Events of Default and Termination Events - 1992 ISDA Provision

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1992 ISDA Master Agreement

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ISDA Text: 5

5 Events of Default and Termination Events

5(a) Events of Default. The occurrence at any time with respect to a party or, if applicable, any Credit Support Provider of such party or any Specified Entity of such party of any of the following events constitutes an event of default (an “Event of Default”) with respect to such party:—

5(a)(i) Failure to Pay or Deliver. Failure by the party to make, when due, any payment under this Agreement or delivery under Section 2(a)(i) or 2(e) required to be made by it if such failure is not remedied on or before the third Local Business Day after notice of such failure is given to the party;
5(a)(ii) Breach of Agreement. Failure by the party to comply with or perform any agreement or obligation (other than an obligation to make any payment under this Agreement or delivery under Section 2(a)(i) or 2(e) or to give notice of a Termination Event or any agreement or obligation under Section 4(a)(i), 4(a)(iii) or 4(d)) to be complied with or performed by the party in accordance with this Agreement if such failure is not remedied on or before the thirtieth day after notice of such failure is given to the party;
5(a)(iii) Credit Support Default.
(1) Failure by the party or any Credit Support Provider of such party to comply with or perform any agreement or obligation to be complied with or performed by it in accordance with any Credit Support Document if such failure is continuing after any applicable grace period has elapsed;
(2) the expiration or termination of such Credit Support Document or the failing or ceasing of such Credit Support Document to be in full force and effect for the purpose of this Agreement (in either case other than in accordance with its terms) prior to the satisfaction of all obligations of such party under each Transaction to which such Credit Support Document relates without the written consent of the other party; or
(3) the party or such Credit Support Provider disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects, in whole or in part, or challenges the validity of, such Credit Support Document;
5(a)(iv) Misrepresentation. A representation (other than a representation under Section 3(e) or 3(f)) made or repeated or deemed to have been made or repeated by the party or any Credit Support Provider of such party in this Agreement or any Credit Support Document proves to have been incorrect or misleading in any material respect when made or repeated or deemed to have been made or repeated;
5(a)(v) Default under Specified Transaction. The party, any Credit Support Provider of such party or any applicable Specified Entity of such party
(1) defaults under a Specified Transaction and, after giving effect to any applicable notice requirement or grace period, there occurs a liquidation of, an acceleration of obligations under, or an early termination of, that Specified Transaction,
(2) defaults, after giving effect to any applicable notice requirement or grace period, in making any payment or delivery due on the last payment, delivery or exchange date of, or any payment on early termination of, a Specified Transaction (or such default continues for at least three Local Business Days if there is no applicable notice requirement or grace period) or
(3) disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects, in whole or in part, a Specified Transaction (or such action is taken by any person or entity appointed or empowered to operate it or act on its behalf);
5(a)(vi) Cross Default. If “Cross Default” is specified in the Schedule as applying to the party, the occurrence or existence of
(1) a default, event of default or other similar condition or event however described) in respect of such party, any Credit Support Provider of such party or any applicable Specified Entity of such party under one or more agreements or instruments relating to Specified Indebtedness of any of them (individually or collectively) in an aggregate amount of not less than the applicable Threshold Amount (as specified in the Schedule) which has resulted in such Specified Indebtedness becoming, or becoming capable at such time of being declared, due and payable under such agreements or instruments, before it would otherwise have been due and payable or
(2) a default by such party, such Credit Support Provider or such Specified Entity (individually or collectively) in making one or more payments on the due date thereof in an aggregate amount of not less than the applicable Threshold Amount under such agreements or instruments (after giving effect to any applicable notice requirement or grace period);
5(a)(vii) Bankruptcy. The party, any Credit Support Provider of such party or any applicable Specified Entity of such party: —
(1) is dissolved (other than pursuant to a consolidation, amalgamation or merger);
(2) becomes insolvent or is unable to pay its debts or fails or admits in writing its inability generally to pay its debts as they become due;
(3) makes a general assignment, arrangement or composition with or for the benefit of its creditors;
(4) institutes or has instituted against it a proceeding seeking a judgment of insolvency or bankruptcy or any other relief under any bankruptcy or insolvency law or other similar law affecting creditors’ rights, or a petition is presented for its winding-up or liquidation, and, in the case of any such proceeding or petition instituted or presented against it, such proceeding or petition
(A) results in a judgment of insolvency or bankruptcy or the entry of an order for relief or the making of an order for its winding-up or liquidation or
(B) is not dismissed, discharged, stayed or restrained in each case within 30 days of the institution or presentation thereof;
(5) has a resolution passed for its winding-up, official management or liquidation (other than pursuant to a consolidation, amalgamation or merger);
(6) seeks or becomes subject to the appointment of an administrator, provisional liquidator, conservator, receiver, trustee, custodian or other similar official for it or for all or substantially all its assets;
(7) has a secured party take possession of all or substantially all its assets or has a distress, execution, attachment, sequestration or other legal process levied, enforced or sued on or against all or substantially all its assets and such secured party maintains possession, or any such process is not dismissed, discharged, stayed or restrained, in each case within 30 days thereafter;
(8) causes or is subject to any event with respect to it which, under the applicable laws of any jurisdiction, has an analogous effect to any of the events specified in clauses (1) to (7) (inclusive); or
(9) takes any action in furtherance of, or indicating its consent to, approval of, or acquiescence in, any of the foregoing acts; or
5(a)(viii) Merger Without Assumption. The party or any Credit Support Provider of such party consolidates or amalgamates with, or merges with or into, or transfers all or substantially all its assets to, another entity and, at the time of such consolidation, amalgamation, merger or transfer: —
5(a)(viii)(1) the resulting, surviving or transferee entity fails to assume all the obligations of such party or such Credit Support Provider under this Agreement or any Credit Support Document to which it or its predecessor was a party by operation of law or pursuant to an agreement reasonably satisfactory to the other party to this Agreement; or
5(a)(viii)(2) the benefits of any Credit Support Document fail to extend (without the consent of the other party) to the performance by such resulting, surviving or transferee entity of its obligations under this Agreement.

