trigger on any Termination Event, you had to pull all Affected Transactions. Under the 2002 ISDA it is only binary for the credit- and tax-related Termination Events.
Otherwise, but for one consequential change — 1992’s “excluding” became 2002’s “other than” — I mean, you can just imagine the barney they must have had in the drafting committee for that one, can’t you — the provisions are identical.
Section 6(b)(iii)
Be careful here: Under the 1992 ISDA, if your Failure to Pay is also an Illegality it is treated as an Illegality: if there are two Affected Parties you will face a significant delay when closing out. A bit of a trick for young players.
Note also that reference to Illegality has been excised from the 2002 ISDA version. They changed this because, in practice, it turned out to too be hard to implement a transfer or amendment after an Illegality. Folks realised that if an Illegality happens you don’t want to have to wait 30 days to terminate, especially if you can’t rely on 2(a)(iii) to withhold payments in the meantime.
Section 6(b)(iv)
Oh, this section 6(b)(iv) stuff
Is sure stirring up some ghosts for me.
She said, “There’s one thing you gotta learn
Is not to be afraid of it.”
I said, “No, I like it, I like it, it’s good.”
She said, “You like it now —
But you’ll learn to love it later”
- — Robbie Robertson[1]
One’s right to terminate early following an Illegality or the newly introduced Force Majeure Termination Event get a proper makeover in the 2002 ISDA, but otherwise, the provisions are the same, but for some formal fiddling in the drafting.
Section 6(c)
The framers of the 2002 ISDA daringly changed a “shall” to a “will” in the final line. We approve, to be clear, but this is kind of out of character for ISDA’s crack drafting squad™. Otherwise, identical.
Section 6(d)
Broadly similar between the versions. Main differences are basic architectural ones (no definition of “Early Termination Amount” or “Close-out Amount” in the 1992 ISDA, for example), and the 2002 is a little more finicky, dealing with what to do if there are two Affected Parties, and also blithering on for a few lines about interest.
Section 6(e)
Redlines
- 1987 ⇒ 1992: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1992 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’02 vs. the ’92: comparison (and in reverse)
- 1987 ⇒ 2002: Redline of the ’92 vs. the ’87: comparison (and in reverse)
Discussion
The 1987 ISDA was half-cocked and shambolic, and laboured under the wishful illusion that if the other guy blew up, even if he was in the money, it was kind of okay to just flip him the bird and walk off with a windfall (in the form of not owing him the money you like, actually owed him). Not cool these days. Once folks realised this wouldn’t fly from a netting perspective they tried to fix it in the 1992 ISDA, whose close-out methodology is truly hideous.
ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ overhauled whole close-out process, soup to nuts, in the 2002 ISDA, and is now much more straightforward — as far as you could ever say that about ISDA’s crack drafting squad™’s output. But a large part of the fanbase — that part west of Cabo da Roca — sticks with the 1992 ISDA. Odd.
Differences, in very brief:
The 1992 ISDA has the infamous Market Quotation and Loss measures of value, and the perennially-ignored First Method and the more sensible Second Method means of evaluating the termination value of terminated Transactions. The 2002 ISDA has just the Close-out Amount to cover everything. So while the 1992 ISDA is far more elaborate and over-engineered, this is not to deny that the 2002 ISDA is elaborate or over-engineeered.
The 2002 ISDA has a new Section 6(e)(iv) dealing with Adjustment for Illegality or Force Majeure Event. This wasn’t needed in the 1992 ISDA, which didn’t have Force Majeure Event at all, and a less sophisticated Illegality.
