Misrepresentation - ISDA Provision

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ISDA Anatomy™


In a Nutshell Section 5(a)(iv):

5(a)(iv) Misrepresentation. A representation (other than a Payee or Payer Tax Representation) made under this Agreement or a Credit Support Document was materially incorrect or misleading when it was made;

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2002 ISDA full text of Section 5(a)(iv):

5(a)(iv) Misrepresentation. A representation (other than a representation under Section 3(e) or 3(f)) made or repeated or deemed to have been made or repeated by the party or any Credit Support Provider of such party in this Agreement or any Credit Support Document proves to have been incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made or repeated or deemed to have been made or repeated;

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Click here for the text of Section 5(a)(iv) in the 1992 ISDA

Index: Click to expand:Navigation
See ISDA Comparison for a comparison between the 1992 ISDA and the 2002 ISDA.
The Varieties of ISDA Experience
Subject 2002 (wikitext) 1992 (wikitext) 1987 (wikitext)
Preamble Pre Pre Pre
Interpretation 1 1 1
Obligns/Payment 2 2 2
Representations 3 3 3
Agreements 4 4 4
EODs & Term Events 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSTCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityFMTax EventTEUMCEUMATE 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSTCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityTax EventTEUMCEUMATE 5 Events of Default: FTPDBreachCSDMisrepDUSSCross DefaultBankruptcyMWA Termination Events: IllegalityTax EventTEUMCEUM
Early Termination 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculations; Payment DatePayments on ETSet-off 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculationsPayments on ETSet-off 6 Early Termination: ET right on EODET right on TEEffect of DesignationCalculationsPayments on ET
Transfer 7 7 7
Contractual Currency 8 8 8
Miscellaneous 9 9 9
Offices; Multibranch Parties 10 10 10
Expenses 11 11 11
Notices 12 12 12
Governing Law 13 13 13
Definitions 14 14 14
Schedule Schedule Schedule Schedule
Termination Provisions Part 1 Part 1 Part 1
Tax Representations Part 2 Part 2 Part 2
Documents for Delivery Part 3 Part 3 Part 3
Miscellaneous Part 4 Part 4 Part 4
Other Provisions Part 5 Part 5 Part 5
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This is where that mystifying Section 3(d) representation comes in.
The fabulous Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation, giving one’s counterparty the right to close out should any so-designated representations turn out not to be true. This is sure to occupy an inordinate amount of your negotiation time — in that it occupies any time at all — because you are as likely to be hit in the face by a live starfish in the Gobi Desert as you are to close out an ISDA Master Agreement because your counterparty is late in preparing its annual accounts. But that’s a personal view and you may not rely on it.

The {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation, in the documents for delivery table in the Schedule, therefore covers only the accuracy and completeness of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} and not (for example) whether {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} is delivered at all. For that, see Section {{{{{1}}}|4(a)}} - {{{{{1}}}|Furnish Specified Information}}.

“Covered by the Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} Representation”

If one is required to “furnish” {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} under Section {{{{{1}}}|4}}, two things can go wrong:

No show: One can fail to provide it, at all, in which case there is a {{{{{1}}}|Breach of Agreement}}, but be warned: the period before one can enforce such a failure, judged by the yardstick of modern financial contracts, is long enough for a whole kingdom of dinosaurs to evolve and be wiped out; or

It’s cobblers: One can provide the {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}}, on time, but it can be a total pile of horse ordure. Now, here is a trick for young players: if your {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} is, or turns out to be, false, you have no remedy unless you have designated that it is “subject to the Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} representation”. That is the one that promises it is accurate and not misleading.

Might Section 3(d) not cover a representation?

Now you might ask what good an item of {{{{{1}}}|Specified Information}} can possibly be, if Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} didn’t apply and it could be just made up on the spot without fear of retribution — as a youngster, the JC certainly asked that question, and has repeated it over many years, and is yet to hear a good answer — but all we can presume is that in its tireless quest to cater for the unguessable predilections of the negotiating community, ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ left this preposterous option open just in case. It wouldn’t be the first time.

Legal opinions, and Credit Support Documents

A trawl through the SEC’s “Edgar” archive[1] reveals that the sorts of things to which “Covered by Section 3(d) Representation” results in a “No” outcome are rare — but not non-existent. It is things like “Legal opinion from counsel concerning due authorization, enforceability and related matters, addressed to the other party and reasonably acceptable to such other party”, or “{{{{{1}}}|Credit Support Document}}s”.
See further discussion in the sections below.

Annual reports

The other little fiddle — and it is a little fidgety fiddle — is to remark of annual reports that, yes, they are covered by that Section 3(d) representation, but with a proviso:

“Yes; provided that the phrase “is, as of the date of the information, true, accurate and complete in every material respect” in Section {{{{{1}}}|3(d)}} shall be deleted and the phrase “fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations as of their respective dates and for the respective periods covered thereby” shall be inserted in lieu thereof.”