5(b) Termination Events. The occurrence at any time with respect to a party or, if applicable, any Credit Support Provider of such party or any Specified Entity of such party of any event specified below constitutes an Illegality if the event is specified in (i) below, a Tax Event if the event is specified in (ii) below or a Tax Event Upon Merger if the event is specified in (iii) below, and, if specified to be applicable, a Credit Event Upon Merger if the event is specified pursuant to (iv) below or an Additional Termination Event if the event is specified pursuant to (v) below:—

5(b)(i) Illegality. Due to the adoption of, or any change in, any applicable law after the date on which a Transaction is entered into, or due to the promulgation of, or any change in, the interpretation by any court, tribunal or regulatory authority with competent jurisdiction of any applicable law after such date, it becomes unlawful (other than as a result of a breach by the party of Section 4(b)) for such party (which will be the Affected Party):
5(b)(i)(1) to perform any absolute or contingent obligation to make a payment or delivery or to receive a payment or delivery in respect of such Transaction or to comply with any other material provision of this Agreement relating to such Transaction; or
5(b)(i)(2) to perform, or for any Credit Support Provider of such party to perform, any contingent or other obligation which the party (or such Credit Support Provider) has under any Credit Support Document relating to such Transaction;
5(b)(ii) Tax Event.[1] Due to:
(x) any action taken by a taxing authority, or brought in a court of competent jurisdiction, on or after the date on which a Transaction is entered into (regardless of whether such action is taken or brought with respect to a party to this Agreement) or
(y) a Change in Tax Law,
the party (which will be the Affected Party) will, or there is a substantial likelihood that it will, on the next succeeding Scheduled Payment Date
(1) be required to pay to the other party an additional amount in respect of an Indemnifiable Tax under Section 2(d)(i)(4) (except in respect of interest under Section 2(e), 6(d)(ii) or 6(e)) or
(2) receive a payment from which an amount is required to be deducted or withheld for or on account of a Tax (except in respect of interest under Section 2(e), 6(d)(ii) or 6(e)) and no additional amount is required to be paid in respect of such Tax under Section 2(d)(i)(4) (other than by reason of Section 2(d)(i)(4)(A) or (B));
5(b)(iii) Tax Event Upon Merger. The party (the “Burdened Party”) on the next succeeding Scheduled Payment Date will either (1) be required to pay an additional amount in respect of an Indemnifiable Tax under Section 2(d)(i)(4) (except in respect of interest under Section 2(e), 6(d)(ii) or 6(e)) or (2) receive a payment from which an amount has been deducted or withheld for or on account of any Indemnifiable Tax in respect of which the other party is not required to pay an additional amount (other than by reason of Section 2(d)(i)(4)(A) or (B)), in either case as a result of a party consolidating or amalgamating with, or merging with or into, or transferring all or substantially all its assets to, another entity (which will be the Affected Party) where such action does not constitute an event described in Section 5(a)(viii);
5(b)(iv) Credit Event Upon Merger. If “Credit Event Upon Merger” is specified in the Schedule as applying to the party, such party (“X”), any Credit Support Provider of X or any applicable Specified Entity of X consolidates or amalgamates with, or merges with or into, or transfers all or substantially all its assets to, another entity and such action does not constitute an event described in Section 5(a)(viii) but the creditworthiness of the resulting, surviving or transferee entity is materially weaker than that of X, such Credit Support Provider or such Specified Entity, as the case may be, immediately prior to such action (and, in such event, X or its successor or transferee, as appropriate, will be the Affected Party); or
5(b)(v) Additional Termination Event. If any “Additional Termination Event” is specified in the Schedule or any Confirmation as applying, the occurrence of such event (and, in such event, the Affected Party or Affected Parties shall be as specified for such Additional Termination Event in the Schedule or such Confirmation).

5(c) Event of Default and Illegality. If an event or circumstance which would otherwise constitute or give rise to an Event of Default also constitutes an Illegality, it will be treated as an Illegality and will not constitute an Event of Default.

Related agreements and comparisons

Related Agreements
Click here for the text of Section 5 in the 2002 ISDA
Comparisons
Template:Isdadiff 5

Resources and Navigation

Resources Wikitext | Nutshell wikitext | 2002 ISDA wikitext | 2002 vs 1992 Showdown | 2006 ISDA Definitions | 2008 ISDA

Navigation Preamble | 1(a) (b) (c) | 2(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) | 3(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) | 4(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) | 55(a) Events of Default: 5(a)(i) Failure to Pay or Deliver 5(a)(ii) Breach of Agreement 5(a)(iii) Credit Support Default 5(a)(iv) Misrepresentation 5(a)(v) Default Under Specified Transaction 5(a)(vi) Cross Default 5(a)(vii) Bankruptcy 5(a)(viii) Merger Without Assumption 5(b) Termination Events: 5(b)(i) Illegality 5(b)(ii) Tax Event 5(b)(iii) Tax Event Upon Merger 5(b)(iv) Credit Event Upon Merger 5(b)(v) Additional Termination Event (c) | 6(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) | 7 | 8(a) (b) (c) (d) | 9(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) | 10 | 11 | 12(a) (b) | 13(a) (b) (c) (d) | 14 |

Index: Click to expand:

Overview

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These are the events that entitle you to close out some or all of your Transactions; to find out what hideous rigmarole you must go through when you have decided to do that, proceed directly to Section 6.

Section 5(a)

5(a)(i): The significant change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA is the restriction of that grace period from three Local Business Days to one. And a bit of convolutional frippery in introducing Local Delivery Days as well.