Summary
Dive in ⇒
This is one of the monster clauses of the ISDA Master Agreement. JC has given each of its subclauses its own page. You can access them by clicking on the links in the wikitext, or, okay, by clicking here:
- Section 6(a) (Right to Terminate Following Event of Default)
- Section 6(b) (Right to Terminate Following Termination Event)
- Section 6(c) (Effect of Designation)
- Section 6(d) (Calculations)
- Section 6(e) ( Payments on Early Termination)
But, generally:
No general “no-fault” termination right under the ISDA
Unlike the 2010 GMSLA and many other — ahh, less sophisticated master agreements[2] — the ISDA Master Agreement doesn’t have a general termination right of this sort at all. It is like one of those fancy fixie pushbikes that cost seven grand and don’t even have brakes. You can only terminate Transactions, not the master agreement construct which sits around them. The empty vessel of a closed-out ISDA thus remains for all eternity as an immortal, ineffectual husk. This is to do with paranoid fears about the efficacy of the ISDA’s sainted close-out netting terms if you do terminate the agreement — meh; maybe — but I like to think it is because, before he was cast out from heaven, the Dark Lord[3] made plans to unleash his retributive fury upon the world through a sleeping army of wight-walker zombie ISDAs, doomed to roam the earth until the day of judgment, apropos nothing but there, not alive, but un-dead, ready to reanimate and rally to the Dark Lord’s banner and rain apocalyptic hell on we errant descendants of the Good Man, who did not heed His warnings of financial weapons of mass destruction.
How the close-out mechanism works
It’s optional ...: An Event of Default gives the “Non-defaulting Party” a right (but not an obligation) to designate an Early Termination Date with respect to all outstanding Transactions on not more than 20 days’ notice.
... Unless AET applies: Where Automatic Early Termination applies to a party (being jurisdiction-dependent, it often will only apply to one party) the Non-defaulting Party loses its optionality should the Event of Default be Bankruptcy: all Transactions automatically terminate whehter you want them to or not, and whether you realise it or not. This is plainly sub-optimal from a Non-defaulting Party's perspective. You should therefore only switch on AET if you are sure you need it (e.g. for counterparties in jurisdictions where close-out netting may fail in an insolvency, but not before). Being sure generally means “having a netting opinion telling you netting does not work without it.” In other words, AET is one provision you should not insist on just because the other party insists upon it against you).
Not triggering an Event of Default can be controversial: For what this optionality not to terminate means, and how controversial it can be, see the commentary to Section 2(a)(iii).
Once all Transactions are terminated, you move to Section 6(e) which directs how to value the Transactions (it depends on who is the Defaulting Party, and whether you have elected Loss or Market Quotation, and First Method or Second Method. Under the 2002 ISDA it is much easier.
Section 6(a)
Automatic Early Termination
There is an entire, long-winded page about AET, so we have refrained from blathering on about it here.
Everyone’s hair will be on fire
This is likely to be a time where the market is dislocated, your credit officer is running around with her hair on fire, your normally affable counterparty is suddenly diffident, evasive, or strangely just not picking up the phone, and your online master agreement database has crashed because everyone in the firm is interrogating it at once. The sense of dreary quietude in which your Master Agreement was negotiated will certainly not prevail. Bear this in mind when negotiating. For example, the elaborate steps your counterparty insists on for your sending close-out notices, to fifteen different addresses, in five different formats and with magic words in the heading, will really trip your gears, especially if some of those methods are no longer possible. There is an argument that some buy-side counterparties complicate the formal process of closing out specifically to buy time and deter their dealers from pulling the trigger. It is a pretty neat trick, if so: you can expect the dealer’s credit department to puke all over a margin lockup, but a bit of fiddling around the edges of a Notices section? Sure, whatever.
Bear in mind, too: this is one time the commercial imperative will count for nothing. This is it: literally, the end game. If you close out there is no business: you are terminating your trading relationship altogether with extreme prejudice. The normal iterated game of prisoner’s dilemma has turned into a single round game. Game theorists will realise at once that the calculus is very different, and much, much less appealing.
So: good luck keeping your head while all around you are losing theirs.
Close-out sequence
Once you have designated an Early Termination Date for your ISDA Master Agreement, proceed to 6(c) to understand the Effect of Designation. Or learn about it in one place with the NC.’s handy cribsheet, “closing out an ISDA”.
The Notices provisions in Section 12 are relevant to how you may serve this notice. In a nutshell, in writing, by hand. Don’t email it, fax it, telex it, or send it by any kind of pony express or carrier pigeon unless your pigeon/pony is willing to provide an affidavit of service.
