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Service level agreement: Difference between revisions
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The difference between the fee and those resources is his profit margin. A free agent is exclusively focused on what it does ''not'' have to do. This, and only this, is what he turns up for. | The difference between the fee and those resources is his profit margin. A free agent is exclusively focused on what it does ''not'' have to do. This, and only this, is what he turns up for. | ||
Thus, you must have an [[SLA]]. You must stipulate in | Thus, you must have an [[SLA]]. You must stipulate in [[Key performance indicator|tortuous detail]] exactly how, when, with what implements and at what rate, your service provider must provide the services. You should expect it to do not one micron more than that. | ||
If you outsource a cleaning contract for a five-thousand seat tower block in the CBD, assume your service provider will roll up with one minimum-waged fifteen-year-old, a mop and a plastic bucket ''UNLESS YOU HAVE AGREED OTHERWISE IN AN SLA''. | If you outsource a cleaning contract for a five-thousand seat tower block in the CBD, assume your service provider will roll up with one minimum-waged fifteen-year-old, a mop and a plastic bucket ''UNLESS YOU HAVE AGREED OTHERWISE IN AN SLA''. | ||
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This is, of course, simply an articulation of the age-old “[[agency problem]]”. Yes, it is true: an [[employee]] is ''also'' an [[agent]], but at least she has a notional [[Uberrimae fidei|duty of good faith]] and some kind of gravitational proximity to her employer that at least bends her trajectory towards its better interests. Now let us extend that cosmological metaphor. If an employee directly orbits her employer’s sun, even though an agent and thus always running at ''some'' kind of tangent to her employer’s best interests she can at least be predicted, and that errant course is largely pulled around by the employer’s gravitational mass. An ''outsourced contractor'', by contrast, is an [[agent]] thrice as far removed. He orbits a different satellite altogether (his contracting service provider), which in turn orbits that employee in minute [[epicycle|epicycles]] so, from the point of view of the best interests of the, ah, ''stellar'' employer, his trajectory ''eccentric''. | This is, of course, simply an articulation of the age-old “[[agency problem]]”. Yes, it is true: an [[employee]] is ''also'' an [[agent]], but at least she has a notional [[Uberrimae fidei|duty of good faith]] and some kind of gravitational proximity to her employer that at least bends her trajectory towards its better interests. Now let us extend that cosmological metaphor. If an employee directly orbits her employer’s sun, even though an agent and thus always running at ''some'' kind of tangent to her employer’s best interests she can at least be predicted, and that errant course is largely pulled around by the employer’s gravitational mass. An ''outsourced contractor'', by contrast, is an [[agent]] thrice as far removed. He orbits a different satellite altogether (his contracting service provider), which in turn orbits that employee in minute [[epicycle|epicycles]] so, from the point of view of the best interests of the, ah, ''stellar'' employer, his trajectory ''eccentric''. | ||
{{ | {{sa}} | ||
*[[Key performance indicator]] | |||
*[[Internal audit]] | |||
*[[Insurance]] | *[[Insurance]] | ||
*[[Agency problem]] | *[[Agency problem]] | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||
{{c2|Cosmology|Metaphor}} | {{c2|Cosmology|Metaphor}} | ||