Compare also Failure to Pay under the 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, which is subtly different given the different purpose that it plays under a CDS.
5(a)(ii): Note the addition of Repudiation of Agreement to the 2002 ISDA. Common law purists like the JC will grumble that you don’t really need to set out repudiation as a breach justifying termination of a contract, because that’s what it is by definition but stating the bleeding obvious has never stopped ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ before. Also, an interesting question: if you do feel the need to provide for what is in essence an evolving common law remedy, then, to the extent your draw that remedy inside the cope of the common law remedy — or the common law evolves some new different and remedy that no-one had thought of before — then what? Section 9(d) has you covered. Woo-hoo.
5(a)(iii): A bit of pedantic flannel found its way into the 2002 ISDA — it captures not just the failure of the Credit Support Document itself, but any security interest granted under it, catering to the legal eagle’s most paranoid fears that a contractual right can have some sort of distinct ontological existence independently from the agreement which gives it breath and enforceable currency in the first place. But otherwise the same.
5(a)(iv): No change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA.
5(a)(v): DUST has been expanded in five significant ways by the 2002 ISDA. See the summary and general sections for details.
5(a)(vi): The 2002 ISDA updates the 1992 ISDA’s Cross Default so that if the combined amount outstanding under the two limbs of Cross Default exceed the Threshold Amount, then it will be an Event of Default. Normally, under the 1992 ISDA, Cross Default requires one or the other limbs to be satisfied — you can’t add them together. This was a bit of a snafu.

The two limbs are:

  1. a default under a financial agreement that would allow a creditor to accelerate any indebtedness that party owes it;
  2. a failure to pay on the due date under such agreements after the expiry of a grace period.

5(a)(vii): There are two differences between the 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA definitions of Bankruptcy.

First, the 2002 ISDA has a slightly more specific concept of “insolvency”. In limb 4 (insolvency proceedings) a new limb has been included to cover action taken by an entity-specific regulator or supervisor (as opposed to a common or garden insolvency proceeding): If initiated by a regulator, the game’s up as soon as the action is taken. If initiated by a random creditor, the action must have resulted in a winding-up order, or at least not have been discharged in 15 (not 30) days.

About that grace period. Second, and unnervingly for those of little faith in their own accounts payble departments, the grace period in which one must arrange the dismissal of a vexations or undeserving insolvency petition (under 5(a)(vii)(4)) or the exercise of security over assets (under 5(a)(vii)(7)) is compressed from 30 days to 15 days.
5(a)(viii): ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ giveth and ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ taketh away. As it neatly excises one square of flannel here, it inserts another one, further itemising ways in which a company might reorganise itself, there. In practical terms — ones that might make a difference were they to be considered by the King’s Bench Division, that is — no real change between 1992 ISDA and 2002 ISDA.

Section 5(b)
Renumbering due to new Force Majeure Event

Since the 2002 ISDA includes a Force Majeure Event, using language that was already agreed and widely inserted into the 1992 ISDA Schedule before its publication. Because this was entered as Section 5(b)(ii) — I mean, honestly, could they have not made it Section 5(b)(vi), so all the other clause references could stay the same? You have no idea what conceptual problems this has created for the poor JC trying to efficiently organise this website.

Clause-by-clause

5(b)(i): Illegality: Quite a lot of formal change to the definition of Illegality; not clear how much of it makes all that much practical difference. The 2002 ISDA requires you to give effect to remedies or fallbacks in the Confirmation that might take you out of Illegality before evoking this provision — which ought to go without saying. It also carves out Illegalities caused by the action of either party, which also seems a bit fussy, and throws in some including-without-limitation stuff which, definitely is a bit fussy. Lastly, the 2002 ISDA clarifies that the party suffering the Illegality is the Affected Party, and that an Illegality applies to the non-receipt of payments just as much as to their non-payment. Again, all this ought to have been true the 1992 ISDA — no doubt there is some whacky litigation that said otherwise — so this is mainly in the service of avoiding doubt.
5(b)(ii): Force Majeure Event: There is no Force Majeure in the 1992 ISDA, though parties would habitually negotiate one in, and by the time the 2002 ISDA was published it was in fairly standardised. For those who didn’t negotiate it in there was also the ISDA Illegality/Force Majeure Protocol (see here) which they could sign — upon payment of the suitable fee is ISDA — to adopt/incorporate the relevant parts.
5(b)(iii): Tax Event: Other than the renumbering, no real change in the definition of Tax Event from the 1992 ISDA. Note, unhelpfully, the sub-paragraph reference in the 1992 ISDA is (1) and (2) and in the 2002 ISDA is (A) and (B). Otherwise, pretty much the same.
5(b)(iv): Tax Event Upon Merger: Note the missing “indemnifiable” from the fifth line of the 2002 ISDA version and the expanded description of “merger events” towards the end of the clause. And the renumbering as a result of the Force Majeure Event clause in the 2002 ISDA.
5(b)(v): Credit Event Upon Merger: The 2002 ISDA introduced the concept of the “Designated Event”, which was an attempt to define more forensically the sorts of corporate events that should be covered by CEUM. They are notoriously difficult to pin down. Even before the 2002 ISDA was published, it was common to upgrade the 1992 ISDA formulation to something resembling the glorious concoction that became Section 5(b)(v) of the 2002 ISDA. The 1992 wording is a bit lame. On the other hand, you could count the number of times an ISDA Master Agreement is closed out purely on account of Credit Event Upon Merger on the fingers of one hand, even if you had lost all the fingers on that hand to an industrial accident. So — yeah.
5(b)(vi): Additional Termination Events: Other than the numbering discrepancy and a daring change of a “shall” to a “will”, Section 5(b)(vi) of the 2002 ISDA is the same as Section 5(b)(v) of the 1992 ISDA. That said, ATEs are likely to be the most haggled-over part of your ISDA Master Agreement.

Section 5(c)

A simple piddling match between Events of Default and Illegality in the 1992 ISDA makes way for a full-blown hierarchy of competing circumstances justifying closeout of the ISDA Master Agreement in the 2002 ISDA.

Section 5(d)

There is no equivalent provision to Section 5(d) in the 1992 ISDA, seeing as it does not contain a Force Majeure Event at all, and its conception of Illegality is far less — how shall we say? — sophisticated than the one in the 2002 ISDA.

Summary

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The process of closing out an ISDA following a Termination Event and not an Event of Default. There is a lengthy discussion of this here for our premium readers.

Among financing documents,[2] The ISDA is — unique? Pioneering? Overcomplicated? — in having two types of event that can induce parties to call the whole thing off. Or parts of it.

That’s a part of the explanation: some things bring down only some transactions and not others.

Termination Events

Specific taxation and regulatory changes that affect only certain transactions or transaction types, that justify terminating those transactions, but not the whole kitten-caboodle.