Defaulting Party
The key thing to notice here is that — in an uncharacteristically rather neat, understated bit of drafting — Defaulting Party encapsulates a party who has itself defaulted, or whose Credit Support Provider or Specified Entity has committed an act which amounts to an Event of Default for that counterparty to this ISDA Master Agreement. I know, I know, this doesn’t seem that big of a deal: this sort of thing that should be plain, obvious and go without saying — but it saves you a job when, in your peregrinations round the party’s Confirmation, you come to talk of pending Events of Default and Termination Events against that party.
Instead of saying, laboriously, “if there is an Event of Default or Termination Event with respect to a party or its Credit Support Providers or Specified Entities, as the case may be” you can speak of a Defaulting Party or an Affected Party.
Of course, it would be nice if there was a catch-all for a party who has committed an Event of Default or suffered a Termination Event, so you didn’t need to go “Defaulting Party or Affected Party, as the case may be” — cheekily we suggest “Innocent Party” and “Implicated Party” (“Guilty Party”, though fun, isn’t quite right, seeing as Termination Events aren’t meant to impute any kind of culpability).
Non-defaulting Party
To be compared with - well, Defaulting Party. Of all things. And Non-affected Party, as well. The difference between a Non-defaulting Party and a Non-affected Party, and the linguistic torture that distinction as inflicted on the race of ISDA lawyers ever since, says everything you need to know about the absurdity of modern commercial law.
- Do say: “the Non-defaulting Party or the non-Affected Party, as the case may be” over and over again.
- Don’t say: “Is there really no other way you could get across this concept, for crying out loud?”
Section 6(b)
There is a difference between Termination Events that are non-catastrophic, and usually Transaction-specific, and those that are catastrophic, which are usually counterparty specific.
Non-catastrophic ones affecting just a subset of Transactions might be caused by, say, a Tax Event or a local Illegality, but in any weather do not concern the solvency, creditworthiness or basic mendacity of your counterparty. They generally won’t have much, directly, to do with your counterparty at all beyond the jurisdictions it inhabits and the laws it is subject to. These are generally the Termination Events, but not Additional Termination Events.
The catastrophic ones are by their nature affect — that is, “Affect” — all Transactions. These generally are the bespoke Additional Termination Events your credit department insisted on — or theirs did; they will have something to do with the naughtiness of lack of fibre of your counterparty (or you!), and these function for most respects a lot more like Events of Default.
Thus, in the drafting of ISDA Schedules, CSAs and so on, you will often find laboured reference to Events of Default and/or Termination Events which lead to Early Termination Dates with respect to all outstanding Transactions as some kind of special, hyper-exciting, class of Termination Event.
Lucky premium content subscribers get a lot more discussion about the practical implications of all the above and a table comparing the events.
Section 6(b)(i)
Note the difficulty of practical compliance with this provision, given a sizeable ISDA portfolio, and the requirement for actively monitoring not only standard Termination Events, but also Additional Termination Events, which may be counterparty or even Transaction-specific.
Be aware of the notices provision of the ISDA Master Agreement, especially if you’re using a 1992 ISDA and you were thinking of serving by email — NatWest Bank could tell you a thing or two about that, as this lengthy article explains — or if the world happens to be in the grip of madness, hysteria, pandemic or something equally improbable[4] like an alien invasion.
Section 6(b)(ii)
Once the Waiting Period expires, it will be a Termination Event entitling either party to terminate some or all Affected Transactions. Partial termination is permitted because the impact on an event on each Transaction may differ from case to case (eg transactions forming part of a structured finance deal like a repack or a CDO) might not be easily replaced, so the disadvantages of terminating may outweigh the advantages.
As far as branches are concerned this is relatively uncontroversial, especially if yours is a multi-branch ISDA Master Agreement. But there is an interesting philosophical question here, for, without an express pre-existing contractual right to do so, a party may not unilaterally transfer its obligations under a contract to someone else. That, being a novation, requires the other party’s consent. This is deep contractual lore, predating the First Men and even the Children of the Woods. So if the Affected Party identifies an affiliate to whom it can transfer its rights and obligations, the Non-affected Party still may withhold consent. True, it is obliged to provide consent if its policies permit but — well — y’know. Polices? Given the credit department’s proclivities for the fantastical, it’s a fairly safe bet they’ll be able to find something if they don’t feel up to it.