Template:Materiality of misrepresentation

Representations by agents on agent’s own behalf

Where your client’s obligations under the ISDA Master Agreement are stewarded by an agent — quite common for an investment manager trading on behalf of a fund — a broker might think about having the agent represent, on its own behalf, about its role as agent. It might ask the agent to do this in the ISDA. The sound of an asset manager confirming its ongoing authority to bind its principal gladdens a broker’s heart. A full-throated assertion of its own regulatory authorisation; its continued good standing with the companies office; the continued involvement of its key persons in making investment decisions — each is sure to put a jaunt in a broker’s stride. Imaginative in-house counsel for the broker will doubtless dream up others.

But tarry a while. Firstly, your investment manager will sign as agent, for the client, not on its own behalf. For many this will be an article of profound faith: they will be at some pains, which they will willingly inflict on you, to avoid the barest hint they are speaking for themselves. “When an agent, as agent opens its mouth,” they will tell you, “it becomes its principal for all purposes that interest the law.”

And so it does. As far as the Courts of Chancery are concerned, to be an agent is to be wholly transubstantiated into the person of one’s principal. Transmogrified. It is, for all forensic intents to disappear; one’s ghostly outline may still be there, but it is a chimera: one exists only to be the earthly representation of another.

Which cast a pall over the representations you are being asked to make.

Take the one that “the principal has duly authorised the agent to act on its behalf”. For the principal to say that, through the person of the very one whose agency is in question, is some kind of Möbius loop. The very comfort you might draw from what is being said is taken away by the person who is saying it.

Even if the fact of the agency is in no doubt, the statements as to the agent’s character may be problematic. The agent is speaking for the principal, remember.

The exchange might go something like this:

Agent (as agent): Why would I be authorised by the FCA? I am not advising anyone. In fact, my investment manager is advising me. Why don’t you ask her?
Broker (rubbing its eyes and peering at the agent): But I am asking her. I mean you.
Agent (as agent): Who?
Broker: You! The investment manager for this blessed fund!
Agent (as agent): Ah, but I am not me, for now, you see. I am the earthly representative of the fund. In my own personal capacity, I don’t exist.
Broker: But you are here, aren’t you? Can’t I just quickly ask you? Can’t you just, you know, be yourself for a moment? It won’t take a mo —
Agent (as itself): What? Here? In this ISDA? You must be joking. I told you under no circumstances will I act as principal.
Broker (A light-bulb comes on): Aha! I've got it! All right then: can you make representations on behalf of your principal?
Agent (as agent) (Thinks for a moment.): Why yes! Yes, I can! That’s what I’m here, as agent, to do! What would you like me to represent?
Broker: Could you represent that your investment manager is duly authorised by the FCA?
Agent (as agent): WELL HOW THE HELL AM I SUPPOSED TO KNOW THAT??
Broker: What?
Agent (as agent): Look: why don’t you ask the agent?

But seriously

Assuming you can persuade your agent to represent, on its own behalf, about itself, as to these matters (whether in the master agreement itself or in a side letter):

  • Now if (notwithstanding breach of this rep) the broker does still have a claim against the fund, then no harm no foul: we shouldn’t need to close out vs the fund unless/until there’s an independent failure to pay, in which case rely on that. But now we have actual knowledge of the agent’s lack of authority we may find we have a second problem: that there is no no-one with ostensible authority to bind the fund, and it is drifting rudderless towards a wall. If so, see below.
  • If we don’t then our action is necessarily against the agent in its personal capacity and against its own assets, not the fund’s. It’s a claim in tort for negligent misstatement. Put yourself in the fund’s position here. Being itself a victim of the agent’s mendacity it will feel it is more sinn’d against than sinning and will not see why this should be a 3(d) representation under the ISDA Master Agreement. The fund will say “well hang on: I didn’t do anything wrong here: this asset manager is taking my name in vain without my consent – so how is it that you’re purporting to close out against me?
  • Loss of manager’s regulatory status, no manager, no good standing etc: The other typical representations goes to a duly authorised manager’s continued ability to to act on the fund’s behalf: to manage positions, monitor risk tolerances and keep the ship steady. If the agent goes AWOL a [[[broker]] has some call to reduce risk against the fund. If the fund is a sports car, the broker’s ATEs are the measures it can take to prevent the car hitting a wall. As long as here is a competent agent driving the car, the broker can have some confidence the car will avoid walls by itself. If the driver is prevented from steering, the car will, eventually, hit the wall. So it is fair enough for the broker to say “okay: you are out of control: unless you name a new driver, within a given period ~ and here you may treat yourself to a fun exchange with your counterpart about how long that period should be ~ we can call this an ATE”.

See also

References

  1. You are welcome.
  2. Yes; the whys and wherefores of ostensible authority are an endless delight; but we can at least say the risk is increased.