And there are things that do justify bringing down the whole kitten-caboodle, but are no-one’s fault as such, just one of these regrettable things that life throws at us every now and then. Changes in tax or regulation that affect a counterparty, or both counterparties, meaning the ongoing trading relationship is not allowed, or is no longer economically efficient.

These events are “Termination Events”: they are complicated two ways: what is affected, and who is affected, which in turn determines who is entitled to call termination and, importantly calculate what is due, according to whose marks. In many cases it will be both parties, and there will be a splitting of the difference.

Events of Default

Then there are events that are someone’s “fault” — in a “banky” way: in that they generally indicate credit failure of some kind, and which necessarily bring down the whole shooting match, but only if the innocent party actually wants that. The close out calculations here are different, and a bunch of other funky ISDA tricks hang off these events too: notably the Section 2(a)(iii) flawed asset provision that allows the Non-Defaulting Party to shoulder arms and just sit there. This doesn’t apply to Termination Events, only Events of Default.

Additional Termination Events

Which leaves Additional Termination Events: bespoke events which parties negotiate into their Schedules, which behave like Termination Events despite in most cases being a lot more like Events of Default in their basic nature: they almost always address credit-impairment of some kind or other (NAV triggers, key person triggers and so on).

Section 5(a)

Section 5(a)(i)

Failure to Pay or Deliver under Section 5(a)(i) of the ISDA Master Agreement: where a party fails to pay or deliver on time and does not remedy before the grace period expires. The grace period for a 2002 ISDA is one Local Business Day; shorter than the three Local Business Days in the 1992 ISDA. This fact alone has kept a number of market counterparties on the 1992 form, nearly thirty years after it was upgraded.

There’s a technical funny due to the American habit of insisting on a pledge-only 1994 NY CSA and then designating it as a Credit Support Document (against the hopes and dreams of ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ when it drafted the Users’ Guide, but still), and that is a failure to pay under an English law CSA is a Section 5(a)(i) Failure to Pay or Deliver, whereas a failure to pay under a New York Law CSA is a Section 5(a)(iii) Credit Support Default. Doth any difference it maketh? None, so far as we can see.

Funny old world we live in.

Section 5(a)(ii)

A failure to perform any agreement, if not cured within 30 days, is an Event of Default, except for those failures which already have their own special Event of Default (i.e., Failure to Pay or Deliver, under Section 5(a)(i)), those that relate to a pre-existing default (for example, default interest on unpaid amounts) and those that only bear on the “defaulting” party’s tax position, meaning that non-performance is punishment enough in itself (and does not affect the “non-defaulting” party) — that is, the non-compliant party will just get clipped for tax it could have avoided had it performed.

These are the boring breaches of agreement: those of a not immediately existential consequence to a derivative relationship (like Failure to Pay or Deliver, or a party’s outright Bankruptcy), which are not therefore hugely time critical, but which, if not promptly sorted out, justify shutting things down with extreme prejudice. Note that, while the 2002 truncates a bunch of other grace periods in the agreement (notably for a Failure to Pay or Deliver, and for discharging a Bankruptcy petition) it does not truncate the grace period for “boring” defaults, which stays at the glacially long 30 days.

All rendered in ISDA’s crack drafting squad™’s lovingly tortured prose, of course: note a double negative extragvaganza in 5(a)(ii)(1): not complying with an obligation that is not (inter alia) a payment obligation if not remedied within a month. High five, team ISDA.

Repudiation

New in the 2002 ISDA: repudiation of contract. Not actually breaching it, per se, but high-handedly saying that you are going to. In writing. Could you argue that by codifying that a repudiation must be in writing to count, in a counter-intuitive way this new clause dilutes the common law rules, rather than reinforcing them? A common law repudiation can, if clear enough, be oral, by conduct, body language, morse code, semaphore and so on,

So rather than empowering a Non-defaulting Party, the addition of a narrow definition of what counts as repudiation makes their avenue of redress that teeny bit narrower. Doubtful it has ever made a difference, but — well, they said that about LIBOR didn’t they.

Hierarchy of Events

Note that a normal Section 5(a)(ii)(1) Breach of Agreement that also amounts to a Section 5(b)(i) Illegality or a Section 5(b)(ii) Force Majeure Termination Event will, thanks to section 5(c), be treated as the latter, but a repudiatory Breach of Agreement under section 5(a)(ii)(2) willl not enjoy the same leniency. If you have repudiated your contract, the fact that there happens to be a concurrent Illegality — it is hard to see how a repudiatory breach could be an Illegality in itself — will not save you from the full enormity of section 5(a)(ii) Event of Default style close out.

Section 5(a)(iii)

Before you even put your hand up: no, a Credit Support Annex between the two counterparties is not a “Credit Support Document”, at least under the English law construct: there it is a “Transaction” under the ISDA Master Agreement that offsets the net mark-to-market value of all the other Transactions, so can’t be a Credit Support Document per se. It is different with a 1994 NY CSA — being a pledge document it is a Credit Support Document, but even there the Users’ Guide cautions against treating a direct swap counterparty as a “Credit Support Provider” — the Credit Support Provider is meant to be a third party: hence references to the party itself defaulting directly under a Credit Support Document.

Therefore, tediously — and we think it was avoiding precisely this tediosity that the Users’ Guide had in mind, but, best-laid plans and all that — there is an ontological difference between the mechanics of close out when it comes to a failure under a New York-law CSA when compared to non-payment under an English-law CSA.

A failure to meet a margin call under an English-law CSA or any of its modern English-law successors is therefore a Failure to Pay or Deliver under Section 5(a)(i) of the actual ISDA Master Agreement; a failure to post under a New York-law CSA is a Section 5(a)(iii) Credit Support Default.

Does this make any difference at all? It may do, if you have negotiated different grace periods under your CSA than those under your ISDA Master Agreement proper.

Now, before you ask why anyone would ever do that, firstly let us say that far stupider things than that happen every freaking day in the negotiation of global markets documentation, and secondly that, for example, grace periods for regulatory initial margin may well be standardised — and dealers may not have the capacity or appetite to negotiate them tightly, given the paper war they will be in in any case — so you can quite easily see 2002 ISDAs with very brief grace periods, and Initial Margin CSDs with longer ones. So won’t this be fun when it comes to closeout.