That is to say, this commitment falls some wat short of the JC’s favourite confection: “in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner”.
Note also that if an Non-Affected Party does elect partial termination, the Affected Party has the right to terminate some or all of the remaining Transactions: this prevents Non-Affected Parties being opportunistic. Heaven forfend.
Section 6(b)(iii)
Handwaving appeals to one another’s good natures with this talk of reasonableness and, of course, both parties will probably be incentivised to keep the trade on foot if some unfortunate tax eventuality comes about — seeing as they were incentivised enough to start it —but ultimately, this is an agreement to agree, however you dress it up, and is as contractually enforceable as one. That is, not very.
Section 6(b)(iv)
What a beast. If you track it through in Nutshell™ terms, it isn’t as bad as it looks, but you have the ISDA ninja’s gift for over-complication, and ISDA’s crack drafting squad™’s yen for dismal drafting, to thank for this being the trial it is.
To make it easier, we’ve invented some concepts and taken a few liberties:
“Unaffected Transaction”, which saves you all that mucking around saying “Transactions other than those that are, or are deemed, to be Affected Transactions” and so on;
Termination Event Notice: An elegant and self-explanatory alternative to “after an Affected Party gives notice under Section 6(b)(i)”.
We take it as logically true that you can’t give 20 days’ notice of something which you then say will happen in fewer than 20 days. Therefore, there is no need for all this “designate a day not earlier than the day such notice is effective” nonsense.
So with that all out the way, here is how it works. Keep in mind that, unlike Events of Default, Termination Events can arise through no fault of the Affected Party and, therefore, are not always as apocalyptic in consequence. Depending what they are, they may be cured or worked-around, and dented Transactions that can’t be panel-beaten back into shape may be surgically excised, allowing the remainder of the ISDA Master Agreement, and all Unaffected Transactions under it, to carry on as normal. So here goes:
Divide up the types of Termination Event
Tax ones: If a Tax Event or a TEUM[5] where the party merging is the one that suffers the tax, the parties have a month to try to rearrange matters between them, their offices and affiliates to avoid the tax issue. Only once that has failed are you in Termination Event territory. See Section 6(b)(ii) and 6(b)(iii).
Non-Affected Party ones: If it’s a CEUM[6], an ATE or a TEUM where the Non-Affected Party suffers the tax, then if the other guy is a Non-Affected Party, then (whether or not you are) you may designate an Early Termination date for the Affected Transactions.
Illegality and Force Majeure: Here, if you are on a 2002 ISDA, there may be a Waiting Period to sit through, to see whether the difficulty clears. For Force Majeure Event it is eight Local Business Days; for Illegality other than one preventing performance of a Credit Support Document: three Local Business Days. So, sit through it. Why is there exception for Illegality on a Credit Support Document? Because, even though it wasn’t your fault, illegality of a Credit Support Document profoundly changes your credit assessment (in a way that arguably, even a payment or delivery obligation doesn’t), and that is the most fundamental risk you are managing under the ISDA Master Agreement.
Section 6(c)
Once you have designated your Early Termination Date under Section 6(a), proceed directly to Section 6(e) to determine the Close-out Amount (if you are under a 2002 ISDA, or “tiresomely unlabelled amount payable upon early termination of the ISDA Master Agreement” if you a labouring under a 1992 ISDA).
The key thing to observe here is that, suddenly, all Transactions vanish, and all payments and deliveries due under them are suspended, to be replaced by the single Close-out Amount per Transaction, which is then subsumed into the Early Termination Amount for the whole agreement. Note the Close-out Amount does not have an independent existence as a payable amount owed by any party at any point: it is simply a calculation one makes, by reference to a now extinguished Transaction, on the way to determining the whole-agreement Early Termination Amount. This is why a Transaction-specific guarantee is a flawed type of Credit Support Document — at the very point you call upon it, the Transaction will vanish.