Section 5(a)(iv)

The purist’s objection is that, since a representation is a pre-contractual statement which induced the wronged party to enter the contract and (ergo) was not, and could not be, itself, a contractual term at all — its bolt was shot, so to speak, before “minds met” — and, as such, one’s remedy for misrepresentation ought to be to set aside the contract altogether (ab initio, as Latin lovers — well, my one, at any rate — would say) voiding it on grounds of no consensus, and not suing for damages for breach of something which, by your own argument, never made it into the cold hard light of legal reality. The JC is nothing if not a purist. We feel that, as written, this provision is a bit misconceived.

Giving our friends at ISDA the benefit of the doubt we think ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ means “breach of warranty”, and were really just being loose with terminology. There again, unlike other, more fundamental obligations, misrepresentation as an Event of Default has neither a materiality threshold nor the accommodation to the wrongdoer of a grace period or even a warning notice, so perhaps not. Anyway.

This is where that mystifying Section 3(d) representation comes in.

Section 5(a)(v)

The connoisseur’s negotiation oubliette.

Default Under Specified Transaction — colloquially, “DUST” — is often confused with Cross Default. In fact, they’re meant to be mutually exclusive. That won’t stop folks conflating them, though. Look, we all do it.

DUST is like Cross Default, but where Cross Default references indebtedness owed to third parties, DUST is all about non-“borrowing” style transactions — e.g., swap agreements, stock loans[3] and repos, but only transactions between the two counterparties.[4]

If a Counterparty[5] experiences an Event of Default under a swap agreement (or other “Specified Transaction[6] with you, this will be an Event of Default under the ISDA Master Agreement.

Changes from the 1992 Master Agreement

DUST overwent quite a makeover in the 2002 ISDA. For example:

Mini-closeout carveout: Defaults require the acceleration of just the Specified Transaction in question (for general defaults) but off all outstanding transactions under the relevant master agreement (for delivery defaults). This change was made with mini-close-out under repos and stock loans in mind — a concept which the stock loan market invented after the 1992 ISDA was published, so you can’t blame ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ for overlooking it at first — where delivery failures under are common and do not of themselves indicate weakness in the Defaulting Party’s creditworthiness.

Credit support failures covered: DUST under the 2002 ISDA can be triggered by default under a credit support arrangement relating to a Specified Transaction. These weren’t included for the 1992 ISDA DUST.

Shortened cure period: In tune with the general tightening up of cure periods — you know, we’re in a new millennium, computers work properly nowadays, and all that — the cure period for a failure to make a final or early termination payment on a Specified Transaction has been reduced from three days to one. This caused many a credit officer to sadly shake her head and refuse to move to the new agreement.

Repudiation evidence: Repudiation was modified to add the phrase “...or challenges the validity of ... after “... disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates or rejects ...” to reduce ambiguity as to whether a party’s action constitutes a repudiation. Also, we imagine, by way of stiffening the criteria for what counts as a repudiation, the 2002 requires written evidence that the repudiating party has an extended middle finger. This rules out being able to close out cornered hedge-fund managers, having been “brought to the negotiating table” by their fund’svproximity to a NAV trigger and who are not enjoying having their “feet held to the fire”, shouting “Well, bugger you, I shan’t pay, and let’s see how you like that” in the heat of the moment, when they really didn’t mean it, only to discover they had inadvertently repudiated a contract they were otherwise in perfect compliance with. Of course, no risk officer would dream of closing out an ISDA Master Agreement based on an intemperate oral communication, or the proverbial extended middle finger, for which she could not subsequently prove with fairly compelling evidence. But still.

Widened definition of Specified Transaction: The “Specified Transaction” concept has been broadened to include additional transaction types such as repos, and to include a catchall clause designed to include any future derivative products that have not been thought of yet.

Voltaire and DUST

In which ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ got bogged down in the weeds once in 1987, doubled down in their in-weed bogged-downness in 2002, and we’ve been dealing with resulting confusion ever since. A case of perfection being the enemy of good enough, as Voltaire would say, in the JC’s humble opinion, especially in these modern times where, thanks to compulsory daily zero-threshold variation margining, DUST is even more of a dead letter than it even was in the good old days. To our knowledge, no ISDA Master Agreement in history has been closed out using, exclusively, Section 5(a)(v).

That said, the 1992 ISDA version is a bit skew-wiff as regards mini-closeout, and you may find assiduous counterparties hungrily licking their lips at the prospect of a hearty negotiation about this bald man’s comb.

We are talking about other derivative-like transactions, between you and the same counterparty, where the counterparty presents a clear and present danger of blowing up, but where that behaviour has not yet manifested under the present ISDA Master Agreement, meaning you have no grounds to blow them up directly. So, you know, fairly implausible scenario, but still. You want to use the event arising under this other Specified Transaction to detonate the present ISDA. The squad breaks your ability to do so down in to four scenarios:

  • Counterparty fails to pay amounts falling due before maturity on a Specified Transaction, and you accelerate that transaction, but not necessarily others under the same master agreement. Here the principle is that any obligation to pay a sum of money on time is fundamental, of the essence and speaks indelibly to a merchant’s credit, whether or not one accelerates other related Specified Transactions (though, actually, walk me through the scenarios in which you wouldn’t, or even weren’t obliged to?)
  • Counterparty fails to pay amounts falling due at maturity on a Specified Transaction, so you can’t “accelerate” as such on that Specified Transaction, as it has matured, but you are still out of pocket and of a mind to press a big red button — though, again, curiously, only on this Specified Transaction and not the other outstanding transactions under the same master agreement, even though you could;
  • Counterparty fails to deliver assets due under a Specified Transaction, and as a result you accelerate the Specified Transaction (1992 ISDA) or all Specified Transactions under the affected master agreement (2002 ISDA — the 2002 version being designed to carve out things like mini close-out under a 2010 GMSLA as these are not credit-related;
  • Counterparty presents you an extended middle finger generally with regard to any obligation under any Specified Transaction, whether you accelerate it or not. Here if your counterparty is playing craziest dude in the room, it has committed a repudiatory breach thereby losing what moral high-ground it might otherwise stand on to expect you to follow form and protocol before closing it out.
Section 5(a)(vi)

Cross Default is intended to cover the unique risks associated with lending money to counterparties who have also borrowed heavily from other people.

Now, if — as starry-eyed young credit officers in the thrall of the moment are apt to — you apply this thinking to contractual relationships which aren’tterm loany” in nature — that is, that don’t have long spells where one party is deeply in the hole to the other, with not so much as interest payment due for months whose failure could trigger any acceleration — it will give you trouble. We go into this more in the premium JC.

Specified Indebtedness

Specified Indebtedness is generally any money borrowed from any third party (e.g. bank debt; deposits, loan facilities etc.). Some parties will try to widen this: do your best to resist the temptation. Again, more details on why in the premium section.

Threshold Amount

The Threshold Amount is a key feature of the Cross Default Event of Default in the ISDA Master Agreement. It is the level over which accumulated indebtedness defaults comprise an Event of Default. It is usually defined as a cash amount or a percentage of shareholder funds, or both, in which case — schoolboy error hazard alert — be careful to say whether it is the greater or lesser of the two.

Because of the snowball effect that a cross default clause can have on a party’s insolvency it should be big: like, life-threateningly big — because the consequences of triggering a Cross Default are dire, and it may create its own chain reaction beyond the ISDA itself. So expect to see, against a swap dealer, 2-3% of shareholder funds, or sums in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. For end users the number may well be a lot lower (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles like funds — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, will key off NAV, not shareholder funds.

Cross acceleration

For those noble, fearless and brave folk who think Cross Default is a bit gauche; a bit passé in these enlightened times of zero-threshold VM CSAs[7] but can’t quite persuade their credit department to abandon Cross Default altogether — a day I swear is coming, even if it is not yet here — one can quickly convert a dangerous Cross Default clause into a less nocuous (but still fairly nocuous, if you ask me — nocuous, and yet strangely pointless) cross acceleration clause — meaning your close-out right that is only available where the lender in question has actually accelerated its Specified Indebtedness, not just become able to accelerate it, with some fairly simple edits, which are discussed in tedious detail here.

Section 5(a)(vii)

The truncating the grace period from 30 days in the 1992 ISDA to 15 days in the 2002 ISDA has, in aggregate over the whole global market, kept many a negotiator in “meaningful” employment. It has also been a large reason why many organisations did not move to the 2002 ISDA and of those who eventually did — organisations whom you’d think would know better — then set about amending these grace periods back to the 1992 ISDA standard of 30 days or better still, insisted on sticking with the 1992 ISDA, but upgrading every part of it to the 2002 ISDA except for the Bankruptcy and Failure to Pay grace periods. A spectacular use of ostensibly limited resources, and an insight into whose benefit organisations really operate for.

Regional bankruptcy variations

The Germanic lands have peculiar ideas when it comes to bankruptcy — particularly as regards banks, so expect to see odd augmentations and tweaks to ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ standard language. Will these make any practical difference? Almost certainly not: it is hard to see any competent authority in Germany, Switzerland or Austria — storeyed nations all, in the long history of banking, after all — not understanding how to resolve a bank without blowing up its netting portfolio. Especially since Basel, where the netting regulations were formulated, is actually in Switzerland.

We have a whole page about Swiss Bankruptcy Language. True story.

The market standard “bankruptcy” definition

The ISDA bankruptcy definition is rarely a source of great controversy (except for the grace period, which gets negotiated only through custom amongst ISDA negotiators because, in its wisdom, ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ thought fit to halve it from 30 days to 15 in the 2002 ISDA.

So you have a sort of pas-de-deux between negotiators where they argue about it for a while before getting tired, being shouted at by their business people, and moving on to something more important to argue about, like Cross Default).[8]

Otherwise, the ISDA bankruptcy clause is a much loved and well-used market standard and you often see it being co-opted into other trading agreements precisely because everyone knows it and no one really argues about it.

1987 ISDA and Automatic Early Termination

Note, for students of history, Automatic Early Termination is (was, right? Oh, come on, guys —) problematic under the 1987 ISDA.

Section 5(a)(viii)

When a firm merges into, or is taken over by, another, some magical — or unexpected — things can happen. Not for nothing does the ISDA Master Agreement labour over the very description: that this might be a “consolidation, amalgamation, merger, transfer, reorganisation, reincorporation or reconstitution” — prolix even by the lofty standards of ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ — should tell you something. Generations of corporate lawyers have forged whole careers — some never leaving the confines of their law practices for forty or more years — out of the manifold ways one can put companies together and take them apart again.

Your correspondent is not one of those people and has little more to say about mergers, except that what happens to live contracts at the time of such chicanery will depend a lot on just how the companies and their assets are being joined together or torn assunder.

If the ISDA Master Agreement and its extant Transactions carry across — which, in a plain merger, they ought to — all well and good - though watch out for traps: what if both merging companies have ISDAs with the same counterparty, but on markedly different terms? Which prevails? Do they both? Which one do you use for new Transactions? This you will have to hammer out across the negotiating table.

But in some cases, Transactions might not carry across. Perhaps the resulting entity has no power to transact swaps. Perhaps it is in a jurisdiction in which they — or ISDA’s sainted close-out netting provisions, about which so many tears and so much blood is annually spilled — cannot be enforced. Perhaps the new entity just refuses to honour them.

Merger Without Assumption addresses all of these contingencies.

This is the clause that would have been covered by Section 5(a)(ii)(2) repudiation, had the resulting entity accepted the contract at all in the first place. It can be triggered if the resulting party repudiates any outstanding Transactions under the ISDA Master Agreement (or otherwise they are not binding on it); or any Credit Support Document stops working as a result of the merger.

Section 5(b)

Triggering formalities in Section 6(b)

The Termination Events themselves are crafted as absolute events, without the need for notices or actions on the part of the Transaction Counterparties to activate them.

But they do not go live automatically: they must be activated by the Non-affected Party.