Section 6(d)
Section 6(d) is to do with working out the termination value of Transactions for which you’ve just designated an Early Termination Date (or, in the 1992 ISDA, the thing you wished they’d defined as an Early Termination Date).
Under the ’92 one uses Loss and Market Quotation, and all that Second Method malarkey, and in the 2002 ISDA the much neater and tidier Close-out Amount concept.
Generally, this is good fat-tail paranoia material, so once upon a time parties used to negotiate it heavily. General SME-drain from the negotiation talent pool over the years due to vigorous down-skilling means people are less fussed about it now.
A popular parlour game among those pedants who still insist on using the 1992 ISDA — or, in fairness, are forced to by some other pedant further up their chain, or a general institutional disposition towards pedantry — is to laboriously upgrade every inconsistent provision in the 1992 ISDA to the 2002 ISDA standard except the one provision of the 1992 ISDA they always liked — if the pedant is in question is from the Treasury department, that will be the longer grace period in the Failure to Pay; if she is from Credit, it absolutely won’t be.
You might well ask why anyone would be so bloody-minded, but then you might well ask why anybody watches films from the Fast and Furious franchise. Because they can.
Or, possibly, to preserve the slightly more generous grace periods for Failure to Pay (three days in the 1992 ISDA versus one in the 2002 ISDA) and Bankruptcy (thirty days in the 1992 ISDA versus 15 in the 2002 ISDA) in which case, you’d retrofit longer grace periods into the new version, wouldn’t you? But no).
Section 6(e)
For our step-by-step guide to closing out an ISDA Master Agreement see Section 6(a).
On the difference between an “Early Termination Amount” and a “Close-out Amount”
Regrettably, the 1992 ISDA features neither an Early Termination Amount nor a Close-out Amount. The 2002 ISDA has both, which looks like rather an indulgence until you realise that they do different things.
A Close-out Amount is the termination value for a single Transaction, or a related group of Transactions that a Non-Defaulting Party or Non-Affected Party calculates while closing out an 2002 ISDA, but it is not the final, overall sum due under the ISDA Master Agreement itself. Each of the determined Transaction Close-out Amounts summed with the various Unpaid Amounts to arrive at the Early Termination Amount, which is the total net sum due under the ISDA Master Agreement after the close-out process. (See Section 6(e)(i) for more on that).
Section 6(f)
One does not exercise a set-off right willy nilly. Unless one is, mutually, settlement netting (where on a given day I owe you a sum, you owe me a sum, and we agree to settle by one of us paying the other the difference) set-off is a drastic remedy which will be seen as enemy action. You would not do it, without agreement, to any client you expected to keep. So, generally, use set-off as a remedy it only arises following an event of default.
A bit of a bish in the 2002 ISDA
Set-off in the 2002 ISDA borrows from the text used to build it into the 1992 ISDA but still contains a rather elementary fluff-up: it imagines a world like our own, but where the Early Termination Amount is payable one way, while all Other Amounts are only payable the other. Life, as any fule kno, is not always quite that convenient.
For example:
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Payer owes Payee an Early Termination Amount of 10 |
But what if there are Other Amounts payable the same way as the Early Termination Amount?
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Payer owes Payee an Early Termination Amount of 10 Net: Payee owes Payer 40. |
Not ideal. But fixable if you’re prepared to add some dramatically anal language:
6(f) Set-Off. Any Early Termination Amount (or any other amounts, whether or not arising under this Agreement, matured, contingent and irrespective of the currency, place of payment of booking of the obligation)” payable to one party (the “Payee”) by the other party (the “Payer”), ...
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- The JC’s famous Nutshell™ summary of this clause
See also
References
- ↑ Okay he didn’t say the bit about Section 6(b)(iv)
- ↑ Yes; there is some inter-industry association bitterness and snobbery here.
- ↑ Sauron, Beelzebub, Nosferatu, Lehman Brothers etc.
- ↑ “The chances of anything coming from Mars were a million-to-one,” he said. Yet, still they came.
- ↑ That’s “Tax Event Upon Merger” to the cool kids.
- ↑ That’s “Credit Event Upon Merger” to the cool kids.