The formal triggering process is set out in Section 6(b) and there is an amount of pre-trigger faffery (since not all of them will be apparent to a Non-affected Party, the Affected Party must give notice and then efforts must be made to fix or avoid them before there is any question of termination) before one gets onto the actual process, which is set out in Section 6(b)(iv).

Clause-by-clause

Section 5(b)(i) Illegality

An Illegality is a Section 5(b) Termination Event — being one of those irritating vicissitudes of life that are no-one’s fault but which mean things cannot go on, and not a Section 5(a) Event of Default, being those perfidious actions of one or other Party which bring matters to an end which, but for that behaviour, ought really to have been avoided.

Note also the impact of Illegality and Force Majeure on a party’s obligations to perform through another branch under Section 5(e), which in turn folds into the spectacular optional representation a party may make under 10(a) to state the blindingly obvious, namely that the law as to corporate legal personality is as is commonly understood by first-year law students. Who knows — maybe it is different in emerging markets and former Communist states?

For the silent great majority of swap entities for whom it is not, the curious proposition arises: what is the legal, and contractual, consequence of electing not to state the blindingly obvious? Does that mean it is deemed not to be true?

If the rules change, that is beyond your control, so it can’t be helped and hence Illegality is a Termination Event not an Event of Default. The 2002 ISDA develops the language of the 1992 ISDA to cater to insomniacs and paranoiacs but does not really add a great deal of substance.

An Illegality may only be triggered after exhausting the fallbacks and remedies specified in the ISDA Master Agreement.

Note the effect of section 6(b)(iv)(2) in the 2002 ISDA is to impose a Waiting Period of three Local Business Days before one can terminate for Illegality. There is no such waiting period in the 1992 ISDA.

The 2002 ISDA adds a Force Majeure termination event — Illegality is, of course, a sub-species of force majeure, so it is then obliged to artfully explain what happens when you have a Force Majeure that is also an Illegality. Section 5(c) (Hierarchy of Events) deals with this, providing that (i) Illegality trumps Force Majeure and (ii) Illegality and Force Majeure both trump the Failure to Pay and Breach of Agreement Events of Default. Given that Illegality is no longer subject to the “two Affected Parties” delay on termination (as it was in the 1992 ISDA), this is significant.

Since the 1992 ISDA is still in widespread use, especially in the New World, and Americans are not entirely blind to what goes on beyond their shores, they have seen the sense of the Force Majeure concept and often reverse engineer an equivalent Force Majeure provision into their 1992s via the Schedule (I know, I know: why not just use the 2002 ISDA?) If yours is like that, then all this hierarchy chat may be useful to you.

Section 5(b)(ii) Force Majeure (2002 only)

For the last word on force majeure, the JC’s ultimate force majeure clause is where it’s at. Breaking what must be a habit of a lifetime, somehow ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ managed to refrain from going crazy-ape bonkers with a definition of force majeure and instead, didn’t define it at all. In the 1992 ISDA they didn’t even include the concept.

Interlude: if you are in a hurry you can avoid this next bit.

I don’t know this, but I am going to hazard the confident hypothesis that what happened here was this:

ISDA’s crack drafting squad™, having convened its full counsel of war, fought so bloodily over the issue, over so long a period, that the great marble concourse on Mount Olympus was awash with the blood of slain legal eagles, littered with severed limbs, wings, discarded weapons, arcane references to regional variations of tidal waves, horse droppings from Valkyries etc., that there was barely a soul standing, and the only thing that prevented total final wipe-out was someone going, “ALL RIGHT, GOD DAMN IT. WE WON’T DEFINE WHAT WE MEAN BY FORCE MAJEURE AT ALL.”

There was then this quiet, eerie calm, when remaining combatants suddenly stopped; even those mortally wounded on the floor looked up, beatifically; a golden light bathed the whole atrium, choirs of angels sang and the chairperson said, “right, well that seems like a sensible, practical solution. What next then?”

“We thought we should rewrite the 2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions in machine code, your worship.”

“Excellent idea! Let’s stop faffing around with this force majeure nonsense and do that then!”

Ok back to normal.

Force Majeure in the 1992 ISDA

We may have said this before but, just because there isn’t a Force Majeure proper in the preprinted 1992 doesn’t mean people don’t borrow the concept from the 2002 — which has been around for, you know, 21 years now — and put it in anyway. One thing we can’t fathom is what possessed ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ to put it in at Section 5(b)(ii), rather than Section 5(b)(iv) just before the Additional Termination Event section, because for absolute shizzle anyone familiar with one version of the ISDA Master Agreement is going to get confused as hell if they start misunderstanding clause references in the other.

Act of state

Note the reference to “act of state”. Now a state, rather like a corporation, is a juridical being — a fiction of the law — with no res extensa as such. It exists on the rarefied non-material plane of jurisprudence. There are, thus, only a certain number of things that, without the agency of one if its employees, a state can do, and these involve enacting and repealing laws, promulgating and withdrawing regulations, signing treaties, entering contracts and, where is has waived its sovereign immunity, litigating their meaning.

Thus, a force majeure taking the shape of an act of state is, we humbly submit, a change in law which makes it impossible for one side or the other to perform its obligations. Compare, therefore, with Illegality.

Section 5(b)(ii)/(iii) Tax Event

Basically the gist is this: if the rules change after the Trade Date such that you have to gross up an Indemnifiable Tax would weren’t expecting to when you priced the trade, you have a right to get out of the trade, rather than having to ship the gross up for the remainder of the Transaction.

That said, this paragraph is a bastard to understand. Have a gander at the JC’s nutshell version (premium only, sorry) and you’ll see it is not such a bastard after all, then.

In the context of cleared swaps, you typically add a third limb, which is along the lines of:

(3) required to make a deduction from a payment under an Associated LCH Transaction where no corresponding gross up amount is required under the corresponding Transaction Payment under this Agreement.
Section 5(b)(iii)/(iv) Tax Event Upon Merger

This is you can imagine, a red letter day for ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ who quite outdid itself in the complicated permutations for how to terminate an ISDA Master Agreement should there be a Tax Event or a Tax Event Upon Merger. Things kick off in Section 6(b)(ii) and it really just gets better from there.

So, Tax Event Upon Merger considers the scenario where the coming together of two entites — we assume they hail from different jurisdictions or at least have different practical tax residences — has an unfortunate effect on the tax status of payments due by the merged entity under an existing Transaction.

It introduces a new and unique concept — the “Burdened Party”, being the one who gets slugged with the tax — and who may or may not be the “Affected Party” — in this case the one subject to the merger.

Section 5(b)(iv)/(v) Credit Event Upon Merger

Known among the cognoscenti as “CEUM”, the same way Tax Event Upon Merger is a “TEUM”. No idea how you pronounce it, but since ISDA ninjas communicate only in long, appended, multicoloured emails and never actually speak to each other, it doesn’t matter.

Pay attention to the interplay between this section and Section 7(a) (Transfer). You should not need to amend Section 7(a) (for example to require equivalence of credit quality of any transferee entity etc., because that is managed by CEUM.

Note also the interrelationship between CEUM and a Ratings Downgrade Additional Termination Event, should there be one. One can be forgiven for feeling a little ambivalent about CEUM because it is either caught by Ratings Downgrade or, if there is no requirement for a general Ratings Downgrade, insisting on CEUM seems a bit arbitrary (i.e. why do you care about a downgrade as a result of a merger, but not any other ratings downgrade?)

Section 5(b)(v)/(vi) Additional Termination Events

Additional Termination Events are the other termination events your Credit department has dreamt up for this specific counterparty, that didn’t occur to the framers of the ISDA Master Agreement — or, at any rate, weren’t sufficiently universal to warrant being included in the ISDA Master Agreement for all. While the standard Termination Events tend to be “non-fault” events which justify termination of the relationship on economic grounds, but not on terms necessarily punitive to the Affected Party, Additional Termination Events are more “credit-y”, more susceptible of moral outrage, and as such more closely resemble Events of Default than Termination Events.

Common ones include:

There is a — well, contrarian — school of thought that Additional Termination Events better serve the interests of the Ancient Guild of Contract Negotiators and the Worshipful Company of Credit Officers than they do the shareholders of the institutions for whom these artisans practise their craft, for in these days of zero-threshold CSAs, the real credit protections in the ISDA Master Agreement are the standard Events of Default (especially Failure to Pay or Deliver and Bankruptcy).

It’s a fair bet no-one in the organisation will have kept a record of how often you pulled NAV trigger. It may well be never.

“Ahh”, your credit officer will say, “but it gets the counterparty to the negotiating table”.

Hmmm.

Section 5(c)

Compared with its Byzantine equivalent in the 2002 ISDA the 1992 ISDA is a Spartan cause indeed: it is as if ISDA’s crack drafting squad™ assumed all ISDA users would be cold, rational economists who instinctively appreciate the difference between causation and correlation — or hadn’t considered the virtual certainty that they would not be — and therefore did not spell out that where your Event of Default is itself, and of itself, the Illegality, this hierarchy clause will intervene but it will not where your it simply is coincidental with one. I.e., if you were merrily defaulting under the ISDA Master Agreement anyway, and along came an Illegality impacting your ability to perform some other aspect of the Agreement, you can’t dodge the bullet.

In the 2002 ISDA the JC thinks he might have found a bona fide use for the awful legalism “and/or”. What to do if the same thing counts as an Illegality and/or a Force Majeure Event and an Event of Default and/or a Termination Event.

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  • The JC’s famous Nutshell summary of this clause
  • Events of Default vs. Termination Events showdown: why is there a difference between Events of Default and Termination Events, what is the difference, how will it affect me in practice, tell me more about this odd netherworld of Additional Termination Events, and is there a good way of describing both, or must I really stick with “an Event of Default or a Termination Event, as the case may be”?
  • Events of Default vs. Termination Events showdown: why is there a difference between Events of Default and Termination Events, what is the difference, how will it affect me in practice, tell me more about this odd netherworld of Additional Termination Events, and is there a good way of describing both, or must I really stick with “an Event of Default or a Termination Event, as the case may be”?
  • A looooong essay about the genealogy of Termination Events and Events of Defaults, why they are different, what they do, which ones matter, which ones are regrettable and the curious incident of the flawed asset clause in the night-time.
  • Section 5(e): the head office and the branch
  • Legal personality: the nature of head offices, branches and affiliates, and so on: a handy guide for when you can’t bring yourself to explain to the head of credit again why you don’t need a contract between two branches of the same entity.
  • How the hierarchy works between Illegalities, Force Majeure and Events of Default, should they all descend on your Counterparty at once, in the shape of the same event
  • Deferral of payments and deliveries during the Waiting Period
  • Waiting Periods generally

Template:Isda Tax Event premium

  • “Burdened” Party? Is that different from an Affected Party?
  • The unbearable vagueness of “materially weaker”
  • The perennial hedge fund complaint: come on, guys: I am never going to merge.

Template:Isda Additional Termination Events premium

  • On why we need a hierarchy clause between Events of Default and Termination Events in the first place
  • The Force Majeure Upgrade (for 1992 fans)
  • The Repudiation exception: what is that all about?

Template:Isda 5(d) premium

  • A deep and unnecessarily ontological enquiry into the difference between a branch and an affiliate, drawing on the metaphor of a body and a limb imagining a scenario with Pink Floyd’s lead guitarist to put it all into context.

See also

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References

  1. The line breaks are for comprehension and do not appear in the original
  2. I know, I know: the ISDA isn’t a financing document. This is like saying Cristal is not specifically a rappers’ drink. Because it might not technically be — but it is.
  3. I know these sound like borrowing transactions, but they’re fully collateralised, and in fact aren’t.
  4. And — sigh — their Credit Support Providers and Specified Entities.
  5. Or — sigh — its Credit Support Provider or Specified Entity
  6. This is typically wide, though it excludes borrowed money — but check the Agreement!
  7. Your correspondent is one of them; the author of that terrible FT book about derivatives is not.
  8. This, by the way, is an ISDA In-joke. In fact, Cross Default is pretty much pointless, a fact that every ISDA ninja and credit officer knows, but none will admit on the record. It is the love that dare not speak its name.